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Abstract 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has undertaken a program to lay the technical 
foundation for defining proactive actions so that future degradation of materials in light water reactors 
(LWRs) is limited and, thereby, does not diminish either the integrity of important LWR components or 
the safety of operating plants.  This technical letter report was prepared by staff at Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory in support of the NRC Proactive Management of Materials Degradation (PMMD) 
program and relies heavily on work that was completed by Dr. Joseph Muscara and documented in 
NUREG/CR-6923. This report concisely explains the basic principles of PMMD and its relationship to 
prognostics, provides a review of programs related to PMMD being conducted worldwide, and provides 
an assessment of the technical gaps in PMMD and prognostics that need to be addressed.  This technical 
letter report is timely because the majority of the U.S. reactor fleet is applying for license renewal, and 
many plants are also applying for increases in power rating.  Both of these changes could increase the 
likelihood of materials degradation and underline, therefore, the interest in proactive management in the 
future. 
 
 

 Executive Summary 
The response of the nuclear industry and regulators to issues of materials degradation in the past 
generally has been to develop and approve mitigation actions after the degradation has occurred.  These 
mitigation actions have involved increases and improvements in in-service inspection, changes in designs, 
materials, and operating conditions, and replacement of degraded components.  This reactive approach 
has maintained the safety of operating reactors but has proved to be an inefficient and expensive way of 
managing materials degradation issues for the industry. 
To address the issue of “reactive management of materials degradation”, the NRC has initiated a 
program to assess the potential to identify early the components that are potentially susceptible to future 
degradation, so that mitigation and/or monitoring and repair actions can be proactively developed, 
assessed, and implemented before the degradation process could adversely impact structural integrity or 
safety.  Two processes can be envisioned for the Proactive Management of Materials Degradation 
(PMMD) programs.  The processes are (a) implementation of actions to mitigate or eliminate the 
susceptibility to materials degradation, and (b) implementation of effective inspection, monitoring, and 
timely repair of degradation.  This study concentrated on an identification of components susceptible to 
future degradation and an assessment of the existing knowledge level for potential development of 
mitigation actions, that is, process (a) only.  The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory conducted the 
research to find and develop the PMMD information contained in this technical letter report.  This 
technical letter report concisely explains the basic principles of PMMD and its relationship to prognostics, 
provides a review of programs related to PMMD being conducted worldwide, and provides an assessment 
of the technical gaps in PMMD and prognostics that need to be addressed. 
Degradation and aging are terms used to describe both the deterioration and aging of components, but 
it is useful to distinguish between them.  Degradation is immediate or gradual deterioration of 
characteristics of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that could impair their ability to function 
within acceptance criteria.  Aging is a general process in which characteristics of an SSC gradually 
change with time or use.  When aging processes are known, they can be monitored through an appropriate 
aging management program and plant life management (PLiM) program and potentially mitigated. 
Aging degradation mechanisms are usually classified into two main categories, which are those that 
(1) affect the internal microstructure or chemical composition of the material and thereby change its 
intrinsic properties (thermal aging, creep, irradiation damage, etc.), and (2) impose physical damage on 
the component either by metal loss (corrosion, wear) or by cracking or deformation (stress-corrosion, 
deformation, cracking).  As can be seen above, the phenomenon of aging degradation in nuclear power 
plants (NPPs) is complex and thus requires sophisticated, state of science and technology procedures to 
effectively manage it and ensure safe, reliable operation.  It will be observed that not only technology is 
involved, but also an effective management system is needed in order to correctly implement mitigation 
or monitoring actions. 
In order to meet the objective of a proactive material degradation assessment and management 
program, it is necessary to understand stressors and assess various damage and damage accumulation 
rate/severity relationships for existing and potential degradation modes, materials, environments, and 
operating states for the different LWR components.  This assessment may be based on formulations for 
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the various stressor and damage-time relationships or more generally on the basis of operating and 
laboratory experience and engineering judgment. 
The past decade has seen major activities developing within both the nuclear and wider engineering 
communities to move from the use of periodic nondestructive testing to condition-based monitoring 
(CBM) and advanced life management with what has been called by various names, including structural 
health monitoring, material damage prognostics, and PMMD.  Where these approaches have been 
applied, they have been implemented with on-line methods developed for advanced monitoring and 
diagnostics.  As the economic value of CBM and other advanced monitoring approaches is being 
demonstrated, there is increasing interest in on-line monitoring and looking towards adopting prognostics, 
the prediction of the remaining safe or service life for both active components, such as pumps, as well as 
with its application to passive components, the basic structural materials. 
The economics of NPP life extension has been seen to change in recent years.  As a result there have 
been developing national and international activities to address PLiM for long-term operation (LTO), 
which may include plant modifications for power uprating.  The primary drivers have been the changes in 
the economic/business climate, as well as a need to provide energy to support sustainable development 
and, in many countries, provide carbon-free electric generation.  Various groups have been working to 
identify and address key issues in three broad areas: 
 technology 
 regulation 
 business. 
The pattern of activities that are developing to meet the needs of life extension for the global NPP 
fleet is complex, and in many cases there are many interconnections and overlapping relationships.  There 
are various international and multi-national activities which overlay national activities.  This report 
provides a review of the international and multi-national activities being conducted.  For the purposes of 
this technical letter report, the 2000 NEA report formed the starting point for the review that was 
performed. 
This report clearly illustrates that the implementation of PMMD programs will require significant 
basic and applied research.  To date, discussion has divided the identified technical gaps into categories:  
the technical gaps that need to be addressed by basic science, those technical gaps in engineering, and 
those that need to be addressed from a regulatory/codes and standards point of view.  The full scope of 
these needs is still being defined.  This report provides some examples of the technical gaps that need to 
be addressed. 
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 1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
There are approximately 440 operating nuclear power reactors in the current global fleet.  These are 
located in 30 countries and fall into six basic design types.  The two most common design types are 
pressurized water reactors (PWR) and boiling water reactors (BWR), which account for 265 and 94 of the 
operating reactors respectively.  All of the 104 commercial nuclear power reactors operating in the United 
States are either of the PWR or BWR design types.  The details of the locations of these reactors, their 
types, and power generating capacity are given in Appendix A.  The average age for this fleet of reactors 
is more than 20 years, and the initial licensing terms were typically 30 or 40 years.  The existing NPPs are 
now considered to be too valuable to scrap at the end of their initial licensing term.  The cost of building 
replacement generating capacity, and at the same time providing new plants that meet the growth in 
demand for electricity, would test the available technical, regulatory, and economic infrastructures.  It is 
therefore important to see where technology can help to better manage existing power plants, enable 
license extension for the existing fleet, and contribute to both new advanced light-water reactors (LWRs) 
and other advanced new designs with initial licensing term of 60 years, all within the limits set by 
performance of materials and operational requirements.  
In a number of countries, there are programs that are designed to enable operating license extension 
beyond 30 years, and in other countries, licensing is being extended from 40 to 60 years.  The United 
States has already established a process for plant assessment and license extension from 40 to 60 years, 
and it is expected that more than 90 percent of current plants will seek a license extension.  Some 
consideration is now being given to determine if it is feasible to extend operating lives further with 
“licensing beyond 60,” extending operation to 80 years and potentially longer.  Such activities require a 
new knowledgeable and streamlined regulatory framework to be established.  In addition, the new 
technical challenges need to be identified, and technologies and operational practices developed, tested, 
and deployed to detect, characterize, monitor, and manage materials degradation. 
All parts of an NPP are subject to the continuous time-dependent degradation of materials due to 
normal service conditions, which include normal operation and transient conditions; postulated accident 
and post-accident conditions are excluded.  These time-dependent degradation phenomena need to be 
considered for all parts of an NPP.  Such a plant is comprised of a number of broad classes of elements:  
concrete structures (e.g., containment), structural materials (e.g., pressure vessel and major piping), 
reactor internals (e.g., core internal framework, control rods and the fuel), machinery (e.g., pumps, and 
valves), and instrumentation and controls (including wiring, sensors and actuators, communication 
systems, and the control room).  These elements can be considered in various categories and are 
commonly divided into active and passive components.  The active components are those that exhibit 
motion under activation or motion as part of operation and include pumps, valves and rotating machinery.  
The passive components are those that are elements in the structure or part of the system that does not 
involve motion as part of its function, and examples include the concrete containment and support 
structures and many primary circuit elements, including the pressure vessel, the reactor vessel core 
internals, and the steam generator. 
1.1 
 The time-dependent degradation of materials in a NPP causes active and passive systems to lose, 
partially or totally, their design function.  If not managed, degradation is a problem for active 
components, for which the probability of malfunction increases with time, and for passive components, 
because their safety margin, in terms of material properties, can potentially be reduced. 
In ensuring fitness for service and appropriate safety margins, plant elements were designed to have a 
design life and initial quality and compliance that were assured through acceptance testing and then 
periodic inspections to ensure that a unit can be expected to remain in a safe operating condition until the 
next scheduled inspection.  Managing time-dependent degradation, particularly when life extension is 
considered, requires adopting practices that can detect and assess the effects of aging.  There are basically 
three methods used to assess the effects of degradation: 
 analysis of operating experience 
 expert opinion 
 probabilistic techniques for predicting, prioritizing, and determining the risk significance of 
degradation. 
The methods are complementary, and for the best assessment of degradation, they should all be 
combined.  The assessments need to include a review of original design basis concerning materials, 
stressors, environment, and operating conditions.  In addition, many operating U.S. NPPs have applied for 
and received approval for an uprate to operate at higher power levels, and the effect of such changes 
needs to be included in aging assessment.  Assessment of degradation problems should determine the 
components, systems, and structures susceptible to degradation whose failures could have a significant 
adverse effect on plant safety. 
In order to ensure safe long-term operation of NPPs, it is increasingly necessary to adopt new 
approaches and modify current operation and maintenance practices.  At the heart of the new approaches 
is proactive material degradation assessment (PMDA).  This moves degradation assessment and then its 
management from being reactive to being proactive – through understanding, monitoring, and managing 
materials degradation/aging processes and plant operational parameters to optimize life-cycle economics 
and still maintaining the highest levels of safety. 
The past decade has seen major activities developing within both the nuclear and wider engineering 
communities to move from the use of periodic nondestructive testing (NDT) to condition-based 
maintenance (CBM) and now advanced life management with what has been called by various names 
including “Structural Health Monitoring” and “Material Damage Prognostics.”  These approaches have 
seen the need for new operation and maintenance practices and the implementation of new forms of 
advanced monitoring and diagnostics, and there is increasing interest in the application of prognostics, the 
prediction of the remaining safe life or service life, for both active components, such as pumps, and 
passive components, the basic structural materials. 
1.2 Nuclear Power Plant Life Management 
The scope of global activities in this area has been reviewed in several places by both the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development–Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA).  Recent benchmarks are provided with the 
1.2 
 proceedings of the IAEA’s Nuclear Power Plant License Management Symposium, held in Budapest, 
Hungary, in 2002 (IAEA 2002b), and most recently in the papers presented at the IAEA’s 2nd 
International Symposium on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management in 2007 (Bond et al. 2008).  Related 
IAEA programs and activities include the Extra-budgetary Programmme on Safety Aspects of Long Term 
Operation of Water Moderated Reactors (SALTO).  This activity started in 2003 to assist Member States 
considering long-term operation of water-moderated reactors to reconcile related processes and practices, 
to establish a general long-term operation framework, and to provide a forum for exchange of related 
information (IAEA 2007a).  There are also a series of earlier IAEA TecDocs (IAEA 1992a) and IAEA-
supported regional and national technical cooperation programs (IAEA 2004a). 
There has also been a growing recognition that NPP condition assessment based on NDT at the time 
of fabrication, followed by intense inspections during outages, requires the adoption of conservative 
assumptions with regard to addressing detected indications and intervention.  With aging plants there is 
the risk of “surprises” at refueling outages, which can cause extended down time.  A recent study has 
concluded that current inspection intervals are too long and do not match rates of degradation growth, 
which adds support to the conclusion that PMMD (proactive management of materials degradation), 
including on-line monitoring, is needed for both current and new reactors (Anderson et al. 2008).  To 
address these issues, many countries have research programs to develop the basis for deploying on-line 
monitoring and condition-based maintenance that has the potential to increase operator situational 
awareness, enhance safety, and provide significant cost savings. 
There are significant opportunities to deploy new technologies when upgrades, including 
modernization of instrumentation and control systems, are implemented at existing NPP facilities.  The 
economic benefit from a predictive maintenance program can be demonstrated from a cost/benefit 
analysis.  An example is the program for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (Johnson and 
Maxwell 2002a, 2002b).  An analysis of the 104 U.S. legacy systems has indicated that the deployment of 
on-line monitoring and diagnostics has the potential for saving more than $1B per year when applied to 
all key active equipment (Bond et al. 2003; Bond et al. 2008).  On-line monitoring is now being deployed 
as part of new LWR plants, for example, by AREVA in the new reactor at Olkiluoto in Finland (AREVA 
2007).  New designs for advanced NPPs, such as those within the Generation (Gen) IV program, are 
considering materials to give an initial licensing life of 60 years; they will require longer intervals 
between refueling and scheduled outages (potentially four years) and also shorter outages.  Achieving the 
required performance for Gen IV reactors will require enhanced maintenance approaches, particularly for 
materials management involving PMMD, including the use of on-line monitoring and diagnostics, which 
become essential. 
To move to PMMD approaches requires transition from periodic inspection to on-line monitoring for 
condition-based maintenance, advanced diagnostics for passive structures, and eventually prognostics that 
will require advances in sensors; better understanding of what and how to measure within the plant; 
enhanced data interrogation, communication and integration; new predictive models for damage/aging 
evolution; system integration for real-world deployments; quantification of uncertainties in what are 
inherently ill-posed problems; and integration of enhanced condition-based maintenance/prognostics 
philosophies into life management for both legacy and new plant designs and operation and maintenance 
(O&M) approaches (Bond and Doctor 2007).  A recently published report presents a methodology that 
incorporates predictive models and damage assessment into improvements in the ASME Code Section XI 
(Gosselin et al. 2007).  This material is expected to be included in the next revision of the code to be 
published in the 2008 Addenda. 
1.3 
 Material studies to support new reactor designs have the potential to provide insights that can assist in 
better understanding of previously used materials and in developing PMMD/life-extension for legacy 
systems.  For new designs, materials are being required to meet more demanding initial design 
requirements.  New advanced gas reactors and Gen IV NPPs are expected to have longer initial design 
lives (60 years), operate with a high capacity factor (90%+) for longer fueling cycles (4–6 years), and 
have necessary inspections and maintenance performed on-line or during shorter outages.  One challenge 
is limited knowledge of material performance under the conditions expected in next-generation designs, 
including balance-of-plant and secondary units for process heat or hydrogen production.  Gen IV NPPs 
will operate at higher temperatures (potentially 510°C to 1000°C).  Operation in this temperature range 
brings to the forefront the potential for many new degradation processes that have not been experienced to 
date in current reactors and thus are not well understood or accounted for in the designs.  In the current 
LWR fleet, new degradation processes have appeared on average at a rate of one new degradation process 
every seven years (Wilkowski et al. 2002). 
Operators need information to better manage power-plant life holistically, adjusting operating 
conditions to reduce the impact of stressors.  Because periodic inspections, which typically occur during 
refueling outages, cannot be assumed to be adequate to help ensure fitness for service for critical safety 
systems and components or help ensure optimal plant life management for license extension with the 
current fleet and for new plants, developing the fundamental knowledge to support PMMD, new 
methodology for life management, and designing systems for on-line continuous monitoring becomes 
critical.  On-line monitoring and diagnostics is needed to provide operators with better plant situational 
awareness and reliable predictions of remaining service life of critical systems and components (Bond and 
Doctor 2007). 
In the United States there has been a long history of activities that addressed the issues of aging in the 
current fleet of NPPs.  Many of the earlier insights gained have been summarized in a 1992 report 
(Blahnik et al. 1992b).  There are also on-going activities and meetings that address water reactor 
safety/aging issues (NRC 1998a). 
The American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (Code) 
was developed for LWRs, and addresses fatigue as the dominant failure mechanism.  Thus, the present 
Code may not be adequate to support “licensing beyond 60” for current plants, and it is not adequate as 
written for Gen IV NPPs.  However, there are ASME code committees that are developing new 
requirements to include other degradation processes and Gen IV reactor designs.  The new materials, new 
degradation mechanisms, and the new operating environments and longer service life mean that flaw 
acceptance standards are unknown at this time, both for fabrication flaws and for service-induced flaws.  
Clearly, the ASME Code needs to be evolved to support further license extension and to lead Gen IV 
design, construction, and operation. 
Periodic inservice inspections may simply be inadequate to manage degradation because of this long 
service life, long intervals between refueling, and the correspondingly long intervals between inspections.  
One alternative would be to develop fully automated robotic nondestructive examination (NDE) and/or 
on-line monitoring inspection tools that could be deployed during operation so that inspections could be 
conducted based on degradation initiation times, degradation growth rates, and the effectiveness of the 
NDE being deployed.  Advanced nondestructive measurements might be developed to provide a means to 
monitor material properties so that as these changes occur during operation they could be detected, 
quantified, and trended.  Sensors could potentially be deployed at all key locations to monitor for the 
1.4 
 initiation and growth of degradation as well as for the key stressors/operational parameters that could be 
the precursors to degradation (Bond and Doctor 2007). 
For the current fleet of operating LWRs, the majority of component failures are the failure of active 
components that are not operating correctly when called upon to perform a given function, such as a valve 
not opening or closing on demand.  The failure of passive components is dominated by failures associated 
with service degradation.  The active components are managed with a maintenance program that is based 
on experience and not based on the known condition of the component and its need for preventive 
maintenance.  For the passive components, their degradation is managed through periodic inspections as 
dictated by the Federal Code of Regulations and the ASME Code.  Over the past few years, these 
inservice inspection programs have changed dramatically, using risk-based management.  Although there 
is management of risk from a safety standpoint, there are open issues that remain.  These include the 
potential risk of having surprise failures.  These surprises are related to the occurrence of new degradation 
mechanisms, including degradation mechanisms that are accelerated by stressor enhancement due to 
altered conditions or newly introduced acceleration mechanisms (e.g., corrosion due to accidental 
chloride introduction).  These may have a long initiation time, and the fact that only the risk-important 
components are being periodically inspected means that fewer components are being inspected, because 
most of the NPP risk is associated with a small percentage of plant components.  Another factor is the 
movement away from the original strategy of defense-in-depth where inservice inspection was to be used 
to detect the unexpected that had not been accounted for in design, selection of materials, fabrication 
processes employed, or the operating conditions (Bond et al. 2008).  These lessons need to be at the heart 
of PMMD that is needed for “licensing beyond 60.” 
Opportunities exist within the nuclear power community to take advantage of the activities and 
technologies that have emerged in other application areas, such as the aerospace community.  There has 
been a relatively long history of activities applied to jet engines and this expanded into wider 
investigations of issues that surround aging aircraft.(a)  A brief history of the role and future challenges of 
NDE in civil aviation, which also looked towards future challenges, was provided by Weber (Weber 
1995).  This community is currently moving from diagnostics and early applications of prognostics to 
integrated schemes for vehicle health monitoring and a vision of structural health management (Chang 
2003a).  Similar technology evolutions are in progress in many high-technology/high-risk fields, 
including defense and aero-space. 
For current-generation NPP aging and a move to PMMD, there needs to be consideration of the 
effects of aging on a diverse range of system elements: 
 Reactor internals 
 Structural materials 
 Machinery (pumps, valves, etc.) 
 Concrete structures 
                                                     
(a) A 1997 National Research Council report recommended that the Air Force adopt a three-pronged plan of action: 
(1) near-term action (3 to 5 years) to improve the maintenance and management of aging aircraft; (2) near-term 
R&D to support the near-term actions; and (3) long-term R&D.  The highest-priority research issues were 
technologies that would lead to reduced maintenance costs, improved force readiness (by prevention and/or 
control of corrosion) and NDE/NDI methods to detect stress corrosion cracking. 
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  Instrumentation & Controls (wiring, sensors, etc.) 
To maximize PMMD, there are needs to understand fundamental materials degradation phenomena 
and stressor interactions as well as a need for new on-line monitoring that can potentially support both 
advanced diagnostics and prognostic methodologies to support remaining life management. 
In the evolution from traditional NDT/NDE to advanced inservice inspection (ISI) and condition-
based maintenance to on-line monitoring and prognostics, new fundamental science can be expected to be 
needed.  Conventional NDT/NDE may not be sensitive to new forms of degradation, particularly to 
phenomena that relate to property change prior to formation of a “defect” such as a crack or other 
traditionally identified defect.  With the evolution of measurement science including the effects of 
improved inspection sensitivity, detection of benign “features” or indications is being found to occur, 
such as those indications due to inherent anomalies in materials (e.g., region of larger-than-average grain 
size).  PMMD, to be effective, needs to be advancing both the fundamental materials degradation science 
and the needed measurement sciences, both in the laboratory and for field deployment. 
1.3 Objective of Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment 
PMMD has the objective to identify materials and components where degradation may occur, both 
now and in the future.  In some cases, the degradation may involve phenomena not yet experienced in the 
operating fleet but where there is laboratory data and/or a mechanistic understanding that indicates that 
they may be pertinent to future reactor operations. 
PMMD is the methodology and actions needed to actively manage the NPP systems throughout the 
life cycle to minimize the impact of degradation, maintain safety, and potentially enable extensions to 
system operating life. 
1.4 Relationship Between PMMD and Prognostics 
PMMD is the emerging technical and methodological basis needed to support enhanced system 
management throughout its life, including life-extension for legacy NPPs.  These approaches involve 
“sensing” material property changes and parameter trends that are precursors to traditionally monitored 
degradation mechanisms and phenomena (e.g., crack growth) that are detected by conventional NDT 
technologies such as eddy current or ultrasound.  To be effective, PMMD needs to understand the 
phenomena of stressor-material interactions and sense early pre-cursor material property changes.  An 
example of the degradation phenomena could be radiation-induced void swelling.  PMMD also includes 
the impact of material degradation on the system or unit life-cycle. 
Prognostics can be defined as being a “forecast of future performance and/or condition.”  Prognostics 
(for active and passive components) is the prediction of a remaining safe or service life, based on an 
analysis of the system or materials condition, stressors, degradation phenomena, and operating conditions. 
In the context of materials degradation assessment, prognostics is the science enabling technology 
and methodologies needed to predict the remaining safe (service or licensable) life for a system or sub-
system.  Prognostic methodologies can be implemented in several ways, but in all cases, they seek to 
detect degradation phenomena by monitoring the driving stressors and using in most cases models to 
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 predict the degradation rate and hence extrapolate to give a prediction for the remaining life (or time at 
which intervention is required). 
Such methods therefore can form a key element within a PMMD program by adding a “predictive” 
element to the proactive activities through the understanding and quantification of the rate of material 
degradation and resultant impact on system safety/life.  Prognostic methods also have the ability to have a 
positive impact on Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), through the ability it gives to manage and 
schedule outages and maintenance activities (Bond et al. 2008). 
In understanding the relationship between PMMD and prognostics, it is helpful to understand some 
definitions within the prognostics lexicon: 
 Prognostics – The ability to reliably predict the remaining useful life of mechanical components, 
within an actionable time period, with acceptable confidence limits (NDIA 2006). 
 Prognostic Accuracy or Confidence Level – The accuracy in terms of difference between the future 
forecast of performance or condition and the actual future value achieved expressed as ± an amount 
or as a percentage of the forecast.  It may also be applied to the accuracy of the predicted time to 
failure, time to a given performance degradation point or percentage, or the remaining useful life. 
 Prognostic Horizon – The maximum time or related parameter (such as number of cycles, etc.) for 
which a given Prognostic Technique will achieve a set accuracy or confidence level.  For example, 
technique “A” may achieve a 90% prognostic accuracy with a horizon of 200 operating hours, or 
Prognostic Technique “B” may achieve a 75% prognostic accuracy with a prognostic horizon of three 
cycles/missions. 
 Prognostic Metrics – Those measures of performance of a prognostic technique or system that 
characterize the performance and predictive reliability of that technique or system for a specific 
application.  These metrics may include: 
– Demonstrated versus design prognostic accuracy/confidence level. 
– Demonstrated versus design prognostic horizon. 
– Demonstrated reliability of the prognostic system versus the system it monitors. 
– Applicability or robustness of the prognostic technique or system – how many other 
applications can the technique be applied to with commensurate accuracy, reliability, and 
horizon attributes. 
The quantification of the uncertainty within prognostic capabilities is central to the implementation of 
PMMD methodologies, particularly with regard to its integration with and impact on PRA. 
1.5 Organization of Report 
Section 1 – Provides background information that is necessary to understand the rationale for Proactive 
Materials Degradation 
Section 2 – Introduces the basic principles of PMMD and presents major conclusion from NUREG/CR-
6329 that are based upon the principles of PMMD 
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Section 3 – Provides a discussion of PMMD and prognostic programs currently being conducted 
nationally and internationally 
Section 4 – Provides a discussion of the technical gaps from the view point of basic science, engineering 
and regulatory needs 
Appendix A – Provides a list of nuclear power reactors in 2006-07 and uranium requirements from the 
U.S. and around the world 
Appendix B – Provides a copy of a draft report titled “Overview Program Plan for Cooperation on 
Proactive Materials Degradation Management (PMDM) Research.” 
 2.0 Basic Principles of PMMD:  Including Conclusions from 
NUREG/CR-6923 
Several unexpected materials degradation incidents have occurred in the recent past, such as Oconee 
vessel head penetration cracking, V.C. Summer hot leg cracking and Davis-Besse vessel head 
degradation.  In part as a result of the incidents, regulators and industry concluded that a proactive 
approach to materials degradation assessment and management was desirable.  The objective of the 
proactive approach included the following key elements: 
 Develop a foundation for appropriate actions to keep materials degradation from adversely impacting 
component integrity and safety and avoid safety significant surprises 
 Develop a path to PMMD following on from the extensive work on proactive materials degradation 
assessment (PMDA)  
 Integrate regulatory and industry approaches for the effective management of materials degradation. 
In developing the technical foundation and path for a proactive approach to materials degradation, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) developed NUREG/CR-
6923.  This document used expert elicitation to identify components susceptible to future degradation.  
This section of the report describes the basic principles of NUREG/CR-6923, the important 
conclusions from that report, and the scenarios that the data in NUREG/CR-6923 can provide valuable 
insights. 
2.1 Basic Principles of Proactive Management of Materials 
Degradation 
The difference between reactive and proactive approaches to the management of materials 
degradation is illustrated in Figure 2.1 (the figure is taken from NUREG/CR-6923).  In the reactive 
management scenario, there is limited time following the damage observation during which mitigation 
actions can be developed before an unacceptable degree of damage occurs.  This constraint may lead to 
the deployment of incomplete mitigation strategies.  The time constraint is considerably reduced in the 
proactive management scenario, with the increase in available time for mitigation development being a 
function of the incubation time before damage starts and the subsequent kinetics of damage accumulation. 
In order to meet the objective of a proactive material degradation assessment and management 
program, it is necessary to understand stressors and assess various damage and damage accumulation 
rate/severity relationships for existing and potential degradation modes, materials, environments, and 
operating states for the different LWR components.  This assessment may be based on formulations for 
the various stressor and damage-time relationships or more generally on the basis of operating and 
laboratory experience and engineering judgment. 
 
 
2.1 
 “D
am
ag
e”
Time
NDE Resolution Limit
“Now”
Reactive Proactive
actions
Structural Integrity Limit
 
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic Diagram Illustrating Degradation, or Damage, Development with Time, and the 
Differentiation between Reactive and Proactive Actions.  Note that the degradation process 
vs. time is rarely linear, as is often assumed  
 
The six principles of proactive management of materials degradation were deduced from Andresen 
et al. (2007) and are highlighted to emphasize their importance. 
 
 Princple 1:  Materials degradation has occurred in LWRs and will continue as long as LWRs are in 
operation.  The trend within the nuclear power industry is to operate plants for longer periods of time 
and at increased power levels.  The numbers of NPPs requesting power uprates(a) and successfully 
applying for license renewal are examples of the trend.  Material degradation (especially potential 
new modes of degradation) will likely increase as NPPs are operated for longer periods of time and at 
increased power levels.  The use of alternate materials or modified operating conditions may 
potentially counteract these factors but in general are not fully qualified and can address only a 
fraction of the degradation modes.  The technical reasons for these statements are outlined in detail in 
NUREG/CR 6923 (Andresen et al. 2007). 
 
 Principle 2:  The proactive management of materials degradation increases the available time for 
mitigation, which is defined as a function of the incubation time before significant damage starts and 
the subsequent kinetics of accumulating damage. 
 
 Principle 3:  Considering license renewal, power uprates, and the potential for “life beyond 60” years, 
addressing degradation in a reactive fashion has the potential to result in an unacceptable loss of 
safety margin.  Current reactive management of materials degradation limits the time window 
following the damage observation during which mitigation actions can be developed before an 
                                                     
(a) The NRC regulates the maximum power level at which a commercial nuclear power plant may operate.  With 
other data, this power level is used in many of the licensing analyses that demonstrate plant safety.  This power 
level is also included in the license and technical specifications for the plant.  The NRC controls any change to a 
license or technical specification, and the licensee may alter these documents only after NRC approves the 
licensee’s application for change.  The definition of power uprate is the process of increasing the maximum 
power level at which a commercial nuclear power plant may operate. 
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 unacceptable degree or level of damage is reached.  This constraint may lead to the deployment of 
incomplete mitigation strategies. 
 
 Principle 4:  Extended operation of a NPP requires the plant owner to address two major issues 
concerning degradation. 
 a. Developing effective aging management programs for known degradation as currently addressed 
in license renewal (NRC 2005a, b). 
 b. Developing a technically based program to understand the impact of stressors that can drive 
“damage” or material life utilization and then detect and mitigate both potential stressors and 
degradation that has not yet happened but has the potential to occur. 
 
 Principle 5:  PMMD programs should include degradation mode-component combinations with 
applied stressors where there was a high susceptibility to degradation based in large part on multiple 
observations in operating plants regardless of the knowledge level concerning degradation. 
 
 Principle 6:  PMMD programs should include degradation mode-component combinations where 
there was little or no evidence to date of degradation in the plants but where there was sufficient 
evidence from laboratory investigations to indicate that degradation in the plants might be expected in 
the future.  Andresen et al. (2007) identified specific degradation mode-component combinations 
where the knowledge level of the system interdependencies is low and additional proactive actions 
(such as research) may be warranted if PMMD by mitigation is desired. 
The overall approach to developing a proactive management program for materials degradation 
involves two steps.  The first is to identify the components of interest that might undergo future 
degradation as compiled in Andresen et al. (2007) (also sometimes referred to as proactive materials 
degradation assessment, PMDA).  The second step is to identify the technical gaps in NPP programs that 
detect, characterize, and monitor stressors resulting in degradation in all LWR components susceptible to 
future degradation.  The technical gaps may require dedicated research projects to address the identified 
technical deficiency (e.g., develop effective mitigation strategies, inservice inspection and on-line 
monitoring techniques, and repair procedures). 
2.2 Major Conclusions from NUREG/CR–6923 
The NRC undertook a program to lay the technical foundation for defining proactive actions so that 
future degradation of materials in LWRs is limited and, thereby, does not diminish either the integrity of 
important LWR components or the safety of operating plants. 
The objective of this study was to identify early the components that are potentially susceptible to 
future degradation, so that mitigation and/or monitoring and repair actions can be proactively developed, 
assessed, and implemented before the degradation process could adversely impact structural integrity or 
safety.  The initial study conducted under the NRC’s PMMD program was a study that focused on an 
identification of components susceptible to future degradation and an assessment of the existing 
knowledge level for potential development of mitigation actions.  The results of this study are provided in 
detail in NUREG/CR-6923. 
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 The major conclusions from NUREG/CR-6923 are provided below. 
2.2.1 Degradation Analysis 
With regard to the degradation analyses, the major conclusions are: 
 Degradation mode-component combinations where there was a high susceptibility to degradation, 
based in large part on multiple observations in operating plants.  It would be prudent to include these 
components in PMMD programs regardless of the knowledge level of degradation. 
 Degradation mode-component combinations where there was little (or no) evidence to date of 
degradation in the plants, but where there was sufficient evidence from laboratory investigations, for 
instance, to indicate that degradation at these locations in the plants might be expected in the future.  
It would also be prudent to consider these components for inclusion in PMDM programs.  In addition, 
cases are identified where the knowledge level of the system interdependencies is low and additional 
proactive actions (research) may be warranted if PMMD by mitigation is desired. 
The conclusions outlined above mark a departure from the reactive mode to managing materials 
degradation to a proactive mode of managing materials degradation and are listed as part of the basic 
principles of proactive materials degradation. 
2.2.2 Pressurized Water Reactor Coolant System under Full Power Operating 
Conditions 
The panel of material degradation experts that developed NUREG/CR-6923 provided two sets of 
conclusions for pressurized water reactor (PWR) reactor coolant system (RCS) components involving full 
power operation and non-steady state conditions such as reactor start-up, water chemistry transients, and 
extended plant lay-up.  The conclusions follow the conclusions listed in Section 2.2.1 of this report and 
the basic principles of PMMD. 
The following degradation modes have been observed in operating plants, and therefore, based on 
Principle 5 as stated in Section 2.1, “Basic Principles of Proactive Management of Materials 
Degradation,” components made for these materials should be considered “high susceptibility” in terms of 
degradation and included in a PMMD program. 
 Stress corrosion cracking of Alloy 82/182 dissimilar metal welds throughout the primary system and 
especially in the highest temperature components such as the pressurizer. 
 Stress corrosion cracking of Alloy 600MA and 600TT steam generator tubes and Alloy 600 forged 
components and, especially, cold worked or mechanically strained material such as steam generator 
tube expansion transitions, small radius U-bends, and the high-temperature components of the 
pressurizer. 
 Corrosion of low-alloy steel components in boric acid concentrate originating from primary water 
leaks, specifically in the annuli between the Alloy 600 penetrations and the low-alloy steel reactor 
vessel or pressurizer. 
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  Irradiation-induced creep and stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steels at more than 
0.5 dpa, (e.g., baffle bolts and other high-strength fasteners) and swelling in internals components that 
reach higher temperatures and much higher radiation doses.  
 Fatigue due to unanticipated vibration and thermal fluctuations, e.g., in socket welds (which occur 
throughout the RCS), primary circuit deadlegs, and baffle bolts after irradiation-induced relaxation of 
pre-stress. 
The following degradation modes follow Principle 6 as stated in Section 2.1 which states:  
 
Degradation mode-component combinations where there was little (or no) evidence to 
date of degradation in the plants, but where there was sufficient evidence from laboratory 
investigations, for instance, to indicate that degradation in the plants might be expected in 
the future.  It would also be prudent to consider these components for inclusion in 
PMMD programs. 
Components made of the materials listed below and exposed to the specified conditions may be 
susceptible to particular degradation modes and thus should also be included in a PMMD program. 
 Although Alloy 690TT has exhibited good resistance to stress corrosion cracking compared with 
Alloy 600 MA during more than 16 years of use in steam generator tubing, some panel members 
questioned its long-term resistance in other PWR primary water applications (e.g., pressure vessel 
penetrations).  The potential for this degradation increases when considering effects of cold work and 
the use of the alternate welding alloys (Alloys 52 and 152), which present welding challenges 
associated with, for example, lack of fusion and ductility dip cracking. 
 Stress corrosion cracking of severely mechanically strained stainless steels in PWR primary water, for 
example, weld shrinkage strains in heat-affected zones, pressurizer heater cladding, and cold-bent 
piping elbows.  
 Cyclic thermal loading in the primary circuit hot leg caused by the difference in temperature between 
primary coolant streams exiting the center and periphery of low-leakage cores which, despite 
turbulence, can persist up to the steam generator channel head.  While studies have shown that this 
cyclic loading does not produce significant thermal fatigue issues, the possible effect of ripple loading 
on other degradation mechanisms (such as stress corrosion cracking) could be a concern.  
 Secondary side degradation (e.g., stress corrosion cracking) of steam generator tubes by potentially 
corrosive species (e.g., lead and low-valency sulfur ions) not previously appreciated to be widespread 
in the secondary system and which may also affect “more resistant” tubing materials such as 
Alloy 690. 
 Potential degradation related to end of fuel cycle primary water chemistry, especially during cycle 
stretch-out, when the concentration of boron may be reduced below the minimum recommended 
value, thereby leading to possible localized corrosion due to excess LiOH in, for example, the boiling 
crevices in the pressurizer. 
 Accelerated environmental effects on fatigue of austenitic stainless steels and nickel alloys at low 
electrochemical corrosion potentials, as demonstrated in the laboratory and therefore anticipated to 
apply in the field. 
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  Less-than-anticipated fatigue resistance of some components due to the current uncertainty in the 
characterization of the cyclic loading conditions, particularly thermal loading, and the material 
response under those specific conditions. 
 Reduced fracture resistance and increased susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking of cast stainless 
steels (and perhaps ferrite-containing stainless steel cladding and welds) as a result of thermal aging. 
 Abusive grinding or machining during weld preparation or surface finishing and their adverse effects 
on stress corrosion and fatigue crack initiation. 
2.2.3 Boiling Water Reactor Coolant System under Full Power Operating 
Conditions 
The panel of material degradation experts that developed NUREG/CR-6923 provided two sets of 
conclusions for boiling water reactor (BWR) RCS components involving full-power operation and non-
steady state conditions such as reactor start-up, water chemistry transients, and extended plant lay-up.  
The conclusions follow the conclusions listed in Section 2.2.1 of this report and the basic principles of 
PMDM. 
The following degradation modes have been observed in operating plants and, therefore, based upon 
Principle 5 from Section 2.1, components made for these materials should be considered “high 
susceptibility” in terms of degradation and included in a PMMD program.  As in the PWR case discussed 
earlier, the listing given below is not in any order of priority. 
 Stress corrosion cracking of Alloy 82/182 weldments used in joints between ferritic and austenitic 
components (e.g., thermal sleeves, attachment pads) and particularly Alloy 182 under normal water 
chemistry (NWC) conditions.  
 Stress corrosion cracking of Type 304/316 stainless steel heat-affected zones (even under HWC 
conditions) at moderate fluences.  
 Fatigue of Type 304/316 stainless steel in steam dryers under NWC and HWC conditions.  This is 
probably design-specific, but as of now, is not quantified across the whole fleet. 
 Stress corrosion cracking of Alloy 600 components and heat-affected zones throughout the reactor 
coolant system, particularly under NWC conditions.  
 Stress corrosion cracking of Alloy X750 components throughout the reactor coolant system under 
both NWC and HWC conditions.  
 Fatigue due to unanticipated vibration and thermal fluctuations in socket welds throughout the reactor 
coolant system. 
The following degradation modes follow the Principle 6 from Section 2.1 which states:  
 
Degradation mode-component combinations where there was little (or no) evidence to 
date of degradation in the plants, but where there was sufficient evidence from laboratory 
investigations, for instance, to indicate that degradation in the plants might be expected in 
the future.  It would also be prudent to consider these components for inclusion in 
PMMD programs. 
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 Components made of the materials listed below and exposed to the specified conditions may be 
susceptible to particular degradation modes and, thus, should also be included in a PMMD program. 
 Cast stainless steel components (e.g., CF8M brackets and guide rods and CF3 control rod guides) 
may experience a reduction in fracture resistance as a result of thermal aging.  For the most part, 
however, the BWR RCS components operate at lower temperatures than PWR RCS components and, 
therefore, possible problems would be expected to become evident in PWRs earlier than in BWRs.  
Also, the possibility of stress corrosion cracking occurring in cast stainless steel components should 
not be dismissed without further investigation of the possible synergistic effect of thermal aging on 
the stress corrosion cracking degradation mode. 
 The long-term effects of HWC on stress corrosion cracking are not yet clear and it is also not clear 
that the low potentials needed for mitigation are in fact achieved at all the high-susceptibility 
locations.  The role of hydrogen in the stress corrosion cracking process of austenitic stainless steels 
is critical but is expected to be less than in high-strength nickel-base alloys.  The effect of hydrogen 
on fatigue and its interaction with ripple loading and dynamic strain aging was noted as a potential 
contributor to degradation under HWC conditions. 
 Several panel members suggested that additional fracture resistance tests are needed for all of the 
austenitic stainless steels and nickel-base alloys, particularly tests in environments simulating the full 
range of high-temperature service environments under both NWC and HWC conditions.  Type 308 
stainless steel weld metal is not as susceptible to thermal aging as cast austenitic stainless steel and 
therefore is also less susceptible to reduction of fracture resistance.  There could, however, be some 
adverse effect of wet steam environments on fracture resistance.  
 Accelerated environmental effects on fatigue of austenitic stainless steels and nickel alloys at low 
electrochemical corrosion potentials under HWC conditions.  These effects have been demonstrated 
in the laboratory and therefore are anticipated to apply in the field. 
 Stress corrosion cracking of severely cold-worked or mechanically strained stainless steels in BWR 
water; for example, weld shrinkage strains in heat affected zones, cold bent elbows.  
 Abusive grinding or machining during weld preparation or surface finishing and their adverse effects 
on stress corrosion and fatigue crack initiation. 
2.2.4 PWR Systems Other than the RCS under Full Power Operating 
Conditions 
The degradation experts that developed NUREG/CR-6923 concluded that PWR systems other than 
the RCS indicated, in general, a lower likelihood of degradation primarily because these systems operate 
at a lower temperature than the RCS.  However, as summarized below, the lower operating temperatures 
plus the existence of different degrees of water chemistry control, led to the identification of degradation 
modes that are favored under these different operating conditions. 
The following degradation modes have been observed in operating plants and, therefore, based upon 
Principle 5 from Section 2.1, components made from these materials should be considered “high 
susceptibility” in terms of degradation and included in a PMDM program.  
 Stress corrosion cracking of dissimilar metal Alloy 82/182 weldments in piping connected to the RCS 
cold leg of Combustion Engineering (CE) and Babcock & Wilcox (B&W) plants.  Such components 
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 operate at high temperature (291°C up to 345°C [556–653°F]) in primary water and are judged to 
have a high susceptibility to cracking.  Some of the dissimilar metal weldments in this system are of 
Type 308/309 stainless steel and were judged to be of much lower susceptibility. 
 The PWR Steam and Power Conversion Systems include the main steam, main feedwater, auxiliary 
feedwater, and steam generator blowdown subsystems.  These subsystems are fabricated primarily 
with carbon and low-alloy steel components that are exposed to steam, condensate, or demineralized 
water.  The degradation modes of high susceptibility are flow-accelerated corrosion and fatigue of 
low-carbon steel components, welds, and heat-affected zones. 
 The PWR Support and Auxiliary Systems include the Service Water, Chemical and Volume Control 
(CVCS), Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Spent Fuel Pool subsystems.  These subsystems are 
fabricated primarily with carbon steels, copper-base alloys, and stainless steels that are exposed to 
untreated and treated water or (for the CVCS lines) primary water, all at relatively low temperatures.  
The degradation modes, such as general corrosion, pitting, stress corrosion cracking, crevice 
corrosion, and microbiologically influenced fouling and corrosion, are recognized on the basis of 
extensive experience in the nuclear and other industries.  However, predicting their occurrence in 
advance is still uncertain.  Failures in these systems can have a significant impact on the functionality 
of RCS components.  (For instance, chloride contamination of the steam generator system can occur 
as a result of turbine condenser leakage, etc.)  The following high-susceptibility component-
degradation mode combinations (which are discussed in Section 3.2.4 of NUREG/CR-6923) have 
been observed in these PWR systems: 
– Microbiologically influenced corrosion of carbon steels in service and raw water and on external 
surfaces of buried piping, which may lead to localized corrosion and penetration of safety-
significant components due to pitting, fouling, and stress corrosion cracking. 
– Pitting and crevice corrosion of buried carbon steel piping and penetrations through concrete, and 
of Cu-Zn brass (as opposed to Cu-Ni alloy) heat exchanger tubing.  
– Fatigue of socket welds throughout the support systems, but especially in the CVCS system due 
to unanticipated flow-assisted vibration. 
– Stress corrosion cracking of Cu-Zn brass heat exchanger tubing used in the service pump water 
discharge piping. 
The following degradation modes follow the Principle 6 from Section 2.1 which states:  
 
Degradation mode-component combinations where there was little (or no) evidence to 
date of degradation in the plants, but where there was sufficient evidence from laboratory 
investigations, for instance, to indicate that degradation in the plants might be expected in 
the future.  It would also be prudent to consider these components for inclusion in 
PMMD programs. 
Components made of the materials listed below and exposed to the specified conditions may be 
susceptible to particular degradation modes and thus should also be included in a PMMD program. 
 Thermal fatigue in non-isolable deadlegs attached to the primary coolant circuit. 
 Fatigue of socket welds throughout the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) due to unanalyzed 
thermal stresses and flow-induced vibrations. 
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  Stress corrosion cracking of cast stainless steel components in, for example, the residual heat removal 
(RHR) pump suction piping. 
 Fatigue of austenitic stainless steels. 
 Possible reduction in fracture resistance of the constrained region adjacent to welds in stainless steels. 
 Stress corrosion of high-strength studs and bolts in the CVCS system. 
2.2.5 BWR Systems other than the RCS under Full Power Operating Conditions 
The degradation experts that developed NUREG/CR-6923 concluded that BWR systems other than 
the RCS indicated, in general, a lower likelihood of degradation primarily because these systems operate 
at a lower temperature than the RCS.  The experts also simplified the analysis of BWR systems by 
excluding the following five systems because they were considered to be no different than the 
corresponding PWR systems already discussed above:  containment isolation penetrations, spent fuel 
storage, spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup, service water, and component cooling water. 
For BWR systems other than the RCS, the following degradation modes have been observed in 
operating plants, and therefore, based upon Principle 5 from Section 2.1, components made for these 
materials should be considered “high susceptibility” in terms of degradation and included in a PMMD 
program. 
 The BWR Engineered Safety Features/Emergency Core Cooling System includes the low- and high-
pressure core spray lines, the condensate storage tank, and the RHR piping and subsystems.  The 
components with a high degree of susceptibility to degradation were far fewer than in the RCS, 
primarily because these predominantly carbon and low-alloy steel systems operate in condensate 
cooling water or suppression pool water at significantly lower temperatures (below 38°C [100°F]).  
The following component-degradation mode combinations were found to have a high or medium 
degree of susceptibility: 
– Carbon and low-alloy steel components and welds exposed to suppression pool water are 
susceptible to crevice corrosion, general corrosion (medium), pitting corrosion, stress corrosion 
cracking (medium), and microbiologically influenced corrosion (medium). 
– Depending on the degree of sensitization, Type 304/316 stainless steel weld heat-affected zones 
are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking in these systems where it is difficult to maintain HWC 
as a mitigation measure. 
– If they are wetted, carbon steel-to-brass joints in the drywell are susceptible to galvanic corrosion 
and crevice corrosion. 
 The BWR Steam and Power Conversion Systems include the main steam and feedwater lines, and 
the main condenser and its associated piping.  The components in these subsystem components are 
fabricated primarily from carbon and low-alloy steel, and are exposed to steam, condensate, or 
demineralized water.  The following component-degradation mode combinations were found to have 
high susceptibility: 
– Low-alloy steel bolts for the T-quencher/sparger above the suppression pool are susceptible to 
pitting corrosion and stress corrosion cracking or hydrogen embrittlement.  Such degradation has 
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 been observed and is exacerbated by the fact that the high-strength bolts are exposed to poor-
quality suppression pool water in conjunction with the use of a zinc primer coating. 
– The outside surfaces of titanium condenser tubes are susceptible to droplet erosion if directly 
exposed to incoming wet steam.  This is a design-specific problem that has been mitigated by 
fabricating the outrow of tubing (i.e., the row that takes the impact) from stainless steel. 
 The BWR Support and Auxiliary Systems are fabricated primarily of carbon steels and stainless 
steels and are exposed to a variety of environments ranging from wet steam at 286°C (547°F) to 
suppression pool water at less than 38°C (100°F).  The degradation modes, such as general corrosion, 
pitting, stress corrosion cracking, crevice corrosion and microbiologically influenced fouling and 
corrosion, are mostly understood on the basis of extensive experience in the nuclear and other 
industries.  As with the corresponding PWR system, however, failures in these systems can impair the 
functionality of other important systems or components. 
– Fatigue of carbon steel socket welds in 286°C (547°F) steam. 
– Crevice corrosion of ferritic valve components exposed to oxygenated suppression pool water 
with poor chemistry control. 
– Stress corrosion cracking adjacent to Type 304/316 stainless steel weldments in the reactor water 
clean up piping to pumps with water at 279°C (535°F) under NWC conditions. 
The following degradation modes follow the Principle 6 from Section 2.1 which states:  
 
Degradation mode-component combinations where there was little (or no) evidence to 
date of degradation in the plants, but where there was sufficient evidence from laboratory 
investigations, for instance, to indicate that degradation in the plants might be expected in 
the future.  It would also be prudent to consider these components for inclusion in 
PMMD programs. 
2.3 Generic Degradation Issues Addressed by the Database in 
NURG/CR-6923 
The data in the Appendices in NUREG/CR-6923 address the specific topics that were described in the 
NRC Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) User Need Request, “Materials Degradation,” dated 
January 12, 2004.  This user need in essence requested the following of RES: 
 Identify reactor components that could experience future degradation 
 Assess effectiveness of inservice inspection programs for degradation-susceptible components 
 Assess risk significance associated with the failure of susceptible components 
 Estimate the probability of failure of susceptible components.   
The objective of this section of this report is to describe specific questions that the data in the 
Appendices in NUREG/CR-6923 will be able to answer.  This objective is achieved by describing a series 
of scenarios based upon the topics above. 
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2.3.1 Identify Reactor Components that could Experience Future Degradation 
Scenario:  A degradation mechanism is found in a new unanticipated component or system 
Within this scenario, NRC and industry are faced with a situation where degradation has been found 
in a component or system where the degradation was not anticipated to occur.  An example of this 
scenario in recent history is the cracking that has occurred in Alloy 600 weld material PWR reactor 
coolant systems.  When faced with such a scenario, NRC needs to quickly answer the following 
questions. 
 Is there any database or data that indicates the degradation could have been anticipated? 
 What other systems and/or components in PWRs and BWRs have similar material and environmental 
conditions where degradation may occur? 
 What is known about the inspection reliability for this degradation mechanism for the components or 
systems where it has now been found? 
A fully functional PMMD database would enable NRC and industry users to more easily search a 
technical database and provide technical references that may be used by NRC and industry in managing 
the degradation.  
2.3.2 Assess Effectiveness of Inservice Inspection Programs for Degradation-
Susceptible Components 
Scenario:  A degradation mechanism is found in a component that has received regular inservice 
inspection 
Within this scenario, NRC and industry are faced with a situation where degradation has been found 
on components during an inservice inspection via visual observation even though the component was 
periodically examined using ultrasonic methods.  An example of this scenario in recent history is the 
detection of boric acid deposits at V.C. Summer.  When faced with such a scenario, NRC and industry 
need to quickly answer the following questions. 
 Could such an event be anticipated?  A corollary question would be – Is there any data (or expert 
opinion) that indicates what the effectiveness of inservice inspection for this component/degradation 
combination should be? 
 What is the estimated probability of detection (POD) for the affected component? 
2.3.3 Assess Risk Significance Associated with the Failure of Susceptible 
Components 
Scenario:  Same as above 
Within the same scenario described above, the NRC and industry need to quickly assess the risk 
significance of susceptible components. 

 3.0 Summary of PMMD and Prognostic Programs 
Currently Being Conducted 
The past 10–15 years have seen a growing awareness within the international community of the value 
of legacy NPPs.  Legacy plants can provide countries with much needed energy, beyond initial licensing 
life, and also make significant contributions to the management of greenhouse gas emissions.  Long-term 
life plans, including power uprate, I&C, and other key system modernization and replacements are all 
being included in life-cycle management as operators look to optimize the management of the life of 
NPPs, which are now viewed as very high-value economic assets.  Within the technical community that is 
considering aging and degradation, as well as optimization of plant operations, there has been a 
convergence between the various strands that combine in integrated approaches to optimized plant life 
management (PLiM).  
For new plants, initial licensing life now is being targeted at 60 years, and PliM has become a key 
part of the philosophical approach.  There has also been a growing recognition that nuclear plant 
condition assessment based on nondestructive testing (NDT) at the time of fabrication, followed by 
intense inspections during outages, requires the adoption of conservative assumptions with regard to 
addressing detected indications and intervention.  With aging plants, there is the risk of “surprises” at 
outages, which can cause extended down time.  A recent study (Anderson et al. 2008) has concluded that 
current inspection frequencies do not match rates of degradation growth, which adds support to the 
conclusion that new approaches, including on-line monitoring, are needed for both current and new 
reactors.  To address these issues, there is already a move to deploy on-line monitoring and condition-
based maintenance that has the potential to increase operator situational awareness, enhance safety, and 
provide significant cost savings.  
In the PLiM arena, numerous international, regional, and national programs and activities are being 
reported at both workshops and major meetings (PLiM 2007; SMiRT-19 2007).  The facility life 
management and extension activities are now seen as impacting all parts of the fuel facility and plant life 
cycle.  For example, insights into aging mechanisms and effects are being gained from samples taken 
from decommissioned plants (Johnson Jr. et al. 2001).  There is increasing interest in moving from 
inservice inspection to on-line monitoring.  The use of modern computer-based instrumentation has 
provided enhanced functionality and given opportunities for near-real time data capture and analysis.  The 
move to upgrade I&C systems, moving from analog to digital systems, provides opportunities to deploy 
enhanced functionality.  In a number of countries, the needs for revised regulatory frameworks are being 
considered and in some cases new approaches developed. 
For NPPs, the operations and maintenance (O&M) costs are estimated for various plants and 
countries at between 40 and 70% of the overall generating cost.  In the United States, O&M is at the 
higher end of the range (~60–70%), and fuel costs are at about 15–30%.  Of the O&M costs (in the United 
States), about 80% are related to the costs of labor.  In both Europe and North America, the situation is 
complicated further by the problem of an aging workforce and a limited supply of replacements (Wogman 
et al. 2005).  In the rapidly growing Asian economies and developing countries, there are also challenges 
in meeting the skilled workforce needs, particularly as new nuclear plants are built (Amin 2004; IAEA 
2004b).  
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 An underlying theme of proactive materials degradation assessment is emerging, although it is still 
being called by a variety of names.  It is seen to be at the heart of PliM and applies to both legacy and 
new LWRs.  There is a trend to move from being reactive, based on assessments used for condition-based 
maintenance (CBM), with action taken after detection of some effect through CBM monitoring or ISI, to 
becoming proactive.  Such a fundamental change in PLiM, including PMMD, requires identification and 
understanding of the effects of stressors on systems and the resulting effects, new or at least adapted 
material degradation models, new measurement technologies, remaining-life prediction (prognostics), 
with management of risk and quantification of uncertainty.  All of the new approaches to PMMD and 
PLiM need to be considered in the context of probabilistic risk assessment, applied to the system and 
specifically to stressors and the resulting materials degradation.  The focus of all the activities is to give 
enhanced situational awareness, early detection of degradation, and the necessary understanding to be 
able to reliably predict material behavior, to maintain both safe and economic plant operation.  PMMD is 
therefore one of the key “planks” needed to build the conceptual framework and to convert advanced 
PliM, or activities which are alternately named PMDM, to practice. 
3.1 Diagnostics and Prognostics:  State of the Art and Potential 
The past decade has seen major activities developing within both the nuclear and wider engineering 
communities to move from the use of periodic NDT to CBM and advanced life management with what 
has been called by various names, including structural health monitoring, material damage prognostics, 
and PMDA/PMMD.  Where these approaches have been applied, they have been implemented with on-
line methods developed for advanced monitoring and diagnostics.  As the economic value of CBM and 
other advanced monitoring approaches is being demonstrated, there is increasing interest in prognostics, 
the prediction of the remaining safe or service life for both active components, such as pumps, and 
passive components, the basic structural materials. 
3.1.1 Diagnostics 
It was recognized in the mid-1970s that NDT needed to become a quantitative science-based 
technology.  Research was initiated and, as a result, nondestructive evaluation (NDE) was developed 
(Thompson and Chimenti 1980-2007).  Many of the measurement capabilities for NDT/NDE were 
identified as set by fundamental physics (Bond 1988).  It was also recognized that different levels of 
performance can be achieved in the laboratory, on production parts, and in service.  An example of these 
performance differences using traditional NDT technologies is shown with Table 3.1 (Bond 1988).  
Recent years have seen the development of better understanding of the NDT/NDE measurement 
processes and quantification of performance in terms of a POD rather than a size for an ultimate detection 
limit.  The operator or inspector is also recognized as a key element in the inspection system, and not all 
operators perform to the same level.  This issue is best illustrated with data from trials, such as the USAF 
Engine Structural Integrity Program (ENSIP) trials, where performance data are shown in Table 3.2 
(Bond 1988).  The top 10% of inspectors perform at exceptional levels.  The median inspector does not 
achieve similar sensitivity.  In part to address performance reliability for ISI, there has been a move to 
automation.  The best automated systems can give repeatability, although they usually do not achieve the 
ultimate sensitivity/detection limits achieved by the best inspectors. 
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 Table 3.1.  Estimated Variations in Flaw Detection Limits by Type of Inspection (in mm) 
 
Surface Cracks Internal Flaws 
NDT Technique Processing Fatigue Voids Cracks 
Test specimens, laboratory inspection 
Visual† 1.25 0.75 + + 
Ultrasonic 0.12 0.12 0.35 2.0 
Magnetic Particle 0.75 0.75 7.5 7.5 
Penetrant 0.25 0.5 + + 
Radiography 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.75 
Eddy Current 0.25 0.25 + + 
Production parts, production inspection 
Visual 2.5 6.0 + + 
Ultrasonic 3.0 3.0 5.0 3.0 
Magnetic Particle 2.5 4.0 + + 
Penetrant 1.5 1.5 + + 
Radiography 5.0 * 1.25 * 
Eddy Current 2.5 5.0 + + 
Cleaned structures, service inspection 
Visual 6.0 12.0 + + 
Ultrasonic 5.0 5.0 4.0 5.0 
Magnetic Particle 6.0 10.0 + + 
Penetrant 1.25 1.25 + + 
Radiography 12.0 * 4.0 * 
Eddy Current 5.0 6.0 + + 
+ Not applicable 
† Use with magnifier 
*Not possible for tight cracks (based on 25-mm ferritic steel, surface 63 RMS) 
 
 
Table 3.2.  Performance of “Best” and Median NDT Operators (from ENSIP) 
 
 Average Best mm 
Magnetic Inspection POD 60% – 0.300 in. crack 65% – 0.25 in. 6.35 
Penetrant Inspection 90% – 0.220 in. crack 90% – 0.175 in. 4.45 
Eddy Current 90% – 0.090 in. crack 90% – 0.030 in. 0.76 
Ultrasonic 80% – 0.375 in. crack 90% – 0.180 in. 4.57 
Average results obtained from majority of technicians. 
Best results obtained from top 10% technicians. 
 
The advances in monitoring technologies developed in other industries can potentially benefit both 
legacy and new NPPs, particularly when using advanced on-line monitoring and diagnostics for 
condition-based maintenance and, in the future, prognostics.  Digital I&C and advanced diagnostics and 
prognostics are being developed in the wider high-technology industry communities and are now being 
considered for NPP deployment.  There is a convergence between material damage prognostics (Larson 
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 et al. 2005); the civil engineering damage and damage evolution models under multiple stressors; the 
traditional “vibration” monitoring community looking toward new challenges in systems used by the 
defense community (Pusey et al. 2005); technology to achieve total structural health management (Chang 
2003b); and the NDE community looking at aging due to thermal embrittlement, fatigue, and neutron 
degradation (Dobmann 2006). 
There has also been development of new approaches to the management of life in mechanical systems 
(Roos et al. 2006) and research into characterization of materials in aging systems, particularly looking at 
early-degradation phenomena that occur before the “traditional” defects (such as cracks) that are detected 
by conventional NDT develop to detectable sizes (Crane et al. 1998).  The trend of seeking to move from 
periodic NDE to on-line condition-based maintenance started several years ago in other industries (Bond 
1999).  A review of the current paradigms and practices in system health monitoring and prognostics has 
recently been provided by Kothamasu et al. (2006).  
There remain significant measurement challenges associated with characterization of aging in 
irradiated reactor components (Doctor 1988; Dobmann 2006).  An example of one major series of 
activities moving from NDE to characterization of aging and degradation is found in the work of 
Dobmann and colleagues.  In their early papers, they reported using ultrasonic and micromagnetic 
techniques to measure strength and toughness and detect early damage (Dobmann et al. 1992).  This 
evolved into work to address the demand for describing damage and service-related aging (Dobmann 
et al. 1997).  This work further evolved into a significant European project involving round-robin sample 
characterization (Dobmann et al. 2001) and bringing together condition-dependent NDT and fracture 
mechanics (Schmitz et al. 2001).  An increasingly diverse range of NDT/NDE tools is being considered in 
both laboratory and field studies (Crane et al. 1998; Dobmann 2006) for aging phenomena 
characterization, as shown with new applications of magnetic methods (Dobmann 2006).  Techniques 
such as ultrasonic backscatter and acoustic birefringence are being investigated as possible tools for in-
service monitoring.  The development of concepts for advanced on-line structural health monitoring for 
next-generation reactor designs, such as IRIS, has been initiated (Nakagawa et al. 2006). 
All U.S. pressurized water reactors that have been granted an operating license extension beyond the 
original 40 years.  In completing the U.S. license renewal process, these plants have identified 
degradation processes, such as void swelling, that do not currently have approved in-service inspection 
technology that enables detecting, monitoring, or trending the degradation mechanism.  In each case, the 
plant has performed an evaluation that demonstrates the degradation is not an eminent threat and has 
made commitments to the regulator for developing programs that will manage these degradation 
processes.  However, the details of these programs are unknown at this time because the technology is 
still under development. 
To address these challenges, a convergence is developing that is bringing together the capabilities in 
the materials science and NDE communities.  This convergence is illustrated with Figure 3.1.  A 
particular challenge is faced in taking characterization capabilities, which can be performed with tools 
such as an SEM or spectroscopic technique, into a service environment, particularly to achieve the 
sensitivity and resolution that seem to be needed. 
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Figure 3.1.  Convergence and Relationship Between NDE and Materials Science 
3.1.2 Prognostics 
Prognostics (for machinery) is the prediction of a remaining safe or service life, based on an analysis 
of system or material condition, stressors, and degradation phenomena.  Moving from diagnostics based 
on observed data to prediction of life and technologies for structural health monitoring/management based 
on predicted behavior is requiring development of new approaches.  The range of developing approaches 
is illustrated in schematic form in Figure 3.2.  The various empirical methods for process and equipment 
prognostics have been reviewed by Hines (2008).  An extensive review of machinery diagnostics and 
prognostics for condition-based maintenance is provided by Jardine et al. (2006) but does not consider 
nuclear power systems. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Range of Prognostic Approaches 
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 An assessment of the state of diagnostics and prognostics technology maturity was recently provided 
by Howard (2005).  The current status for various system elements, including both active and passive 
structures, is shown in Table 3.3. 
Technologies are being developed for non-nuclear applications, including instrumentation and system 
health monitoring for electronics, in what is being called “electronics prognostics”; for example, see 
Urmanov (2007).  Integrated technologies also are being developed for advanced fighter aircraft and 
unmanned aerial vehicle system health monitoring, which include both electrical/electronic and 
mechanical systems.  Within the field of advanced diagnostics/prognostics, systems have been deployed 
for individual elements, but fully integrated systems are still being developed. 
 
 
Table 3.3. Assessment of State of Maturity for Diagnostic (D) and Prognostic (P) Technologies 
(Howard 2005) 
 
Diagnostic/Prognostic Technology for: AP(a) A(b) I(c) NO(d) 
Basic Machinery (motors, pumps, generators, etc.) D  P  
Complex Machinery (helicopter gearboxes, etc.)  D P  
Metal Structures D  P  
Composite Structures   D&P  
Electronic Power Supplies (low power)  D P  
Avionics and Controls Electronics D  P  
Medium Power Electronics (radar, etc.)  D  P 
High Power Electronics (electric propulsion, etc.)    D&P 
(a) AP = Technology currently available and proven effective. 
(b) A = Technology currently available, but V&V not completed. 
(c) I = Technology in process, but not completely ready for V&V. 
(d) NO = No significant technology development in place. 
 
For the existing NPPs, particularly when life extension is being developed, there are opportunities to 
deploy on-line monitoring/prognostics, assuming it can be demonstrated that there is still remaining 
useful life in the plant.  Key to developing more advanced prognostic schemes (in active systems such as 
pumps and valves) that give maximum warning of degradation is to focus on monitoring the stressor 
rather than just the subsequent effects of aging and degradation.  A schematic showing system operational 
performance and stressor magnitude is given as Figure 3.3 (Jarrell et al. 2004; Bond et al. 2008).  
Researchers found (Jarrell et al. 2004; Bond et al. 2008) that monitoring of the stressor (e.g., a 
temperature, cavitation, vibration, or a pressure), combined with active system control parameter 
management across several processors, enables the use of the “warning time” (ΔT in Figure 3.3) to adjust 
operational parameters and limit or at least control rates of degradation for a path to failure.  For this type 
of strategy to be successful, good physics-based models relating the stressors to the rate of aging or 
degradation must be developed in the prognostic scheme. 
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Figure 3.3. Stressor Measurement Giving Time for Intervention Prior to Failure (Jarrell et al. 2004; 
Bond et al. 2008) 
To move from periodic inspection to on-line monitoring for condition-based maintenance and 
eventually prognostics will require advances in sensors; better understanding of what and how to measure 
within the plant; enhanced data interrogation, communication, and integration; new predictive models for 
damage/aging evolution; system integration for real-world deployments; quantification of uncertainties in 
what are inherently ill-posed problems; and integration of enhanced condition-based maintenance/ 
prognostics philosophies into new plant designs, operation, and operating and maintenance approaches. 
3.1.3 Lessons from U.S. License Extension Activities 
A 2006 report prepared by the Chockie Group International (CGI) (Gregor and Chockie 2006) 
provides an overview of U.S. aging management and life extension programs and regulations within the 
U.S. commercial nuclear power industry and their possible applicability to the petroleum industry in 
Norway.  It was prepared as part of the project for the Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) Norway, Design 
Life Extension Regulations (PSA Project Reference Number:  NO 99B16).  Associated with the 2006 
report are two companion briefing reports that provide focused examinations of two important aspects of 
life extension requirements.  These are Performance Monitoring of Systems and Active Components (CGI 
Report 06.21)—an examination of the Maintenance Rule requirements for effective maintenance 
programs—and Condition Monitoring of Passive Structures and Components (CGI Report 06.22)—a 
review of the License Renewal Rule requirements and process for aging management of passive and long-
lived structures and components.  Three important principles associated with aging management are 
identified.  These are 
 maintaining the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in “as new” condition, with no reduction 
in performance or safety margins 
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  preventing failures of critical SSCs 
 understanding and managing the age-related degradation mechanisms. 
In the late 1970s, the NRC and the nuclear industry began to address the issues concerning life 
extension.  The first initiatives were directed at determining whether or not the safe operation of the plant 
beyond its 40-year licensing limit could be technically justified.  That is, could the aging effects be 
adequately managed so the plant could be operated within the original safety margins during the period of 
extended operation? 
To answer this question, both the NRC and the industry initiated a number of aging research 
programs.  One of the largest aging research efforts was the Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) 
program.  This 10-year, multi-million dollar effort was sponsored by the NRC and produced over 
150 aging research reports.  Other aging research programs by the industry complemented the work of the 
NPAR program. 
Based on the results of these programs, it was concluded that many aging phenomena are readily 
manageable and do not pose technical issues that would preclude life extension for NPPs.  As long as 
there are effective inspection and maintenance practices, the plant life is limited simply by the economic 
cost of repair or replacement of any components that do not meet specified acceptance criteria.  Many of 
the earlier insights gained have been summarized in a 1992 report (Blahnik et al. 1992a).  In addition, 
ongoing activities and meetings address water reactor safety/aging issues (NRC 1998b).  Specific studies 
have considered topics such as aging of pressure sensors (Hashemian et al. 1989; Hashemian 1993) and 
process instrumentation (Hashemian 1995). 
The NRC then moved forward with the development of license renewal requirements and published 
the initial License Renewal Rule in 1991.  For over 15 years, the NRC and the nuclear industry have been 
continuously refining both the license renewal requirements and the renewal process.  The resulting 
revised rule established a simpler, more stable, and more predictable regulatory process.  The key changes 
that were made included 
 focusing on the adverse effects of aging rather than identification of all aging mechanisms such that 
identification of individual aging mechanisms is not required 
 simplifying the integrated plant assessment process and making it consistent with the revised focus on 
the detrimental effects of aging 
 adding an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses 
 requiring only passive, long-lived structures and components to be subject to an aging management 
review for license renewal, thus removing active SSCs from license renewal. 
In the current light-water reactor fleet, new degradation processes have appeared on average at a rate 
of one every seven years (Wilkowski et al. 2002).  Operators have been shown to need information to 
better manage power-plant life holistically, adjusting operating conditions to reduce the impact of 
stressors.  Recently, a report (Anderson et al. 2008) has been developed that indicates that periodic 
inspections, which typically occur during refueling outages, may not be assumed to be adequate to help 
ensure fitness for service for critical safety systems and components or help ensure optimal plant life 
management, developing methodology and designing systems for on-line continuous monitoring becomes 
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 critical.  It is needed to provide operators with better plant situational awareness and reliable predictions 
of remaining service life of critical systems and components. 
For the current fleet of operating light-water reactors, the majority of component failures are the 
failure of active components not operating correctly when called upon to perform a given function, such 
as a valve not opening or closing on demand.  The failure of passive components is dominated by failures 
associated with service degradation.  The active components are managed with a maintenance program 
that is based on experience and not based on the known condition of the component and its need for 
preventive maintenance. Degradation of passive components is managed through periodic inspections as 
dictated by the ASME Code.  Over the past few years, these inservice inspection programs have changed 
dramatically using risk-based management.  
Although there is management of risk from a safety standpoint, open issues remain.  These include 
the potential risk of having surprise failures.  These surprises are related to the occurrence of new 
degradation mechanisms, including degradation mechanisms that are accelerated by stressor enhancement 
due to altered conditions or newly introduced acceleration mechanisms (e.g., corrosion due to accidental 
chloride introduction).  These have a long initiation time, and the fact that only the risk-important 
components are being inspected periodically means that fewer components are being inspected because 
most of the NPP risk is associated with a small percentage of plant components.  Another factor is the 
movement away from the original strategy of defense-in-depth where inservice inspection was to be used 
to detect the unexpected that had not been accounted for in design, selection of materials, fabrication 
processes employed, or the operating conditions.  How will these lessons learned be addressed in both 
new-build water reactors and advanced designs under consideration for Gen IV NPPs? 
An important aspect of the U.S. nuclear plant life extension requirements is the distinction between 
passive and active systems, structures, and components.  Passive SSCs are those that do not move to 
function (such as structures, heat exchangers, cables, valve and pump bodies, and piping).  Their age-
related degradation can be monitored and trended only by performing periodic condition assessments 
(such as inspections, testing, and measurements).  By focusing the license renewal process on safety-
critical passive and long-lived components, the process has been reduced to manageable proportions—
licensees are not required to consider all SSCs to justify extended operations.  A diagram of the 
relationship of the License Renewal and Maintenance Rules to the aging management of active and 
passive SSCs is shown in Figure 3.4 (Gregor and Chockie 2006). 
During the renewal process, the licensee must confirm whether the original design assumptions will 
continue to be valid throughout the period of extended operation or whether aging effects will be 
adequately managed.  The licensee must demonstrate that the effects of aging will be managed in such a 
way that the intended functions of passive or long-lived structures and components will be maintained 
during extended operation. 
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Figure 3.4.  Relationship of Maintenance and License Renewal Rules 
(from Gregor and Chockie 2006) 
New advanced gas reactors and Generation IV NPPs are expected to operate with high capacity factor 
(90%+) for longer fueling cycles (4–6 years) and have necessary inspections and maintenance performed 
during shorter outages.  One challenge is limited knowledge of material performance for next-generation 
designs, including balance of plant and secondary units for process heat or hydrogen production.  Gen IV 
NPPs will operate at higher temperatures (potentially 510°C to 1000°C).  Operation in this temperature 
range brings to the forefront the potential for many new degradation processes that have not been 
experienced in current reactors and thus are not well understood or accounted for in the design. 
3.2 International Programs 
The economics of NPP life extension has changed in recent years.  As a result, national and 
international activities have been developing to address PLiM for long-term operation (LTO), which may 
include plant modifications for power up-rating.  The primary drivers have been the changes in the 
economic and business climate as well as a need to provide energy to support sustainable development 
and, in many countries, provide carbon-free electricity generation.  Various groups have been working to 
identify and address key issues in three broad areas: 
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  technology 
 regulation 
 business. 
The pattern of activities that are developing to meet the needs of life extension for the global NPP 
fleet is complex; in many cases, there are many interconnections and overlapping relationships.  Various 
international and multinational activities overlay national activities.  Workgroups that addressed these 
issues met at an OECD/NEA Workshop in 2000 (NEA 2000a).  At about the same time, a major NEA 
Expert Group provided a status report on nuclear power-plant life management in member countries 
(NEA 2000b).  The NEA Expert Group report formed the starting point for our review of current PMMD 
programs documented in this section. 
The OECD/NEA activities include representation in the activities of both the IAEA and the European 
Union (EU; in particular, Joint Research Center [JRC] Petten).  In addition, two major IAEA meetings on 
NPP life management are associated with the IAEA PLiM programs.  The first meeting was held in 
Budapest in 2002 and the second in Shanghai in October 2007.  Bolstering the various international 
activities, there are now programs of some form in every country that currently operates NPPs, and plant 
life management and long-term operation (management of aging) are being considered as central 
elements in the design philosophy for new plants. 
The OECD studies conclude that the principal advantages of longer-term operation are economic, in 
that 
 Extending the life of a major generating asset avoids the need for immediate investment in new 
generating capacity.  
 The capital costs of plant life management for LTO will be much smaller than investment in any type 
of replacement capacity, although there might be a need for some additional investment in plant 
upgrading. 
 Costs per kilowatt-hour for waste management and decommissioning can be reduced.  
 With nuclear fuel costs being generally lower and more stable than fossil fuel costs, LTO can be 
expected to provide electricity at a lower cost than any other available option, which has a clear 
benefit to the national economy. 
It can be seen from the various programs presented in the OECD/NEA reports (NEA 2000a), and 
those in the wider nuclear power community, that LTO of existing NPPs beyond their original license 
lifetime has become an important option for countries with established nuclear programs.  In most OECD 
countries, LTO has already been accepted as a strategic objective to ensure adequate supplies of 
electricity over the coming decades.  LTO has significant economic advantages but can also help improve 
plant safety and minimize CO2 emissions.  While the LTO of each plant must be considered individually 
in the light of its specific condition and economic circumstances, the general conclusion from studies 
carried out in several OECD/NEA member countries is that, for most reactor types, no significant 
technical challenges are known that would limit plant lifetime to less than 50 to 60 years.  The remaining 
challenges lie, among other things, in proper planning and management, working with the existing 
regulatory and energy policy frameworks, obtaining public confidence, realizing the R&D required, and 
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 ensuring knowledge management.  International cooperation in the public and private sectors can 
contribute to the successful implementation of LTO. 
The IAEA has implemented a number of activities addressing various economic and technical issues 
associated with PLiM/PLEX: 
 The report, Review of Selected Cost Drivers for Decisions on Continued Operation of Older Nuclear 
Reactors, IAEA-TECDOC-1084, was published in 1999 (IAEA).  It provides a review of published 
information related to three cost categories:  safety upgrades necessary for continued operation of a 
nuclear unit, lifetime extension measures, and decommissioning.  The report views the costs globally, 
and they are intended mainly as input for subsequent overall economic analysis. 
 The activities related to the technical aspects of PLiM were implemented to facilitate the exchange of 
information and experience in monitoring the aging mechanisms affecting the main NPP systems and 
components and to provide guidance on lifetime-limiting mechanisms and the impact of mitigating 
measures as well as their effects on the policies and strategies of PLiM programs in Member States. 
 Within the Safety Aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Aging project, a program of international 
cooperation for increased awareness and understanding of aging degradation processes has been 
established.  This activity includes development of methods and guidelines to manage aging for safe 
and reliable operation of NPPs. 
NEA is also implementing a program that is providing an opportunity for exchange of information on 
strategic and economic issues on PLiM/PLEX.  As part of this program, the following topics are reported 
as being addressed: 
 A glossary of aging terminology for NPP life management was published in 1999 (OECD 1999).  The 
aim is to improve the understanding of aging phenomena, facilitating the reporting of relevant plant 
failure data, and promote uniform interpretations of standards and regulations that address aging.  
This terminology is useful in the areas of PLiM/PLEX and aging management. 
 A study by an Expert Group on Refurbishment Costs of Nuclear Power Plant was completed in 1999.  
The report includes cost data derived from experience and from plans to implement life extension or 
life management programs in 10 OECD countries (Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom).  However, the group 
decided not to publish the report and instead produced an internal document.  The restriction was due 
to concerns expressed by participants about the confidentiality of some of the reported cost data and 
because the report does not include relevant data from non-participating OECD countries. 
3.2.1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development–Nuclear 
Energy Agency 
The NEA addresses scientific, technical, and legal issues to ensure the safe, environmentally friendly, 
and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, through international cooperation.  The NEA 
has 28 of the OECD member countries participating.  The inter-relationships between the various 
elements engaged in the OECD/NEA in the area of PliM and LTO performed under the Committee on the 
Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) are shown in Figure 3.5  
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Figure 3.5. Organizational Structure of the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations within the 
OECD/NEA 
(NEA 2007).  The current operating plan for 2006-2009 and the charters for the various committees are 
given in a recent report (NEA 2007).  The status of NPP life management was extensively reviewed in a 
2000 NEA report (NEA 2000b) and in the proceedings of a meeting held in the same year (NEA 2000a).  
A 2006 OECD report has subsequently reviewed the issues relating to the potential value, drivers, 
decision-making process, management issues, and international context of NPP life management and 
long-term operation (NEA 2006a).  The elements that are considered to comprise PliM are shown in 
Figure 3.6.  In addition, a substantial number of NEA reports review specific topical areas; see, for 
example, Research Efforts Related to Wire System Aging in NEA Member Countries (NEA 2004). 
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Figure 3.6.  General Description of PLiM 
 
3.2.1.1 Working Group on Integrity of Components and Structures (IAGE) 
The mandate of the Working Group on Integrity of Components and Structures (IAGE) is to advise 
the CSNI on the topical basis for management of plant aging and to propose general principles to 
maintain the integrity of systems and components.  The main topics investigated in this area include metal 
components, concrete structures, seismic behavior of structures and components, and the aging of wire 
systems.  OECD member country representatives are joined at the group’s meetings by representatives 
from the IAEA, the European Commission, and JRC Petten. 
The main topics investigated by IAGE include the integrity of metal components, the integrity and 
aging of concrete structures, and the seismic behavior of structures and components.  Lifetime 
management remains an important topic for the working group.  A status report on risk-informed in-
service inspection (RI-ISI) methodologies was completed in 2006 (NEA 2005b), and the group is now 
actively working on a benchmark study on RI-ISI methodologies.  Reactor pressure vessel integrity is 
being addressed through a benchmark on probabilistic structural integrity methods. 
An extensive report on concrete containment integrity was issued during 2006 (NEA 2005a).  A 
workshop on corrosion and long-term performance of reinforced concrete in nuclear waste facilities was 
held in Cadarache, France, March 27–30, 2006 (in press), which provided insights into structural and 
regulatory issues. 
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 A workshop on seismic input motions, incorporating recent geological studies, was held in Japan 
November 15–17, 2005, and this meeting completed a series of workshops on seismic input motions.  
Methods to calculate seismic input motions for NPPs and related uncertainties continued to be explored 
through close cooperation with geologists and seismologists. 
Integrity of metal components and structures.  Recent activities of the integrity of metal components 
and structures sub-group include 
 Developing a benchmark on the probabilistic structural integrity of a PWR reactor pressure vessel 
(PROSIR) 
 Compiling a report that collected information on primary water stress corrosion cracking in nickel-
based alloys used in the reactor vessel head penetrations and other components—in particular, Alloy 
600 and its associated welds.  Report on the Survey on Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking 
(PWSCC) and Nickel-based Alloy:  Final Version September 2006, NEA/CSNI/R(2006)8 
(Restricted), has been issued (NEA 2006b). 
 Currently preparing a report examining plant aging and lifetime management. 
Integrity and aging of concrete structures.  The integrity and aging of concrete structures sub-group 
has recently been focusing on the preparation of a strategy report that identifies and ranks challenges for 
concrete structures for operating and new and advanced reactors. 
Seismic behavior of structures and components.  The seismic behavior of structures and components 
sub-group’s recent activities include 
 an ongoing activity on facilities that have experienced an earthquake, being carried out in cooperation 
with the IAEA 
 a report on the differences in approach between nuclear and conventional seismic standards with 
regard to hazard definition is being developed 
 a report on issues related to the definition of seismic input motions, using material from previous 
CSNI workshops. 
3.2.1.2 Ad Hoc Expert Group on the Impact of Nuclear Power Plant Life Extension 
Extending the lifetime of NPPs is becoming common practice in OECD member countries.  While 
applying for an extended operating license, most operators are planning technical improvements, safety 
upgrades, and modification of fuel characteristics and performance as well as refueling patterns and lead 
times.  
NPP lifetime extension affects operation and maintenance strategies, decommissioning schedule and 
strategy, radioactive waste management, and disposal requirements.  It also has an impact on a country’s 
overall nuclear energy program.  When it is an alternative to ordering new nuclear units, lifetime 
extension raises questions in the field of education, knowledge preservation, and the maintenance of 
highly qualified manpower.  These issues are a concern for the future of nuclear energy in some OECD 
member countries.  
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 These topics are of interest to policy makers in most OECD member countries, including those that 
have opted for a progressive phase-out of nuclear energy as well as those wishing to retain the option or 
to increase their reliance on nuclear energy.  This ad hoc expert group aims to identify and analyze the 
technical, economic, and strategic issues raised by lifetime extension in different member country 
contexts.  
Technical issues addressed included refurbishment requirements and timing, fuel characteristic 
modifications and fuel cycle delays, decommissioning, and waste disposal.  The economic assessment 
aimed to analyze the impacts of lifetime extension versus early shutdown followed (or not) by the impact 
of construction of a new NPP on capital requirements, future financial liabilities, and levelized electricity 
generation costs.  
Experts provided country statements describing the status and trends in the field of NPP life 
management in their respective countries.  Country reports were discussed and analyzed by an ad hoc 
group of experts aiming at developing findings derived from various national experience and 
recommendations to policy makers, based on best practices.  The group’s study was published at the end 
of 2006 (NEA 2006a). 
3.2.1.3 OECD/NEA Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cable Ageing Project 
The Stress Corrosion Cracking and Cable Ageing Project, which is supported by 14 NEA member 
countries, began in 2006.  According to the project web page on the Internet 
(http://www.nea.fr/html/jointproj/scap.html), the main objectives are stated as follows: 
 to establish two complete databases with regard to major aging phenomena for stress corrosion 
cracking (SCC) and degradation of cable insulation, respectively, through collective efforts by 
OECD/NEA member countries 
 to establish a knowledge base by compiling and evaluating collected data and information 
systematically 
 to perform an assessment of the data and identify the basis for commendable practices that would 
help regulators and operators to enhance aging management.  
It is anticipated that the database definition and the collection of a representative amount of data for 
starting the assessment will take approximately two years.  The assessment phase and the commendable 
practice report are expected to take one year each.  The IAEA and the European Commission also 
participate as observers.  Some activities in this program are funded by a voluntary contribution from 
Japan. 
3.2.1.4 The Halden Reactor Project 
The OECD Halden Reactor Project, based in Norway, is a leader in programs to develop international 
cooperation in an effective, results-oriented environment that addresses delivery of safe and reliable 
operation of NPPs.  The project, which has developed over the past 50 years, is a joint undertaking of 
national organizations in 17 countries sponsoring a jointly financed program under the auspices of the 
OECD/NEA (IFA 2008).  The project programs aim to generate key information for safety and licensing 
assessments, and the joint program is focused on three areas:  
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  extended fuel utilization:  basic data on how the fuel performs in commercial reactors, both at normal 
operation and transient conditions, with emphasis on extended fuel utilization  
 degradation of core materials:  knowledge of plant materials behavior under the combined 
deteriorating effects of water chemistry and nuclear environment  
 man-machine systems:  advances in computerized surveillance systems, human factors and man-
machine interaction in support of upgraded control rooms.  
Additional projects described on the project’s Internet site: http://www.ife.no/hrp.  Discussions are 
reported to be under way for enlarging the member circle.  Collaborations with East-European countries 
in support of plant safety and reliability also are being expanded. 
3.2.1.5 OECD/NEA-Identified Major Working Groups and Networks Acting On Aging 
Issues 
In addition to the OECD/NEA activities, the working groups (NEA 2006a) have identified a number 
of major groups and networks, with which some level of interacting is occurring.  The groups identified 
are as follows (most of these groups have their own Internet sites where further information is given): 
 AMES, Aging Materials Evaluation and Studies, is the European Network on Nuclear Component 
Aging Studies coordinated by JRC Petten and relies on irradiation and annealing data available by the 
members or to be generated.  The main objectives are to provide information on neutron irradiation 
effects on reactor pressure vessel materials in support of designers, operators, regulators, and 
researchers, and to establish and execute projects in the above areas. 
 ENDEF, the European Non Destructive Examination Forum, was created and launched by the 
Directorate General DG XVII for Energy of the European Commission to establish an industrial 
cooperation framework together with the Central and Eastern European countries as well as the 
New Independent States operating Soviet-designed reactors, considering the effectiveness and the 
adaptability of European NDE technology. 
 ENIQ, the European Network for Inspection Qualification, issued the first edition of the European 
Methodology for Inspection Qualification in 1995.  Qualification of inspection procedures for the 
well-known components of the nuclear reactor is effectively a way of harmonizing inspection 
requirements with the objective of being equally open to any inspection technology. 
 EPERC, the European Pressure Equipment Research Council (previously know as the European 
Network of the Non-Nuclear Pressure Equipment Industry), connects the fields of fatigue design, 
high-strength steel for pressure equipment thickness reduction, harmonization of inspection 
programming in Europe, and flanges and gaskets. 
 EPLAF, the European Plant Life Assessment Forum, was created in 1997 under the auspices of the 
General Directorate for Energy of the European Commission (DG XVII), to foster communication 
and dialogue between different European industrialists involved in Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
Ukraine in bilateral or multilateral projects related to the assessment of aging and remaining lifetime 
of Russian-designed NPP components. 
 ESIS, the European Structural Integrity Society, has several technical committees dealing with issues 
related to structural integrity. 
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  EURIS, the European Network of Risk-Informed In-Service Inspection, deals with the analysis of 
different approaches to the estimation of failure probabilities of components and of the failure 
consequences, gathering operator feedback; definition of effective ISI programs and qualification 
strategies are based on a risk-informed approach.   
 ICG-EAC, the International Co-operative Group on Environmentally Assisted Cracking of Light 
Water Reactor Materials.  The general objective of the ICG-EAC is to coordinate the international 
efforts on EAC of structural materials in LWR service environments to develop the fundamental 
understanding and the relevant database for disposition/design criteria for safe operation and license 
extension.  The ICG-EAC coordinates cooperative research programs, develops recommended test 
procedures, advises on the interpretation of results to obtain data relevant to component design and 
flaw assessment, and encourages transfer of this information by organizing symposia, interacting with 
Code committees. 
 IG-RDM, the International Group on Radiation Damage Mechanism, was established in late 1980 
and is a forum of more than 100 scientists all over the world to discuss the newest results, exchange 
information, and initiate new projects in the field of irradiation damage mechanisms.   
 IWG-LMNPP (IAEA) is the International Working Group on Life Management of Nuclear Power 
Plants.  Its main objective is to provide information and guidance on design, materials, testing, 
maintenance, monitoring, and mitigation of degradation with regard to major components, with the 
aim of ensuring high availability and safe operation of NPPs.  This activity is reporting that a first 
phase of an international database on NPP life management has been established, the International 
Nuclear Information System. 
 NESC, the European Network for Evaluating Structural Components, connects the NDT/NDE 
methods and material aspects with the structural integrity assessment.  The tasks deal with structural 
integrity problems like constraint, cladding, sensitivity analyses, crack arrest, residual stresses, 
probabilistic approach, fracture criteria consistency, transients, and large-scale projects. 
 OECD NEA/CSNI IAGE Working Group is the Working Group on Integrity and Aging of 
Components and Structures.  Its main objective is to provide information and guidance on structural 
integrity and aging issues, such as fracture and damage mechanics modeling, fracture toughness 
measurements, neutron embrittlement of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) steels, stress corrosion 
cracking of RPV steels and of stainless steels, fatigue of piping, NDT, NDE, residual stresses, and 
long-term behavior of concrete. 
3.2.2 International Atomic Energy Agency 
The IAEA has a number of activities that can be grouped into the general area of safe long-term 
operation for NPPs.  Further details of recent activities are found on the IAEA Internet site, including 
meeting proceedings on materials degradation issues at NPPs (IAEA 2007c).  Much of the activity in the 
PLiM area was reported at two NPP life management conferences (IAEA 2002c, 2007b).  The IAEA has 
published a significant number of technical reports, guidelines, and meeting proceedings.  To support and 
help provide access to these activities and documents, the IAEA has developed the International Nuclear 
Information System (INIS); a subset of the material within the database specifically addresses PLiM 
issues (IAEA 2008b).  Recently some of these data have been made available in compact disk (CD) form 
and online at various meeting and workshops.  The CD for the 2nd International Symposium on Nuclear 
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 Power Plant Life Management contains 249 bibliographic references and 136 full-text documents, 
including the proceedings from the 2002 Budapest PLiM Meeting. 
3.2.2.1 IAEA Plant Life Management 
The basic goal of the IAEA Plant Life Management (PLiM) program is to satisfy the requirements for 
safe and provide long-term supplies of electricity in an economically competitive way.  This activity 
supports the basic goal of the operating company and the owners of NPPs, which is to operate as long as 
economically reasonable and possible from a safety point of view.  PLiM is an approach and management 
tool for accomplishing this goal.  
Within the IAEA PLiM program is a system of programs and procedures that satisfy requirements for 
safe operation, competitive power production, and maintaining a plant in operation for a time that is 
rational when considered from both technical and economic perspectives.  PLiM is not a technical system 
but rather a philosophy that can be adopted by an operating company; the philosophy seeks to keep the 
plant in operation as long as possible from safety and business perspectives (IAEA 2006a). 
The IAEA provides various services including plant assessments (IAEA 2008a).  The common 
objectives for a PLiM assessment are to help and review the pre-conditions that exist before PLiM and 
long-term operation approaches are implemented.  The PLiM philosophy and methodologies should be 
considered as part of normal operations and not associated just with extension of the operational lifetime 
of the NPP.  The effectiveness of PLiM programs can be measured by three complementary forms of 
assessment:  
1. self-assessment  
2. peer review 
3. comprehensive program review by the plant owner/operator. 
To support such activities, the IAEA provides the assessment service for peer review of PLiM.  The 
specific objectives of the PLiM assessment are as follows: 
 to give knowledge to better understand PLiM 
 to investigate and assess the Member-State approach on PLiM 
 to take proper action to minimize material degradation 
 to formulate guidelines for aging management of critical systems, structures, and components (SSC) 
 to review detailed plants license evaluation and establishment of PLiM programs.  
Recent activities by the Nuclear Power Engineering Section in PLiM have included technical support 
through technical cooperation projects: 
 regional technical cooperation (TC) projects: 
– RER/04/27:  strengthening capabilities for NPP performance and service life including 
engineering aspects 
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 – RLA/4/021:  Cracking and Structural Integrity of Components in Light Water Reactors 
– RAS/4/028:  Integrated Management Systems for Expanding Nuclear Power Program 
 national TC projects: 
– China:  Aging Management of Critical Components 
– Mexico:  Life Management program for Laguna Verde NPPs 
– Hungary:  License Renewal of Paks Nuclear Power Plant Operation 
– Ukraine:  Action Plans for Nuclear Power Plant Lifetime Management 
– Argentina:  PLiM program for Embalse NPP 
The NPES has developed and published a series of technical documents that relate to the PLiM area.  
Recent examples include 
 PLiM Guidelines for Light Water Reactors (IAEA 2006a) 
 Heavy Water Reactor PLiM Refurbishment – Processes & Technology (IAEA 2006b) 
 Reactor Irradiation Effects in RPV Steels (IAEA 2005b, 2005c) 
 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Core Internals Behavior and Technology for Repair and 
Replacement(a) 
In addition, there are coordinated research projects on reactor pressure vessel integrity, with the 
participation of 15 member states: 
 Master Curve Approach to Monitor the Fracture Toughness of RPV in Nuclear Power Plants  
(2005–2007) (IAEA 2005c) 
 Review and Benchmark of Calculation Methods for Structural Integrity Assessment of RPVs During 
Pressurized Thermal Shock (2005–2008) 
 Material degradation workshops on both technology and managerial topics 
These activities are directed and coordinated through a Technical Working Group for NPP Life 
Management (TWG LM-NPP), which is composed of representatives from 25 member states.  The IAEA 
reports that activities in the PLiM area are planned to grow.  A PLiM assessment service is reported to be 
being developed.  This activity will be initiated, however, only after it has been formally approved and 
funded and the technical cooperation project established.  When approved, it is stated that it is expected 
that the scope of the review should be agreed upon between relevant organizations (e.g., utility or an 
industry) and the IAEA. 
The 2nd International Symposium on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management was organized by the 
IAEA in cooperation with China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and China National Nuclear 
Corporation (CNNC).  It focused on topical issues affecting nuclear power PLiM.  Thirty-five countries 
and five international organizations were represented at the four-day event, which also emphasized the 
                                                     
(a)  IAEA.  2007.  Proceedings of a Technical Meeting ™ on Core Internals Behaviour and Technology for Repair 
and Replacement.  CD-ROM, in preparation. 
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 role of PLiM programs in ensuring safe and reliable NPP operation.  The meeting proceedings are 
currently in preparation (IAEA 2007, 2008c). 
3.2.2.2 International Nuclear Information System 
The International Nuclear Information System (INIS) is the world’s leading information system for 
accessing material on the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.  Part of the INIS addresses the 
needs of PLiM, LTO, and aging.  It provides access to a unique collection of references, extended 
abstracts, and full-text documents related to NPP life management (IAEA 2008b).  At the recent PLiM 
Symposium, a CD was provided that gave access to a subset of the INIS database materials on specific 
topics, including 
 specific probabilistic approaches to aging management  
 environmental-assisted cracking, flow-accelerated corrosion 
  integrity and material degradation issues 
 economics of plant life management 
 regulatory issues concerned with plant life management 
 issues important to the safe and reliable long-term operation of NPPs.   
The INIS is based on information provided as part of the international cooperation activities of 
participating member states and international organizations.  INIS can be accessed via the IAEA Internet 
site:  http://www.iaea.org/inis/. 
The IAEA continues to develop various programs in the life-extension technical area.  One example 
is a new three-year program in the PLiM area, starting in 2008, which addresses advanced surveillance, 
diagnostics, and prognostics techniques used for health monitoring of systems, structures, and 
components in NPPs.  This initiative builds on previous workshops and activities that have been assessing 
needs and developing technical documents, including in the area of on-line monitoring (IAEA 2007, 
2008c).  Further details are to be found on the IAEA Internet site, 
http://www.iaea.org/nuclearpower/IandC/. 
3.3 National and Regional Aging Programs 
Globally, there are currently approximately 440 operational NPPs (see Appendix A) located in 
30 countries.  Associated with every plant are some activities that relate to long-term management of 
operations and maintenance, in-service inspections, and increasingly to more advanced condition-based 
maintenance.  In some countries, the activities are linked with the various international coordinated 
activities discussed in Section 3.2.  In other cases, activities are focused more locally, addressing the 
specific needs of one or a small number of facilities.  There also are activities within the various owners 
and design-based groupings that cross international boundaries and provide a second set of relationships. 
The owners’ group activities are not explicitly discussed in this document. 
The proceedings for the recent IAEA PLiM meeting (IAEA 2008e) provide an overview of the 
majority of the current and emerging national programs.  The status for activities in 14 OECD/NEA 
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 member countries was extensively reviewed in a 2000 report (NEA 2000b).  In addition to the 
international activities, an increasing number of both national meetings and workshops address technical 
topics.  Technical papers on aspects of aging and plant life extension also are now being included in 
special sessions in more general nuclear and energy conferences. 
Some general issues of the cost drivers for the assessment of NPP life extension have been discussed 
in a number of reports, both internationally (IAEA 2002a) and nationally.  This section discusses 
European activities and then the national activities for each of the 13 countries with 10 or more NPPs.  A 
final section briefly addresses those plants and activities for NPPs in the rest of the world.  
The number of reactors and percentage electricity generated for countries with more than 10 reactors 
are shown as Table 3.4.  The data for Greater Europe are given in Table 3.5.  These countries encompass 
almost 50% of the global reactor fleet and include a number of design families, including those that were 
developed in the former Soviet Union. 
 
 
Table 3.4. Number of Reactors and Percentage Electricity Generated for Countries with More 
Than 10 Reactors 
 
Country Number of Reactors Electricity,% 
United States 104 19 
France 59 78 
Japan 55 30 
Russian Federation 31 16 
Korea (South) 20 39 
United Kingdom 19 18 
Canada 18 16 
Germany 17 32 
India 17 2.6 
Ukraine 15 48 
China 11 1.9 
Sweden 10 48 
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Table 3.5. Selected Nuclear Power Plants and Generating Capacity in Greater Europe (EU and 
non-member European states) [from European Nuclear Society (ENS 2008)] 
 
In Operation Under Construction 
Country Number 
Net Capacity,
MWe Number 
Net Capacity, 
MWe 
Belgium 7 5,824 - - 
Bulgaria 2 1,906 2 1,906 
Czech Republic 6 3,523 - - 
Finland 4 2,696 1 1,600 
France 59 63,290 - - 
Germany 17 20,425 - - 
Hungary 4 1,755 - - 
Lithuania 1 1,185 - - 
Netherlands 1 482 - - 
Romania 2 1,310 - - 
Russian Federation 31 21,743 5 4,585 
Slovakian Republic 5 2,034 - - 
Slovenia 1 666 - - 
Spain 8 7,450 - - 
Sweden 10 9,034 - - 
Switzerland 5 3,220 - - 
Ukraine 15 13,107 2 1,900 
United Kingdom 19 10,222 - - 
Total 197 169,842 12 9,991 
 
3.3.1 Europe 
The European Union now comprises 27 countries, of which 14 have NPPs.  About 33% of EU 
electricity is generated by nuclear plants.  There are also a significant number of NPPs in adjacent non-
EU countries.  Widely ranging activities are developing in Europe, including countries that were formerly 
part of the Soviet Union and have Soviet-designed legacy NPPs.  
The first Joint Research Center networks on structural integrity of critical components for nuclear 
installations were set up in 1992.  They now include six programs: 
 Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Core Internals (AMALIA) 
 Aging Material European Strategy or Ageing Materials Evaluation and Studies (AMES) 
 European Network for Inspection and Qualification (ENIQ) 
 Network for Evaluating Structural Components (NESC) 
 Network on Neutron Techniques Standardization for Structural Integrity (NET) 
 Safety of Eastern European Type Nuclear Facilities (SENUF). 
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 The activities within the EU have focused on understanding phenomena that could affect nuclear 
safety, and results from projects have been reported in numerous papers (Contri and Vaisnys 2007).  For 
instance, the in-service inspection qualification methodology developed by ENIQ is now a reference point 
both in Europe and internationally for qualification of the inspection techniques used to check for the 
presence of defects or cracks.  The network organized a series of practical trials leading to the publication 
of eight recommended practices demonstrating the application of the qualification methodology.  Some 
elements of these programs did include participation from outside the EU.  
The programs performed in the EU in the 1990s have subsequently evolved into an integrated EU 
program, SAFELIFE, and further details are on the program Internet site 
(http://SAFELITE.JRC.EC.EUROPA.UE/).  The SAFELIFE activities, which form an integrated 
approach to NPP life management, are shown in Figure 3.7. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7.  SAFELIFE (EU Program) (http://SAFELITE.JRC.EC.EUROPA.UE/) 
 
SAFELIFE is described as providing an integrated approach to research and development (R&D) 
activities on critical issues for plant life management of aging nuclear power installations.  The focus is 
on establishing European best practices for deterministic and risk-informed structural integrity assessment 
of key components, covering the main R&D disciplines involved and considering all NPP designs, both 
western and Russian-type.  The principal objectives and overall work planning are set out in the detailed 
work scopes (http://projects-2008.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ [search under SAFELIFE]).  The activities are 
reported as started in 2003 in collaboration with all major international organizations (e.g., IAEA) and 
consisted of experimental studies on thermal and irradiation effects on critical safety components (e.g., 
RPV, internals, piping), including characterization of mechanical properties, fracture properties and 
residual stresses, qualification and validation of inspection, and surveillance practices.  The activities 
formed a contribution to development of European guidelines for lifetime assessment of NPP components 
and development of key facilities to support European Network activities and training, together with 
contribution to and operation of nuclear safety-related European Networks and integrated projects and 
development and promotion of a related Network of Excellence within the framework of the European 
Research Area. 
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 The activities in the EU have continued to develop.  The most recent program is NULIFE and is led 
by the VTT Research Centre in Finland (Rintamaa et al. 2007).  This activity is focused on nuclear plant 
life prediction.  It is a five-year program launched in October 2006.  The expected evolution for NULIFE 
between 2006 and 2011 is shown in Figure 3.8.  It is seeking to provide methods and tools to assess 
service life of NPP materials and structures as well as to underpin upgrades and refurbishment (Rintamaa 
et al. 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8.  Planned Organization and Evolution of the EU NULIFE Program 2006–2011(a) 
 
3.3.2 United States 
The United States currently has 104 nuclear power reactors that provide about 19% of the total 
electricity production.  About 25 new reactors currently are being proposed.  A status report for U.S. 
nuclear power plant life management is provided as a country report in a 2000 OECD/NEA report (NEA 
2000b).  A more extensive look at aging management and life extension in the U.S. nuclear power 
industry is provided in a report by Gregor and Chockie (2006).  This report was intended to provide an 
overview that could be used to assess potential lessons that could transfer to the petroleum industry, but it 
is also a valuable resource for those addressing U.S. NPP needs. 
The 2000 OECD/NEA report stated “At present there is no fully integrated and mutually agreed upon 
national strategy, plan, or organization responsible for plant life management” (NEA 2000b).  There are, 
however, significant activities in progress within the United States.  The NRC has developed a regulatory 
process that is being used to review applications for life extensions from 40 to 60 years for the current 
fleet.  The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) are coordinating 
collaborative research, including in the area of plant life management, and owners’ groups are engaged in 
performing generic evaluations that can be shared by several operators.  A more coordinated approach to 
identifying, and potentially addressing research needs for “life/licensing beyond 60,” is developing 
(NRC/DOE Workshop on U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Life Extension Research and Development Life 
                                                     
(a)  From NULIFE contract description at http://vtt.fi/project/nulife/nulife_project_21122006.pdf   
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 Beyond 60, held February 19–21, 2008) (Energetics Inc. 2008).  The U.S. Department of Energy also is 
promoting plant life management, although in recent years funded research in this area has been modest. 
The operators of U.S. NPPs are looking at opportunities to deploy more cost-effective operation and 
maintenance practices, as well as opportunities provided through adoption of new plant life management 
philosophies and technologies.  As part of the 40- to 60-year license renewal activity, plants are providing 
commitments to aging management plans, although in some cases there remain open technical issues.  
The activities of plant operators have been pragmatic and focused on meeting regulator requirements 
needed to reach a 60-year operating life.  With consideration now being given to longer-term operation 
(60–80 years, and potentially beyond), aging issues are receiving new attention. 
The research programs that have been addressing aging have been performed by several 
organizations, including work in the university community.  Aspects of the various U.S. activities have 
been reported at various conferences and in journal papers. 
3.3.2.1 U.S. Department of Energy 
A brief summary of U.S. activities and the DOE role was provided by Marcus in 2000 (Marcus 2002), 
and this report was prepared in the same time-frame as the OECD/NEA United States Country Report 
(NEA 2000b).  At that time, DOE was supporting six programs, which included technical topics 
potentially related to long-term operation.  The specific DOE Office of Nuclear Energy programs are 
NEPO, NERI, University Programs, ATW, I-NERI and GEN IV.  In each area, the research funds are at a 
modest level.  These have also included work supported by DOE Office of Science, Basic Energy 
Sciences (BES), which has addressed basic materials issues.  BES held a workshop on Basic Research 
Needs for Advanced Nuclear Energy Systems (BES-DOE 2006).  There are also U.S. government 
initiatives (Advanced Energy Initiative and the American Competitive Initiative) that include aspects of 
the science and technology needed to provide electricity nuclear energy.  In connection with GEN IV and 
NGNP/GNEP (advanced reactors) activities, there have been significant studies that have sought to gather 
materials information (Corwin 2007).  In all of the advanced reactor work, materials issues are central:  
activities in programs such as GEN IV that consider materials have potential to be leveraged in looking at 
PMMD for legacy nuclear systems, as life beyond 60 is considered. 
The DOE also was central to providing much of the technical capability needed for previous aging 
investigations relating to legacy light water reactors, particular with regard to the 40- to 60-year life 
extensions for U.S. legacy plants.  Several of the DOE national laboratories are continuing in 
investigating aspects of long-term operation, PMMD, and advanced technologies (Jarrell et al. 2004).  A 
recent NRC/DOE Workshop on U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Life Extension Research and Development Life 
Beyond 60 (held February 19–21, 2008) provided a forum for discussions on operating NPPs for 60 years, 
and a central theme in the discussions was management of materials degradation (Energetics Inc. 2008).  
The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy is again seeking to promote activities in plant life management and a 
new program in LWR sustainability is being proposed to be started in fiscal year 2009. 
3.3.2.2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
In 2006, the NRC completed an Expert Panel report on proactive materials degradation assessment 
(Andresen et al. 2007).  The data in the report, NUREG/CR-6923, has now been placed into an 
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 information tool that can be accessed on the Internet (http://pmmd.pnl.gov).  The NRC also has sponsored 
three meetings in 2005–2006 that gathered information regarding research needs that could potentially 
help to define needs for a cooperative program in PMMD (Andresen et al. 2007); the findings from the 
workshops are given as Appendix B of this report.  Further NRC activities in the PMMD, which leverage 
ongoing projects, are being developed in areas that include materials degradation, NDE and in-service 
inspection, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), and related activities for advanced reactors, and NRC is 
establishing cooperation and connections with the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy  LWR Sustainability 
Program. 
3.3.2.3 Nuclear Energy Institute 
The U.S. nuclear plant operators, through the NEI materials technology advisory group, have been 
working to identify and address common materials issues.  A summary of the management of materials 
issue from the NEI–industry perspective was provided to the NRC Commissioners in a 2004 presentation 
(Crane 2004).  Related activities are being performed also through EPRI. 
3.3.2.4 Electric Power Research Institute 
A focus for much of the EPRI activity is to provide utilities with the science and technology needed 
to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the U.S. legacy NPPs.  Aging and degradation of both active 
and passive components are potential threats to the long-term economic viability of the existing fleet of 
LWRs.  When addressing the needs to ensure long term operation of major structural components, there is 
need for concerted action in the areas of corrosion research, water chemistry, and plant operation and 
management.  To address this need, EPRI has identified the research activities included in the Materials 
Degradation/Aging Action Plan (EPRI 2004).  The plan, together with extensive detailed technical 
reports, helps nuclear plant owners and operators maximize useful plant life; employ cost-based and risk-
focused decision-making processes; develop technologies to address materials degradation and aging; 
anticipate and avoid safety events; and improve plant capacity, reliability, and availability.  Activities 
within the EPRI Action Plans are closely linked with related activities at the Nuclear Energy Institute and 
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO).  An example of a material degradation matrix 
developed by EPRI is shown in Figure 3.9 (Crane 2004). 
In recent years, there has been increasing globalization and teaming among entities with common 
interests in life-cycle management.  One such program has been an EPRI/EDF collaboration (EPRI 2003).  
A major development in aging research activities and coordination, announced by EPRI in the technical 
press in February 2008, was teaming with EDF and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) to create 
the international Materials Aging Institute, a collaborative research facility located in France.  The 
Material Ageing Institute will examine the critical link between materials science and power plant 
component performance and degradation.  It was reported that the Institute will have an initial budget of 
$13.1 million, and that research will consider equipment corrosion, component and material degradation 
due to irradiation, non-metallic material performance (e.g., polymers), and concrete aging. 
3.3.2.5 Plant Operators and Owners Groups 
The Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) activities are closely linked with those within the 
EPRI Action Plans (EPRI 2004) and are also closely linked with related activities at the Nuclear Energy 
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 Institute. Some activities also are performed within the owners’ groups for plants provided by specific 
suppliers (e.g., Westinghouse Owners’ Group) that support life-cycle management and license renewal 
(Meyer and Giddens 1994). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9.  Example of Part of the Materials Degradation Matrix Developed by EPRI (Crane 2004) 
 
3.3.3 France 
France currently operates 59 reactors that generate 78% of the country’s electricity.  An overview of 
French NPP life management, in the form of a country report, is provided in a 2000 OECD/NEA report 
(NEA 2000b).  The French “plant life program,” which provides a systematic study of life management, 
was established in 1985 by Electricite de France (EdF) to coordinate all issues relating to aging and 
lifetime management.  EdF reports periodically on the activities to the French safety authorities.  An 
overview of the EdF approaches to plant life management was provided recently by Hedin (2007). 
The nuclear electricity generating system in France comprises 58 PWRs, all managed by a single 
operator, EdF.  The EDF system is unique in that it uses standardization of the designs, which gives a 
large number of technically similar reactors.  These features have justified the adoption of a generic 
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 approach to aging management.  Also France does not issue its NPPs a license for operation for a 
specified period of time.  The original license for a plant gives an operating life of 40 years.  The French 
safety authorities are then required to give an authorization to restart each unit after an outage (fuel 
reloading) at the end of each cycle (which is typically between 12 and 16 months) (IAEA 2002a).  In 
2002, French nuclear safety authorities approved a further decade of operation for the EdF 900-MW-class 
PWRs.  This action marked the end of a systematic safety review and upgrade process that had taken 
more than a decade.  A process is established in which a new safety review cycle will be initiated for the 
plants before the 30-year outage.  
Activities are reported as having been initiated to consider opportunities for longer-term operation.  
The standardization in French NPP designs has advantages for the owners but also creates a need to 
anticipate any risk of the occurrence of generic defects.  This primarily concerns the problem of aging for 
both the primary system and for the civil engineering side.  Preparation for the 900-MW third 10-yearly 
outage is under way, but current activities still are assuming life is limited to 40 years.  Tests and checks 
conducted during the 10-year outages are being used as an opportunity for owners and authorities to gain 
a clear picture of the current level of safety of the installations.  This proactive approach is ongoing and 
will lead to back-fitting work, for which the completion dates must be both justified in terms of safety and 
realistic in terms of implementation.  The operator aims to improve safety through periodic safety reviews 
that compare the reactors with the most recent standards develop probabilistic safety studies, within the 
framework of a realistic approach to risk reduction.  At the same time, EdF is talking about the possibility 
of extending the life of some power plants beyond that. 
In support of plant life extension, the various French research and nuclear organizations are strongly 
engaged in activities at EdF laboratories, with the EU, and with EPRI nuclear safety programs.  There are 
also significant projects looking at renewal scenarios that interface with Generation III and Generation IV 
reactors being on line by about 2020 and 2035, respectively. 
In February 2008, EdF and EPRI announced in the a press release to the technical press and in 
announcements posted on their Internet sites, that they have teamed with Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(TEPCO) to create the international Materials Aging Institute, a collaborative research facility that will 
examine the critical link between materials science and power plant component performance and 
degradation.  The Institute will be based at EDF’s facilities in Les Renardières, France.  EDF is investing 
$22.3 million to erect a new building to house the institute and is purchasing modern laboratory 
equipment, including three electron microscopes and powerful numerical simulation tools.  The institute 
initially will be staffed by members of EDF, EPRI, TEPCO, utility organizations, national laboratories 
and universities.  To address global concerns regarding the medium- to long-term availability of a capable 
workforce for the electric power industry, the institute will include a formal training program for young 
engineers. 
In recent years, the French regulatory organizations have undergone changes.  Until 2002, the French 
regulator was the Direction de la Surete des Installations Nucleaires (DSIN).  In February 2002, there was 
the formation of the Directorate General for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, which, with the 
support of the Divisions for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection within the regional directorates for 
research, industry, and the environment, constitute the new Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) in charge of 
Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection.  At the same time, the former technical support organizations of 
the regulatory authorities, both IPSN (nuclear safety) and OPRI (radiation protection), were merged into 
the Technical Support Organization (TSO) responsible for technical assessment and research, the Institute 
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 for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN). Based upon the organizational changes, research 
issues that deal with PMMD would now be addressed to IRSN. 
3.3.4 Japan 
Japan currently operates 55 nuclear reactors, and these generate about 30% of the country’s 
electricity.  An overview of Japanese NPP life management is provided in a 2000 OECD/NEA report 
(NEA 2000b) in the form of a country report.  The initial program has been reported in several papers 
(Maeda and Tajima 2004).  An updated overview was provided at the recent IAEA PLiM meeting in 
Shanghai in October 2007 (IAEA 2007b) and at program meetings held in Japan in 2007 and 2008 [e.g., 
Nei (2007)and Sekimura (2007)]. 
In Japan, the regulatory authority is the Ministry of International Trade and Industries (MITI).  The 
operational license for an NPP is granted for an indefinite period.  There is reported to be no specific 
regulatory process in place for plant life extension.  A periodic inspection system is defined, and an NPP 
is shut down yearly to undergo annual inspections before approval is given to operate for another year.  
MITI endorses the safety of a plant as long as it meets the safety standards at the time.  Nuclear power 
plants can continue to operate as long as the operator can prove annually that the plant can operate safely 
for one more year.  In addition, periodic safety reviews are conducted at each plant at approximately 
10-year intervals.  
Activities that support development of the science and technology needed for long-term operation of 
NPPs in Japan have been developing for more than a decade.  In 1996, MITI launched a program to 
provide a conceptual framework by which the integrity of aging NPPs is examined and addressed.  Pilot 
projects were developed for three plants that have been in operation since 1970/1971 (Mihama 1, 
Tsuruga 1, and Fukushima Daiichi-1).  This program assumes that the plants ultimately will operate for 
60 years (IAEA 2002a). 
To perform research activities that address NPP aging, the Plant Life Engineering Center (PLEC) was 
established by the Japan Power Engineering and Inspection Corporation (JAPEIC) in April 2000.  The 
PLEC is sponsored by Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, presently METI), and 
activities have included performing a needs survey that has resulted in a roadmap for aging phenomena.  
The data have been summarized in table form (Research Maps) that categorizes them under 
 “inspection and monitoring,”  
 “evaluation method for aging,” and 
 “preventive maintenances and refurbishment.”  
The PLEC program has been described and results reported at various meetings, including the 
Nuclear Safety Research Forum, held in Tokyo in March 2007.  Presentations from that meeting are 
posted on the meeting Internet site (http://www.nsc.go.jp/forum/2007/).  The resulting research themes 
have been reviewed, and they are further categorized as either medium- or long-term research issues.  The 
review process has now provided prioritized research themes, and new research themes are proposed by 
various organizations and considered for funding by METI every year.  Examples of various roadmaps 
and their relationships are shown in schematic form in Figure 3.10; an example of technology issues is 
shown in Figure 3.11 (Sekimura 2007). 
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 A review of activities indicates that the Japanese program is well structured and processes are in place 
for continuous revision of the strategy maps (Figure 3.12). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10.  Structure of Roadmaps for Aging Management (Sekimura 2007) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11.  Example of Technology Issues (Sekimura 2007) 
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Figure 3.12.  Japanese Strategy Map Revision Process (Sekimura 2007) 
 
These Japanese activities bring together government, academia, and industry (Figure 3.13).  
Opportunities for international partnerships are reportedly also being sought (IAEA 2007b).  The 
activities are being developed through four regional consortia, and progress is reported at the annual 
Symposium on the Ageing Management and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants.  There is also 
Japanese participation on the EdF and EPRI team with Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) to 
create the international Materials Aging Institute (discussed in Section 3.3.3). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13.  Roles in Japanese Ageing Management Program (Sekimura 2007) 
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 3.3.5 Russian Federation 
The Russian Federation currently operates 31 nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 22.2 gigawatts 
(GWt) that generate about 16% of the country’s electricity.  Russia has decided to extend the operation of 
NPPs that pass their original design life.  A review of life extension of Russian NPP’s was provided at the 
2002 PLiM meeting (IAEA 2002c); and aspects of the program were discussed further at the 2007 PLiM 
meeting (Bakirov et al. 2007b).  There are also a number of papers in the wider technical literature, which 
include a recent discussion of the safety philosophy for RBMK-1000 plants (Burlakov et al. 2007). 
Russia is actively implementing a program to extend the life of its nuclear power reactors to enable 
them to operate beyond their initial 30-year design life.  Russia is seeking to extend the service life of its 
first-generation EGP-6, VVER-440, and RBMK-1000 types of reactors by up to 15 years and plans to 
move to a 15+30 (where 15 is the extended life span in years and 30 years is the initial design life).  
Burlakov et al. (2007) reported that by the end of 2005, life extension work was completed at seven first-
generation NPP reactors.  In the same period, Burlakov (2007) also reports that Russia is preparing for 
life extension for another eight NPP reactors whose planned service life runs out after 2008 (up to 2013). 
The program has assumed that the original design life estimate of 30 years was conservative, that 
significant upgrades performed during the original designed life have been performed, and that these 
support life extension.  There is also reported to be a good financial justification for life extension, given 
that life-extension costs are significantly less than those for constructing new reactors. 
3.3.5.1 Extending the Reactors’ Engineered Life Spans 
A number of major research centers are engaged in life extension research in Russia.  They are also 
interacting with the IAEA and participating in IAEA PLiM projects and meetings.  In supporting these 
activities, it is recognized that human resource issues, similar to those being faced in other countries, are 
developing.  A significant number of experts are expected to retire.  Issues have been identified regarding 
knowledge transfer in the technical area of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) embrittlement, in particular with 
regard to in-depth knowledge of materials behavior and related neutron embrittlement issues.  In addition, 
for the Russian-designed RPVs, a significant fragmentation of the knowledge took place with the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the disruption of technical support activities that occurred, given that 
various WWERs now are located in several countries outside Russia, particularly in Hungary, Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. 
The IAEA and EU have been engaged in supporting life extension activities for NPPs in the Russian 
Federation, and those reactors that were formerly in the Soviet Union.  Russia’s Central Research Institute 
of Structural Materials is organizing a major meeting to be held in October 2008 (http://www.crism-
prometey.ru/Conferences/Nuclear2008), and the program shows representation from a number of centers 
and institutes. 
3.3.5.2 Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Research (INPPR) 
The INPPR (VNIIAES) has a long history of research into a diverse range of NPP issues, including 
plant life extension.  The institute’s activities are at the heart of the Russian PLiM program.  The 
methodology for managing the service life of NPPs, including developing the technical justification that 
supports 10- to 15-year life extensions for Russian reactors, are reported by Bakirov et al. (2007a).  This 
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 paper also includes a discussion of mechanisms degradation and NDT that needs to be employed to 
support these reactor designs. 
3.3.5.3 Center of Material Science and Lifetime Management (CMSLM) 
The CMSLM (Moscow) has a 20-year history of working on NDT and property measurements, 
including projects in the area of aging and life extension.  This center is reported to be active at all 
Russian NPPs as well as in Ukraine, Czech Republic, and Bulgaria.   
3.3.6 Republic of Korea 
The Republic of Korea currently has 20 operational reactors that generate about 39% of the country’s 
electricity.  An overview of the Korean NPP life management program, in the form of a country report, is 
provided in a 2000 OECD/NEA document (NEA 2000b).  The overview was updated in an IAEA report 
(IAEA 2006b).  The regulatory strategy for operational safety and aging management is described in a 
2003 paper (Kim et al. 2003).  More recently, papers were presented at the second PLiM meeting in 
Shanghai (IAEA 2008d).  
Plant life extension is seen as a major activity needed to support the current fleet of NPPs in Korea.  
The Korea Electric Power Research Institute (KEPRI) developed a comprehensive PLiM project for a 
CANDU plant (Wolsong Unit 1) working in cooperation with Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) 
(Song et al. 2006).  The project was conducted to understand the aging status of major components at the 
plant and to develop methods and technology needed to address areas for action so as to enable continued 
operation beyond its original license life.  The study investigated the continued operation and reviewed 
aspects of technology, economics, and regulatory environments.  Detailed life evaluation and 
development of aging management programs for continued operation are ongoing.  The general approach 
of aging assessment in Korea includes screening of critical structures and components and leveraging of 
experience for aging assessments of, for example, fuel channels, which are the most critical component in 
CANDU plants. 
Korea also is addressing life extension for PWRs (Kim et al. 2006).  Kori-1, South Korea’s first 
nuclear power reactor, was provided on a turnkey basis.  It began commercial operations in 1978.  It is a 
two-loop, Westinghouse pressurized light water reactor; its sister plant is the Kewaunee NPP in 
Wisconsin, United States.  Kori-1 was constructed under the first phase of South Korea’s nuclear power 
program in which foreign firms were contracted to design and build the reactors with Korean firms 
playing only a minimal role.  The primary goal of this first phase of NPP development was for South 
Korean industries to gain the knowledge and expertise needed to manufacture the equipment and 
components for NPPs.  During this period, foreign capital was the primary source of financing NPP 
construction, as South Korea required potential contractors to provide financing sources with their bids.  
In 1995, a project to replace aging components was launched that included the replacement of two steam 
generators and plant auxiliary systems.  Kori-1 was originally planned to be decommissioned in 2008 
when its license expires, but in 2003, KHNP began negotiating for a 10-year extension.  In addition, nine 
other NPPs have been operating for more than 10 years in Korea. 
As the number of aging plants increases, public concern over the safety of existing operating NPPs 
also has increased (Kim et al. 2006).  Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments, in addition to 
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 existing safety reviews, are proposed as an effective way to verify that operating NPPs maintain high 
levels of safety.  To ensure safe operation, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), Korea’s 
nuclear regulatory body, recently established an institutional process through revision of the Atomic 
Energy Act to introduce the periodic safety review (PSR).  The PSR considers, among other factors, 
improvements in safety standards and practices, the cumulative effects of plant aging, operating 
experience, and the evolution of science and technology.  In particular, the assessment and management 
of plant aging is one of the major areas.  It includes identification of SSCs for aging management, 
assessment of aging effects, and implementation of aging management programs.  In addition, the PSR 
results could be one of the procedural requirements employed to approve life extension or renewal of an 
operating license of an NPP.  The current regulatory requirements for operational safety and aging 
management, technical requirements for aging assessment and management, regulatory strategy, 
objectives, and approach of the PSR process recently established in Korea have been reported in recent 
papers (Kim et al. 2003). 
The Korean organizations are strongly engaged in international activities and have developed their 
own program to address what is seen as a critical national need.  NPP aging-related research supported by 
MOST is being performed at several universities. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14.  Schematic Showing PliM Process for Korean Kori Unit 1 (Kim et al. 1999) 
 
According to Kim et al. (1999), the Korean government policy is to continue to have nuclear power as 
a major contributor to electricity production.  Kim also reports that theMinistry of Science and 
Technology is planning to develop the South Korean nuclear industry into one of the top five in the 
world, with about 60% of electricity coming from nuclear by 2035. Another eight reactors are expected to 
come into operation by 2017; four will be the larger APR-1400s. 
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 3.3.7 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom currently operates 19 nuclear power reactors that generate about 18% of the 
country’s electricity.  In addition, about 3% of UK electricity demand is met by imports of nuclear-
generated power from France, so overall nuclear-generated electricity totals about 22% of UK 
consumption.  An overview of the UK’s NPP life management program, in the form of a country report, 
is provided in a 2000 OECD/NEA report (NEA 2000b).  The UK has a mix of reactor types in its national 
fleet and is currently working to develop a new national energy policy, which is expected to include a 
nuclear component.  One major driver for the renewed interest in nuclear power is the need to replace 
generating capacity because all but one of the current 19 reactors will be retired by 2023.  In 1978, the 
decision was made to build an initial PWR (at Sizewell).  This large Westinghouse unit started up in 1995 
and was intended to be the first of four.  It is typical of much of the world capacity but newer and more 
complex than most PWRs.  If new-build activities are initiated, new-generation plants could be expected 
to be on line about 2017.  The UK also is working to re-establish nuclear infrastructure that would be 
needed to support construction of new reactors. 
Ageing is seen as an important problem for the UK’s nuclear power generating capacity (IAEA 
2002).  In 2006, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate gave formal consent to decommission Sizewell-A 
and Dungeness A power stations, both 40 years old; both were closed at the end of 2006.  They will be 
defueled by 2009, and site decommissioning is scheduled for 2110–2011, although decommissioning may 
begin sooner.  The remaining two Magnox power stations—the only ones with pre-stressed concrete 
pressure vessels (rather than steel)—are due to close in 2008 and 2010.  In 2006, British Energy (BE) 
closed four AGRs because of boiler degradation in the non-nuclear part of the plants.  It was reported that 
the intent was to restart the units after a few months, but approval was not given until May 2007.  All four 
plants will operate at about 60% capacity, but BE states that it intends to increase this to 70%.  A 
December 2007 decision was expected regarding a 5-year life extension for the units to 2016, which 
involved a commitment to spend £90 million (~US$180M), beyond a current £150 million (~US$300M) 
upgrade program, to achieve.  According to British Energy, a further life extension will be considered in 
2013 and is likely to occur if electricity prices stay high.  Life extensions for other AGR plants will be 
considered at least 3 years before the scheduled closure of each unit.(a) 
However, part of the long-term problem in UK is that costs for decommissioning gas-cooled reactors 
are much higher per unit of capacity than for light water reactors—at least five times that for Magnox.  
This is due to the large volume of material and the need to dispose of a lot of graphite moderator.  
Decommissioning waste volumes per unit capacity for Magnox are ten times those for western light water 
reactors.  The Nuclear Generation Decommissioning Fund was set up to ensure a secure source of funds 
for eventual decommissioning of NPPs operated by BE.  British Energy was the only contributor to the 
fund, to which final payment will be made in 2035 or whenever Sizewell B is closed down. 
British Energy was hit in January 2008 by recent closures at its Hartlepool and Heysham 1 sites.  The 
two have the capacity to supply power to about 1.5 million homes.  The costs associated with the 
problems are expected to run nearly US$74 million, and the company has already spent more than 
US$44 million to buy out disrupted contracts.  The company manages eight nuclear power stations built 
since 1965 but has recently begun struggling with cracks in boilers and other aging issues. 
                                                     
(a) See www.british-energy.com/ for various fact sheets and press releases. 
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 The United Kingdom supports the IAEA PLiM activities and is engaged with the various European 
Networks, AMES, NSEC and ENIQ and PWR aging consortium activities.  Efforts are in progress to re-
establish research capabilities though several university consortia, including two that are based at the 
Dalton Nuclear Institute (University of Manchester) and Imperial College (University of London).  
Imperial College is leading an effort known as KNOO (Keep the Nuclear Option Open) and is looking to 
leverage and re-establish efforts that involved the University of Oxford and former UKAEA (Harwell) 
staff.  Activities are in process also to convert the Sellafield site into a UK national nuclear laboratory. 
3.3.8 Canada 
Canada’s 18 operational nuclear power reactors produce 16% of the country’s electricity.  These 
reactors are part of a global fleet of 44 CANDU reactors.  Many CANDU reactors are nearing the end of 
their initial licensing life, and life extension is being considered.  An overview of Canadian power plant 
life management, in the form of a country report, is provided in a 2000 OECD/NEA report (NEA 2000b) 
and in a second document (IAEA 2006b).  An overview of the Canadian regulatory approach to ensuring 
effective aging management programs for CANDU NPPs was reported at SMiRT in 2007 (Blahoianu et 
al. 2007).  Papers presented at that meeting also reported on aging studies relating to concrete and other 
parts of plant structure.  Other research papers presented at the IAEA PLiM meetings in 2002 and 2007 
also provide information on the Canadian approach. 
The CANDU reactor design is significantly different from both the PWRs and BWRs that account for 
most of the plants in the global NPP fleet.  The design differences and technical issues associated with the 
CANDU reactor design have led to the development of a somewhat separate technical community that 
holds meetings, many organized through the Canadian Nuclear Society and AECL.  These organizations 
address specific CANDU issues (CNS 1980-2007).  
Over the past 10 to 15 years, all of the Canadian CANDU owner/operators and Atomic Energy 
Canada Limited (AECL) have been involved in PLiM programs and activities.  The PLiM programs have 
used various terminologies (such as Life Cycle Management and Integrated Age Management), and there 
have been some variations in detailed activities that respond to various ageing issues and utility practices.  
The activities have been focused primarily on ensuring that CANDU plants will operate successfully and 
reliably throughout their license life, thus preserving the option to extend plant life license.  Compre-
hensive CANDU PLiM programs have been developed from the operational knowledge gained from the 
Pickering A and Bruce A stations, and from the four original CANDU 6 plants. The CANDU PLiM 
programs are based also on relevant information from the CANDU industry research and development 
programs and from other national and international sources.  Processes to systematically identify and 
evaluate the critical systems, structures, and components (CSSCs) in Canadian HWRs have been 
developed and implemented. 
The CANDU owners’ group includes operating units in a range of countries outside North America.  
AECL is working with national authorities to develop and deploy PLiM for the global CANDU fleet.  An 
example of activities includes those associated with the Wolsong 1 CANDU 6 nuclear reactor in South 
Korea. 
In developing PLiM for CANDU reactors AECL adopted the IAEA’s Periodic Safety Review (PSR) 
process (IAEA 2003), and IAEA requirements for research reactors (IAEA 2005a) as the basis for the 
PSR Gap Analysis employed.  AECL is reported as implementing a “living” Aging Management 
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 Program.  This is a formal and structured program, which seeks to provide assurance that the facility 
systems, structures, and components function as designed to provide safe and reliable operation of the 
plant.  
Regulatory guidance for life extension of NPPs was issued as a draft for public comment in May 2006 
and subsequently issued as formal guidance in 2008 (CNSC 2008).  Canada is participating in inter-
national activities through the IAEA and the OECD/NEA (Blahoianu et al. 2007).  It is also providing 
technical leadership with the CANDU owners’ group and is participating in EPRI and INPO programs.  
AECL supports a modest research program, mostly directed toward meeting the technical needs of 
CANDU reactors. 
3.3.9 Germany 
Germany currently operates 17 nuclear reactors for electricity generation, and these reactors provide 
about 32%of the country’s electricity.  An overview of the German NPP life management activities, in the 
form of a country report, is provided in a 2000 OECD/NEA report (NEA 2000b).  There is a complex 
political situation in Germany in that there had been an expectation that nuclear power would be phased 
out.  In looking at the need to meet the country’s energy needs, that decision is being revisited.  At 
present, there is no special organization in German to look at the issues of NPP aging and plant life 
management.  A diverse range of government, industry, and research organizations are engaged in the 
area. 
Germany is strongly engaged in EU activities, particularly in AMES and the SAFELIFE programs 
discussed in Section 0. 
3.3.9.1 Fraunhofer Institutes (IZFP) 
Much of the technical expertise in this area of NPP aging is found in the Fraunhofer-institutes.  NDT 
and materials characterization activities have been developed at IZFP (Saarbruechen).  Both institutes 
have excellent Internet sites, and the details of their programs may be found at 
http://www.fraunhofer.de/EN/institutes/index.jsp for the Fraunhofer Institute and http://www.izfp-
d.fraunhofer.de/english/ for IZFP. 
3.3.10 India 
India currently operates 17 NPPs that generate about 2.6% of the country’s electricity.  The current 
nuclear power capacity of 2720 MWe and India is planning an aggressive increase to up to 9335 MWe by 
March 2012 and reach 20,000 MWe by the year 2020 (Puttaswamy 2002).  The safety record of nuclear 
power in India has been very good over the past several decades, and India has achieved a high overall 
annual average plant capacity load factor of 85%. 
India appears to be developing activities to support plant life management for its NPPs.  Papers 
presented have reported in-service inspection as a key contributor to monitoring and health assessment for 
critical plant components (Ramu et al. 2006; Shah 2006). 
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 India has a diverse range of reactor types.  Plant life management for the pressurized heavy water 
reactors (PHWRs) in India is reported to generally follow the practices identical to CANDU reactors.  
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) reports that it conducts PLiM activities at its plants in 
accordance with requirements specified in NPCIL HQI-7005 and Atomic Energy Regulatory Board safety 
guide SG-O-14.  These guidelines cover requirements based on both national and international 
experience, including guidance provided by various IAEA reports (IAEA 1990, 1992b, 1998, 2000). 
The Indian nuclear regulatory body, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), initially grants 
authorization for operation for a specified period that may range from five to nine years and then extend 
this period based on an assessment of plant safety.  For extended operation, a comprehensive safety 
review of the plant is required, which considers the cumulative effects of plant ageing and irradiation 
damage, results of in-service inspection, system modifications, operational feedback, and status of safety 
systems. The AERB safety guide on Renewal of Authorization for Operation of Nuclear Power Plants 
SG-O-12 covers the requirements (Koley et al. 2006).  The process used for safety review and license 
renewal is carried out several times during the operating life of an NPP.  This comprehensive safety 
review is defined as the periodic safety review (PSR) in the Indian literature. 
The available information on PLiM and activities is limited.  There are a small number of papers in 
the technical literature, and the Indian nuclear community is holding regional/national meetings on aging 
topics.  India is reported to have allowed a delegation from the World Association of Nuclear Operators to 
visit one power plant recently, but findings remain confidential.  The November 15, 1999 issue of 
Business Week Online reported that India is also grappling with whether it should continue to operate two 
30-year-old American-built reactors near Bombay.  The NPCIL has extended the lifetime of the aging 
General Electric plants, and some refurbishment activity is in progress.   
The importance and growing interest in PLiM within the technical community in India is known and 
recognized.  A workshop reportedly is being planned to cover “Nuclear Power Plant Life Management:  
Emphasis on Interdisciplinary Science and Technology,” October 20–23, 2008, at the Indira Gandhi 
Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam, India.  The workshop will cover a wide range of technical 
topics, including 
 an overview of ageing management, in-service inspection, risk analysis, life prediction, refurbishment 
and life extension 
 life extension of PHWR, BWR, PWR and sodium-cooled FBRs 
 international scenario and practice on life management of NPPs 
 classification of components for ageing management 
 ageing management of metallic materials, long term properties, damage mechanism, fracture 
mechanics, mitigation strategies, new materials, materials modeling 
 ageing management of non-metallic structures and components including concrete 
 ageing management of cables and instrumentation 
 issues related to safety upgradation and redundancy 
 regulatory guidelines and licensing renewal procedures 
– waste storage and disposal during extended periods of plant life 
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 – economics of nuclear plant life management 
– public acceptance 
 international cooperation in research and development programs 
A range of international experts is being invited to participate in this event. 
3.3.11 Ukraine 
Ukraine has 15 nuclear power reactors that provide 48% of the country’s electricity.  Several plant 
life extension activities are in progress.  The core of the NPP lifetime management activities is an “Action 
Plans for Nuclear Power Plant Lifetime Management,” which is being developed as an IAEA technical 
cooperation program (see the IAEA Internet site for SKALTO Program descriptions and documents, 
http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/engineering-safety/skalto/pubs-ageing.htm).  This activity was initiated 
in 2003 to create a strategy and action plan for lifetime management for all NPPs in Ukraine.  The 
institutes involved are the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine, State Nuclear Regulatory Committee 
of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine; Department of Technical Norms.   
Ukraine also has strong links to technical activities being performed in Russia and technical 
interactions with the EU and a number of IAEA activities.  In addition, for the Russian-designed RPVs, a 
significant fragmentation of the knowledge took place when the USSR dissolved, limiting the ongoing 
interactions with operators of the various WWERs in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Bulgaria. 
3.3.12 China 
China currently operates 11 nuclear power reactors that generate 1.9% of the country’s electricity.  
Nuclear power plant operation started in China in 1991 when Quinshan-I, a 300-MWe PWR, went on 
line.  Since then, the nuclear industry has been growing.  Nuclear power development has been in 
progress for more than 30 years in China but has never been incorporated into the national electric power 
plan.  Instead, power projects were arranged and constructed individually.  In 2003, for the first time, 
China initiated plans for major nuclear power developments as a key component within the state electric 
power plan.  China is also seeking to include PLiM as a key enabling philosophy for its nuclear power 
program.  The prospects for PLiM in China were discussed by Zheng and Dou at the 2007 PLiM meeting 
in Shanghai (IAEA 2008d). 
The Chinese national activities in nuclear power are requiring design requirements that consider and 
even facilitate PLiM as NPP programs develop (Mingguan and Yikang 2008).  China has established a 
Technical Cooperation program with the IAEA to address aging management of critical components.  
Through this program, China is adopting the IAEA approaches to PLiM.   
The initial goal for PLiM in China is to address the needs of the Qinshan NPP (Qinshan-I), China’s 
first nuclear plant, and seek to double its operational life through a cutting-edge PLiM program.  The 
expectation is that with effective plant life management methods, Qinshan-I will probably be able to 
continue to operate for another 20–40 years after its initial 30-year design life.  The Shanghai Nuclear 
Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) and the Research Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operation of Wuhan in Central China are providing PliM technical support for Qinshan-I (Mingguan and 
Yikang 2008). 
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 3.3.13 Sweden 
Sweden currently operates 10 nuclear power reactors that generate approximately 48% of the 
country’s electricity.  The Swedish NPP life management activities are overviewed in the form of a 
country report in a 2000 OECD/NEA report (NEA 2000b).  An update on ageing management in Sweden 
was provided at the IAEA 2nd PLiM meeting in Shanghai in 2007 (Gott 2008). 
In 1980 a referendum in Sweden canvassed three options for phasing out nuclear power but none for 
continuing it.  In 1997, the energy policy changed to retain most of the country’s nuclear plants, but 
earlier decisions had resulted in premature closure of one 2-unit plant.  
On July 1, 2008, the Swedish government merged the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI, 
founded 1965) and the Reactor Safety Inspectorate (SKI, 1974) into a single agency, the Swedish 
Radiation Safety Authority (SSM).  Sweden believes the merger will provide a step toward more effective 
cooperation between two organizations, many of whose duties have overlapped.  Nuclear safety has 
topped the agenda of both, but whereas SKI has been more strictly focused on the engineering aspects of 
nuclear technology, SSI’s responsibilities have included public health and environmental protection 
implications as well. 
Swedish Government-funded R&D totaled SKR 10.5 million in 2007, focused on reactor safety as 
well as ensuring that Sweden maintains competence in the nuclear industry.  A ban on nuclear research 
was removed in 2006.  The country is increasingly participating in several IAEA and OECD/NEA 
activities [e.g., a cable aging and stress corrosion cracking activity with the NEA (Yamamoto et al. 
2007)]. 
3.3.14 Rest of the World 
There are approximately 100 reactors in countries that are not included in either Europe or the 
specific countries discussed above.  In almost all cases, plant life management and plant life extension 
activities either are in place or are being developed.  Many of these countries reported aspects of their 
programs at the IAEA 2007 PLiM meeting (IAEA 2008d). 
In many cases, there are links into the plant life management activities within the OECD/NEA, IAEA 
or through user groups or supplier networks.  For example, there are 44 CANDU reactors in the global 
fleet; only 18 of these plants in Canada.  In many cases, the regulatory guidance, codes, and standards of 
the supplier nation are employed in combination with varying degrees of locally developed regulators’ 
guidance, codes, standards, and local technical and research activities. 
3.4 Advanced Reactor Designs 
New LWRs as well as GEN III and Gen IV fission and fusion reactor designs are causing an 
increased emphasis on material topics.  Many new reactors are being proposed with 60-year initial design 
lives.  For Generation IV reactors these are expected to have more demanding operating conditions, and 
the GEN IV program has resulted in the collecting and review of much materials data. 
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 3.5 Other Technology Areas 
The past decade has seen significant development within both the nuclear and wider engineering 
communities from the use of periodic NDT to condition-based maintenance and advanced life 
management.  These activities have been called by various names, including structural health monitoring, 
material damage prognostics, and PMMD.  Where these approaches have been applied, they have been 
implemented with on-line methods developed for advanced monitoring and diagnostics.  As the economic 
value of CBM and other advanced monitoring approaches is demonstrated, there is increasing interest in 
prognostics, the prediction of the remaining safe or service life for both active components such as pumps 
as well as passive components that do not need any external input to operate (such as basic structural 
materials). 
3.5.1 Diagnostics 
It was recognized in the mid-1970s that NDT needed to become a quantitative, science-based 
technology.  A series of excellent technical research is documented in the books Review in Progress in 
Quantitative Nondestructive Evaluation (Thompson and Chimenti 1980-2007).  Many of the 
measurement capabilities for nondestructive testing and evaluation (NDT/NDE) were identified as set by 
fundamental physics (Bond 1988).  It was also recognized that there are different levels of performance 
that can be achieved in the laboratory, on production parts, and in-service. 
Recent years have seen development of better understanding of the NDT/NDE measurement 
processes and quantification of performance in terms of a probability of detection (POD) rather than a 
size for an ultimate detection limit.  The operator or inspector is also recognized as a key element in the 
inspection system, and not all operators perform to the same level.  The top 10% of inspectors have been 
found to perform at exceptional levels (Bond 1999).  The median inspector does not achieve similar 
sensitivity.  In part to address performance reliability for ISI, there has been a move to automation.  The 
best automated system can give repeatability, although it usually does not reach the ultimate 
sensitivity/detection limits achieved by the best inspectors. 
Advances in monitoring technologies from other industries can potentially benefit both legacy and 
new NPPs, particularly when using advanced on-line monitoring and diagnostics for condition-based 
maintenance and, in the future, prognostics.  Digital instrumentation/controls and advanced 
diagnostics/prognostics are being developed in high-technology industry communities and are now being 
considered for NPP deployment.  There is a convergence between materials damage prognostics (Larson 
et al. 2005); the civil engineering damage and damage evolution models under multiple stressors; the 
traditional “vibration” monitoring community looking towards new challenges in systems used by the 
defense community (Pusey et al. 2005); technology to achieve total structural health management (Chang 
2003b); and the NDE community looking at aging due to thermal embrittlement, fatigue, and neutron 
degradation (Dobmann 2006). 
There have also been new approaches to the management of life in mechanical systems (Roos et al. 
2006) and research into characterization of materials in aging systems, particularly early-degradation 
phenomena that occur before the “traditional” defects (such as cracks) detected by conventional NDT 
develop into detectable sizes (Crane et al. 1998).  The trend of seeking to move from periodic NDE to on-
line condition-based maintenance started several years ago in other industries (Bond 1999).  A review of 
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 the current paradigms and practices in system health monitoring and prognostics has recently been 
provided (Kothamasu et al. 2006). 
There remain significant measurement challenges associated with characterization of aging in 
irradiated reactor components (Doctor 1988; Dobmann 2006).  An example of one major series of 
activities moving from NDE to characterization of aging and degradation is found in the work of 
Dobmann and colleagues.  In early papers, they reported using ultrasonic and micromagnetic techniques 
to measure strength and toughness and detecting early damage (Dobmann et al. 1992).  This evolved into 
work that addresses the demand for describing damage and service-related aging (Dobmann et al. 1997), 
which evolved into a significant European project involving round-robin sample characterization 
(Dobmann et al. 2001) and bringing together condition-dependent NDT and fracture mechanics (Schmitz 
et al. 2001).  An increasingly diverse range of NDT/NDE tools are being considered in both laboratory 
and field studies (Crane et al. 1998; Dobmann 2006) for aging phenomena characterization, as shown 
with new applications of magnetic methods (Dobmann 2006).  Techniques such as ultrasonic backscatter 
and acoustic birefringence are being investigated as possible tools for in-service monitoring.  The 
development of concepts for advanced on-line structural health monitoring for next-generation reactor 
designs such as International Reactor Innovative & Secure (IRIS) has been initiated (Nakagawa et al. 
2006). 
As this article is being written, 42 U.S. operating commercial NPPs have completed the license 
extension process (see the NRC Internet site http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/ 
applications.html for detailed information on the license extension process in the United States).  Every 
plant granted license extension has committed to developing the tools to manage degradation processes 
such as void swelling where no accepted or reliable detection or measurement technology presently 
exists.  Therefore, the working details of these degradation management programs have yet to be defined, 
and the regulator has to review or accept these future programs. 
To address these challenges, a convergence is developing that is bringing together capabilities in the 
materials science and NDE communities. 
3.5.2 Prognostics 
Prognostics (for machinery) is the prediction of a remaining safe or service life based on an analysis 
of system or material condition, stressors, and degradation phenomena.  Based on observed data and 
predicted behavior, moving from diagnostics to prediction of life and technologies for structural health 
monitoring/management requires development of new approaches.  The range of developing approaches 
is illustrated in schematic form in Figure 3.3.  The various empirical methods for process and equipment 
prognostics have been reviewed by Hines et al. (2008).  An extensive review of machinery diagnostics 
and prognostics for condition-based maintenance is provided by Jardine et al. (2006) but again, it does not 
consider nuclear power systems. 
An assessment of the state of diagnostics and prognostics technology maturity was recently provided 
(Howard 2005).  The current status for various system elements, including both active and passive 
structures, is shown in Table 3.3. 
Technologies are being developed for non-nuclear applications (including instrumentation and system 
health monitoring for electronics) in what is being called “electronics prognostics” (Urmanov 2007).  For 
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example, there are integrated technologies being developed for advanced fighter aircraft and unmanned 
aerial vehicle system health monitoring, which include both electrical/electronic and mechanical systems.  
Within advanced diagnostics/prognostics, systems have been deployed for individual elements, but fully 
integrated systems are still being developed. 
For the existing NPPs, particularly when life extension is being developed, there are opportunities to 
deploy on-line monitoring/prognostics, assuming it can be demonstrated that there is still remaining 
useful life in the plant.  Key to developing advanced prognostic schemes (in active systems such as pumps 
and valves) that give maximum warning of degradation focuses on monitoring the stressor rather than 
solely the subsequent effects of aging and degradation.  A schematic showing system operational 
performance and stressor magnitude is shown in Figure 3.3.  The monitoring of the stressor (e.g., a 
temperature, cavitation, vibration, or a pressure) combined with active system control parameter 
management across several processors enables use of the “warning time” (ΔT in Figure 3.3) to adjust 
operational parameters and limit or at least control rates of degradation for a path to failure.  In order for 
this type of strategy to be successful, physics-based models relating the stressors to the rate of aging or 
degradation must be developed in the prognostic scheme. 
To move from periodic inspection to on-line monitoring for condition-based maintenance (and 
eventually prognostics) will require advances in sensors; better understanding of what and how to 
measure within the plant; enhanced data interrogation, communication, and integration; new predictive 
models for damage/aging evolution; system integration for real-world deployments; quantification of 
uncertainties in what are inherently ill-posed problems; and integration of enhanced, condition-based 
maintenance/prognostics philosophies into new plant designs, operation, and operating and maintenance 
approaches. 
 
 4.0 Technical Gaps That Need To Be Addressed for PMMD 
Clearly, implementation of PMMD programs will require significant investments in basic and applied 
research to achieve the needed advances required to enable effective PMMD programs.  Appendix B of 
this report contains a draft of a report titled – “Overview Program Plan for Cooperation on Proactive 
Materials Degradation Management (PMDM) Research” that was compiled and edited by Roger Staehle 
and Joe Muscara.  The report presents a summary of a number of research plans that experts 
who attended two workshops felt needed to be conducted to develop the 
technical basis for effective PMMD programs.  The report also identifies potential 
international cooperative research that could lead to the implementation of 
effective PMMD programs.  
This section of the report provides examples of the technical gaps contained in Appendix B and 
divides the gaps into categories:  the technical gaps that need to be addressed by basic science, those 
technical gaps in engineering, and those that need to be addressed from a regulatory/codes and standards 
point of view.  The full scope of these needs is still being defined.   
4.1 Summary of Technical Gaps from the EPRI PMMD Program 
4.1.1 Gaps in Basic Science for PMMD 
In order to move from a reactive mode to a proactive mode when dealing with degradation, there are 
fundamental materials science gaps that need to be addressed.  EPRI has developed a detailed description 
of several gaps that require basic science to develop reasonable solutions. 
 Limited mechanistic understanding of environmentally assisted cracking of reactor coolant system 
components in light water reactors:  Material degradation problems due to environmentally assisted 
cracking have cost the U.S. nuclear industry at least $10 billion in the last 30 years because of forced 
and extended outages, increased inspection requirements, component repairs and replacements, and 
increased scrutiny by the regulator.  A better mechanistic understanding of crack initiation and early 
crack propagation processes that cause stress corrosion cracking and irradiation-assisted stress 
corrosion cracking is required to develop reliable predictive models and cost-effective mitigation 
technologies.  The EPRI Primary System Corrosion Research Program has the lead for overcoming 
this barrier. 
 Incomplete understanding of the effects of some LWR water-chemistry variables:  Detailed 
understanding of water chemistry variables is essential in the design and implementation of chemistry 
programs that limit operational and maintenance impacts.  Improved understanding would enable 
plant owners and operators to define optimized chemistry programs on a plant-specific basis to reduce 
corrosion damage, minimize the release of corrosion products into coolant systems, and mitigate the 
impact of chemistry-related problems on plant safety, operation, and profitability.  The EPRI Water 
Chemistry Control Program has the lead for overcoming this barrier. 
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 4.1.2 Gaps in Engineering for PMMD 
In order to move from a reactive mode to a proactive mode when dealing with degradation, there are 
gaps in engineering that need to be addressed and require the basic science that supports the engineering 
solution.  EPRI has developed a description of several gaps that require engineering to develop reasonable 
solutions. 
 Lack of an integrated, proactive approach for managing degradation of reactor coolant system 
components in pressurized water reactors, including the steam generator:  The lack of a 
comprehensive and integrated approach for addressing materials degradation issues in PWR reactor 
coolant systems can result in ineffective diagnosis and maintenance of nuclear equipment and 
components.  Refined approaches are needed to provide the technical bases for resolving four 
pressing issues:  cracking of nickel-alloy components and welds in primary piping and penetrations; 
reactor vessel internals cracking; reactor pressure vessel integrity; and piping fatigue damage.  The 
Materials Reliability Program has the lead for overcoming this barrier. 
 Lack of an integrated, proactive approach for managing degradation of reactor coolant system 
components in boiling water reactors:  The lack of a comprehensive and integrated approach for 
addressing materials degradation issues in BWR reactor coolant systems can result in ineffective 
diagnosis and maintenance of nuclear equipment and components.  Refined approaches are needed to 
develop strategies and technology that enable plant operators to inspect, assess, mitigate, and repair 
stress corrosion cracking in core shrouds, other major reactor vessel internals components, and 
primary pressure-boundary piping.  The EPRI Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Program 
has the lead for overcoming this barrier. 
4.2 Summary of Technical Gaps from the NRC-Sponsored Reports 
Two NRC-sponsored reports provide valuable thoughts from international experts on research that is 
needed to develop Proactive Management of Materials Degradation (PMMD) programs.  NUREG/CR-
6329 titled Expert Panel Report on Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment contains significant 
information on degradation mechanisms and an assessment of our knowledge of the degradation 
mechanism.  This document provides an excellent starting point for prioritizing the research needs for 
basic material science.  Appendix B of this PNNL technical letter report contains a draft report that 
provides an overview of a research program plan, including descriptions of work plans (WPs) aimed at 
developing knowledge and technology that would allow for the development and implementation of 
PMMD programs for light water reactors (LWRs).  The research program plans presented in the 
Appendix B draft report is based upon the information that was presented at the following workshops. 
 Snowbird Resort, Salt Lake city, Utah, USA, August 16 and 19, 2005 
 Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, Tokyo, November 9–11, 2005 
 Mills House Hotel, Charleston, South Carolina, USA, May 11–13, 2006 
The research described below is a brief summary of the more essential research presented in the 
NRC-sponsored reports. 
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4.2.1 GAPS in Basic Science for PMMD 
 Limited understanding of basic material science behavior associated with degradation mechanisms: 
NUREG/CR-6329 titled Expert Panel Report on Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment 
contains significant information on degradation mechanisms and an assessment of our knowledge of 
the degradation mechanism.  This document provides an excellent starting point for prioritizing the 
research needs for basic material science.  The draft report included as Appendix B to the PNNL 
technical letter report contains 46 detailed scopes of research for assessing degradation of materials. 
4.2.2 Gaps in Engineering for PMMD 
 Continuous monitoring for detecting LWR materials degradation: There are significant limitations to 
the required NDE that is performed on a periodic basis as part of the inservice inspection (ISI) 
program.  Improvements can be made to ISI programs to overcome some of the limitations through 
improvements in how frequently inspections are performed (reduction from a 10 year interval to 
every refueling outage), the effectiveness of the NDE method (employing SAFT or phased arrays 
versus conventional amplitude based UT), etc.  Other limitations are not solvable with simplistic 
improvements in the ISI program.  For example, there are a number of locations where access to the 
areas requiring inspection are limited because the surface of the component is in an as welded 
condition or surface geometries (tapers) limit inspection.  This demonstrates a need to develop and 
demonstrate continuous on-line methods to monitor all forms of LWR materials degradation as it 
initiates and grows. 
 Detection and characterization of material degradation precursors:  NDE is used to identify defects 
(cracks, fabrication flaws, wall thinning) that have already developed and may challenge component 
integrity.  The capability to detect and characterize the precursors to degradation initiation enables 
proactive materials degradation management by mitigation as well as by timely repair or replacement.  
The precursor stage of degradation may exhibit physical characteristics substantially different than 
the macro-defect that ultimately manifests.  The ability to predict degradation by detecting and 
characterizing precursor state(s) may require an inspection capability that is: 
– evolutionary (i.e., higher spatial resolution ultrasound) 
– revolutionary (i.e., entirely new application of physics/engineering to this NDE problem) 
The technical issues for development of new NDE approaches to precursor detection and characterization 
range from advanced engineering concepts to more fundamental understanding of how physical states and 
material features (or properties) are exhibited and hence, measurable. 
4.3 Technical Gaps That Need To Be Addressed within the 
Framework of Codes and Standards Regulation 
Currently, Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code only specifies criteria for 
periodic inspections that must be conducted for active and passive components.  There is no specific 
guidance or criteria for PMMD programs. 
 

 5.1 
5.0 Conclusions 
The move from periodic inspections to condition-based maintenance and now consideration of 
prognostics has the potential to significantly impact the operation of legacy NPPs.  It has been 
demonstrated that the application of stressor-based prognostics to active LWR components (e.g., pumps, 
valves, motors, etc.) has the potential greatly improve performance reliability of power plants, maintain 
and monitor safety and to reduce operations and maintenance costs significantly.  The proactive 
management of materials degradation program being investigated by the NRC extends consideration to 
include major passive systems (e.g. piping and pressure vessels).  It builds on advanced diagnostic and 
prognostic methods developed in the wider engineering community and addresses key needs as the 
nuclear power community looks at extended operation, which in the United States is licensing beyond 
60 years.  To achieve the goals of extended operation, various forms of on-line monitoring and predictive 
remaining-life methodologies will need to be developed, demonstrated and deployed. 
Based upon the clear need to continue to operate nuclear reactors in the U.S. for extended periods of 
time, the knowledge that new degradation mechanisms have the potential to challenge the safety design 
safety margins of reactors and the advances in diagnostics and prognostics, the information in this report 
provides the basis for the following conclusions. 
1. The NRC will need to develop tools that enable NRC staff to evaluate the impact of degradation 
more quickly and effectively.  
2. Addressing the technical gaps needed to develop effective PMMD programs will require 
substantially more resources than are available to the NRC.  Therefore, the NRC will need to 
develop a major program that prioritizes NRC regulatory needs, leads the appropriate research 
efforts based upon priorities and participates in national and international research to supplement 
NRC resources. 
3. Actively participate in the development of the national codes and standards that will support 
effective PMMD programs. 
The conclusions described above will help address the following needs. 
 There is a need to establish the science base necessary to develop effective PMMD programs.  This 
science base needs to address the following topics. 
– The material science that underpins NPP component aging and degradation  
– Understand stressor impacts 
– The need for new and improved on-line monitoring that will enable early detection and 
characterization of degradation. 
– Ensures the development of the technical basis for regulatory and standards framework that 
requires effective PMMD programs  
There is a need for NRC to more fully engage both national and international efforts relevant to 
PMMD. 
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A.1 World Nuclear Power Reactors 2006–07 and Uranium 
Requirements 
 
17 October 2007 
 
Nuclear 
Electricity 
Generation 2006 
Reactors 
Operable 
October 2007 
Reactors Under 
Construction 
October 2007 
Reactors 
Planned 
October 2007 
Reactors 
Proposed 
October 2007 
Uranium 
Required 
2007 
 
Billion 
kWh % e No. MWe No. MWe No. MWe No. MWe 
Tonnes 
U 
Argentina 7.2 6.9 2 935 1 692 1 740 1 740 135 
Armenia 2.4 42 1 376 0 0 0 0 1 1000 51 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000 0 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000 0 0 0 
Belgium 44.3 54 7 5728 0 0 0 0 0 0 1079 
Brazil 13.0 3.3 2 1901 0 0 1 1245 4 4000 338 
Bulgaria  18.1 44 2 1906 0 0 2 1900 0 0 255 
Canada*  92.4 16 18 12595 2 1540 4 4000 2 2200 1836 
China  51.8 1.9 11 8587 5 4540 30 32000 86 68000 1454 
Czech 
Republic  
24.5 31 6 3472 0 0 0 0 2 1900 550 
Egypt  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1000 0 
Finland  22.0 28 4 2696 1 1600 0 0 1 1000 472 
France  428.7 78 59 63473 1 1630 0 0 1 1600 10368 
Germany  158.7 32 17 20339 0 0 0 0 0 0 3486 
Hungary  12.5 38 4 1826 0 0 0 0 2 2000 254 
India  15.6 2.6 17 3779 6 2976 10 8560 9 4800 491 
Indonesia  0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000 0 0 0 
Iran  0 0 0 0 1 915 2 1900 1 300 143 
Israel  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1200 0 
Japan  291.5 30 55 47577 2 2285 11 14945 1 1100 8872 
Kazakhstan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 300 0 
Korea DPR 
(North)  
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 950 0 0 0 
Korea RO 
(South)  
141.2 39 20 17533 2 2000 6 7600 0 0 3037 
Lithuania  8.0 69 1 1185 0 0 0 0 2 3200 134 
Mexico  10.4 4.9 2 1310 0 0 0 0 2 2000 257 
Netherlands  3.3 3.5 1 485 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 
Pakistan  2.6 2.7 2 400 1 300 2 600 2 2000 64 
Romania  5.2 9.0 2 1310 0 0 2 1310 1 655 92 
Russia  144.3 16 31 21743 7 4920 8 9600 20 18200 3777 
Slovakia  16.6 57 5 2064 2 840 0 0 0 0 299 
Slovenia  5.3 40 1 696 0 0 0 0 1 1000 145 
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 17 October 2007 
 
Nuclear 
Electricity 
Generation 2006 
Reactors 
Operable 
October 2007 
Reactors Under 
Construction 
October 2007 
Reactors 
Planned 
October 2007 
Reactors 
Proposed 
October 2007 
Uranium 
Required 
2007 
 
Billion 
kWh % e No. MWe No. MWe No. MWe No. MWe 
Tonnes 
U 
South 
Africa  
10.1 4.4 2 1842 0 0 1 165 24 4000 332 
Spain  57.4 20 8 7442 0 0 0 0 0 0 1473 
Sweden  65.1 48 10 9086 0 0 0 0 0 0 1468 
Switzerland  26.4 37 5 3220 0 0 0 0 1 1000 575 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4000 0 
Turkey  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4500 0 
Ukraine  84.8 48 15 13168 0 0 2 1900 20 27000 2003 
United 
Kingdom  
69.2 18 19 11035 0 0 0 0 0 0 2021 
USA  787.2 19 104 99049 0 0 7 10180 25 32000 20050 
Vietnam  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2000 0 
WORLD** 2658 16 439 372,002 33 26,838 94 101,595 222 193,095 66,529 
 
Sources:  
Reactor data:  WNA to 17/10/07. 
IAEA- for nuclear electricity production & percentage of electricity (% e) 5/07. 
WNA: Global Nuclear Fuel Market (reference scenario) - for U.  Includes first cores for new reactors.  
 Operating = Connected to the grid 
 Building/Construction = first concrete for reactor poured, or major refurbishment under way 
 Planned = Approvals, funding or major commitment in place, mostly expected in operation within 
8 years, or construction well advanced but suspended indefinitely 
 Proposed = clear intention or proposal but still without firm commitment.  Planned and Proposed are 
generally gross MWe 
 TWh = Terawatt-hours (billion kilowatt-hours), MWe = Megawatt net (electrical as distinct from 
thermal), kWh = kilowatt-hour. 
 
NB:  66,529 tU = 78,458 t U3O8  
 
* In Canada, ‘construction’ figure is 2 laid-up Bruce A reactors.  
 
** The world total includes 6 reactors operating on Taiwan with a combined capacity of 4884 MWe, 
which generated a total of 38.3 billion kWh in 2006 (accounting for 20% of Taiwan’s total electricity 
generation).  Taiwan has two reactors under construction with a combined capacity of 2600 MWe. 
A.2 Nuclear Power Plants, World-Wide, Reactor Types 
Mainly pressurized water reactors (PWR) are used in the nuclear power plants world-wide – 61% 
according to the number, 65% according to the output - followed by boiling water reactors (BWR) – 23% 
according to the number, 23% according to the output. 
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 A.3 Nuclear Power Plants, World-Wide, Reactor Types, 30 September 
2007 
 
Operational 
Reactor Type Number Electr. Net Output MW 
PWR 265 243,218 
BWR 94 85,044 
CANDU/D2O-PWR 44 22,367 
GGR/AGR 18 9,034 
RBMK 16 11,404 
FBR 2 690 
Total 439 371,757 
 
From European Nuclear Soc Web site http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encylopedia/n/npp-reactor-
types.htm 
 
 
 
(NRC site) 
 
Home > Nuclear Reactors > Operating Reactors > List of Power Reactor Units 
List of Power Reactor Units  
For more information, see Map of Power Reactor Sites and our annually published Information Digest, Appendix A. 
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 Plant Name 
Docket Number 
Reactor 
Type Location Owner/Operator 
NRC 
Region 
Arkansas Nuclear 1 
05000313 
PWR 6 MI WNW of Russellville, AR Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc.  
4 
Arkansas Nuclear 2 
05000368 
PWR 6 MI WNW of Russellville, AR Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc.  
4 
Beaver Valley 1 
05000334 
PWR 17 MI W of McCandless, PA FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Operating Co.  
1 
Beaver Valley 2 
05000412 
PWR 17 MI W of McCandless, PA FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Operating Co.  
1 
Braidwood 1 
05000456 
PWR 24 MI SSW of Joilet, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
Braidwood 2 
05000457 
PWR 24 MI SSW of Joilet, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
Browns Ferry 1 
05000259 
BWR 10 MI NW of Decatur, AL Tennessee Valley 
Authority  
2 
Browns Ferry 2 
05000260 
BWR 10 MI NW of Decatur, AL Tennessee Valley 
Authority  
2 
Browns Ferry 3 
05000296 
BWR 10 MI NW of Decatur, AL Tennessee Valley 
Authority  
2 
Brunswick 1 
05000325 
BWR 2 MI N of Southport, NC Progress Energy  2 
Brunswick 2 
05000324 
BWR 2 MI N of Southport, NC Progress Energy 2 
Byron 1 
05000454 
PWR 17 MI SW of Rockford, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
Byron 2 
05000455 
PWR 17 MI SW of Rockford, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
Callaway 
05000483 
PWR 10 MI SE of Fulton, MO Ameren UE  4 
Calvert Cliffs 1 
05000317 
PWR 40 MI S of Annapolis, MD Constellation Energy 1 
Calvert Cliffs 2 
05000318 
PWR 40 MI S of Annapolis, MD Constellation Energy 1 
Catawba 1 
05000413 
PWR 6 MI NW of Rock Hill, SC Duke Energy Power 
Company, LLC  
2 
Catawba 2 
05000414 
PWR 6 MI NW of Rock Hill, SC Duke Energy Power 
Company, LLC 
2 
Clinton 
05000461 
BWR 6 MI E of Clinton, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC 
3 
Columbia 
Generating Station 
05000397 
BWR 12 MI NW of Richland, WA Energy Northwest  4 
Comanche Peak 1 
05000445 
PWR 4 MI N of Glen Rose, TX TXU Generating 
Company LP  
4 
Comanche Peak 2 
05000446 
PWR 4 MI N of Glen Rose, TX TXU Generating 
Company LP  
4 
Cooper 
05000298 
BWR 23 MI S of Nebraska City, NE Nebraska Public Power 
District  
4 
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 Plant Name 
Docket Number 
Reactor 
Type Location Owner/Operator 
NRC 
Region 
Crystal River 3 
05000302 
PWR 7 MI NW of Crystal River, FL Progress Energy 2 
D.C. Cook 1 
05000315 
PWR 11 MI S of Benton Harbor, MI Indiana/Michigan Power 
Co.  
3 
D.C. Cook 2  
05000316 
PWR 11 MI S of Benton Harbor, MI IndianaMichigan Power 
Co.  
3 
Davis-Besse 
05000346 
PWR 21 MI ESE of Toledo, OH FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Operating Co.  
3 
Diablo Canyon 1 
05000275 
PWR 12 MI WSW of San Luis Obispo, 
CA 
Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co.  
4 
Diablo Canyon 2 
05000323 
PWR 12 MI WSW of San Luis Obispo, 
CA 
Pacific Gas & Electric 
Co.  
4 
Dresden 2 
05000237 
BWR 9 MI E of Morris, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
Dresden 3 
05000249 
BWR 9 MI E of Morris, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
Duane Arnold 
05000331 
BWR 8 MI NW of Cedar Rapids, IA Florida Power & Light 
Co.  
3 
Farley 1 
05000348 
PWR 18 MI SE of Dothan, AL Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co.  
2 
Farley 2 
05000364 
PWR 18 MI SE of Dothan, AL Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. 
2 
Fermi 2 
05000341 
BWR 25 MI NE of Toledo, OH Detroit Edison Co.  3 
FitzPatrick 
05000333 
BWR 8 MI NE of Oswego, NY Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc.  
1 
Fort Calhoun 
05000285 
PWR 19 MI N of Omaha, NE Omaha Public Power 
District  
4 
Ginna 
05000244 
PWR 20 MI NE of Rochester, NY Constellation Energy 1 
Grand Gulf 1 
05000416 
BWR 25 MI S of Vicksburg, MS Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
4 
Hatch 1 
05000321 
BWR 11 MI N of Baxley, GA Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc.  
2 
Hatch 2 
05000366 
BWR 11 MI N of Baxley, GA Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co., Inc.  
2 
Hope Creek 1 
05000354 
BWR 18 MI SE of Wilmington, DE PSE&G Nuclear  1 
Indian Point 2 
05000247 
PWR 24 MI N of New York City, NY Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
1 
Indian Point 3 
05000286 
PWR 24 MI N of New York City, NY Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
1 
Kewaunee 
05000305 
PWR 27 MI E of Green Bay, WI Dominion Generation  3 
La Salle 1 
05000373 
BWR 11 MI SE of Ottawa, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
La Salle 2 
05000374 
BWR 11 MI SE of Ottawa, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
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 Plant Name 
Docket Number 
Reactor 
Type Location Owner/Operator 
NRC 
Region 
Limerick 1 
05000352 
BWR 21 MI NW of Philadelphia, PA Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
1 
Limerick 2 
05000353 
BWR 21 MI NW of Philadelphia, PA Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
1 
McGuire 1 
05000369 
PWR 17 MI N of Charlotte, NC Duke Energy Power 
Company, LLC 
2 
McGuire 2 
05000370 
PWR 17 MI N of Charlotte, NC Duke Energy Power 
Company, LLC 
2 
Millstone 2 
05000336 
PWR 3.2 MI WSW of New London, 
CT 
Dominion Generation  1 
Millstone 3 
05000423 
PWR 3.2 MI WSW of New London, 
CT 
Dominion Generation  1 
Monticello 
05000263 
BWR 30 MI NW of Minneapolis, MN Nuclear Management 
Co.  
3 
Nine Mile Point 1 
05000220 
BWR 6 MI NE of Oswego, NY Constellation Energy 1 
Nine Mile Point 2 
05000410 
BWR 6 MI NE of Oswego, NY Constellation Energy 1 
North Anna 1 
05000338 
PWR 40 MI NW of Richmond, VA Dominion Generation 2 
North Anna 2 
05000339 
PWR 40 MI NW of Richmond, VA Dominion Generation 2 
Oconee 1 
05000269 
PWR 30 MI W of Greenville, SC Duke Energy Power 
Company, LLC 
2 
Oconee 2 
05000270 
PWR 30 MI W of Greenville, SC Duke Energy Power 
Company, LLC 
2 
Oconee 3 
05000287 
PWR 30 MI W of Greenville, SC Duke Energy Power 
Company, LLC 
2 
Oyster Creek 
05000219 
BWR 9 MI S of Toms River, NJ Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC 
1 
Palisades 
05000255 
PWR 5 MI S of South Haven, MI Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
3 
Palo Verde 1 
05000528 
PWR 36 MI W of Phoenix, AZ Arizona Public Service 
Co.  
4 
Palo Verde 2 
05000529 
PWR 36 MI W of Phoenix, AZ Arizona Public Service 
Co.  
4 
Palo Verde 3 
05000530 
PWR 36 MI W of Phoenix, AZ Arizona Public Service 
Co.  
4 
Peach Bottom 2 
05000277 
BWR 17.9 MI S of Lancaster, PA Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
1 
Peach Bottom 3 
05000278 
BWR 17.9 MI S of Lancaster, PA Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
1 
Perry 1 
05000440 
BWR 7 MI NE of Painesville, OH FirstEnergy Nuclear 
Operating Co.  
3 
Pilgrim 1 
05000293 
BWR 4 MI SE of Plymouth, MA Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
1 
Point Beach 1 
05000266 
PWR 13 MI NNW of Manitowoc, WI FPL Energy Point 
Beach, LLC 
3 
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 Plant Name 
Docket Number 
Reactor 
Type Location Owner/Operator 
NRC 
Region 
Point Beach 2 
05000301 
PWR 13 MI NNW of Manitowoc, WI FPL Energy Point 
Beach, LLC 
3 
Prairie Island 1 
05000282 
PWR 28 MI SE of Minneapolis, MN Nuclear Management 
Co.  
3 
Prairie Island 2 
05000306 
PWR 28 MI SE of Minneapolis, MN Nuclear Management 
Co.  
3 
Quad Cities 1 
05000254 
BWR 20 MI NE of Moline, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
Quad Cities 2 
05000265 
BWR 20 MI NE of Moline, IL Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC  
3 
River Bend 1 
05000458 
BWR 24 MI NNW of Baton Rouge, LA Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
4 
Robinson 2 
05000261 
PWR 26 MI from Florence, SC Progress Energy  2 
Saint Lucie 1 
05000335 
PWR 12 MI SE of Ft. Pierce, FL Florida Power & Light 
Co.  
2 
Saint Lucie 2 
05000389 
PWR 12 MI SE of Ft. Pierce, FL Florida Power & Light 
Co.  
2 
Salem 1 
05000272 
PWR 18 MI S of Wilmington, DE PSE&G Nuclear  1 
Salem 2 
05000311 
PWR 18 MI S of Wilmington, DE PSE&G Nuclear  1 
San Onofre 2 
05000361 
PWR 4 MI SE of San Clemente, CA Southern California 
Edison Co.  
4 
San Onofre 3 
05000362 
PWR 4 MI SE of San Clemente, CA Southern California 
Edison Co.  
4 
Seabrook 1 
05000443 
PWR 13 MI S of Portsmouth, NH Florida Power & Light 
Co. 
1 
Sequoyah 1 
05000327 
PWR 9.5 MI NE of Chattanooga, TN Tennessee Valley 
Authority  
2 
Sequoyah 2 
05000328 
PWR 9.5 MI NE of Chattanooga, TN Tennessee Valley 
Authority  
2 
Shearon Harris 1 
05000400 
PWR 20 MI SW of Raleigh, NC Progress Energy 2 
South Texas 1 
05000498 
PWR 12 MI SSW of Bay City, TX STP Nuclear Operating 
Co.  
4 
South Texas 2 
05000499 
PWR 12 MI SSW of Bay City, TX STP Nuclear Operating 
Co.  
4 
Summer 
05000395 
PWR 26 MI NW of Columbia, SC South Carolina Electric 
& Gas Co.  
2 
Surry 1 
05000280 
PWR 17 MI NW of Newport News, VA Dominion Generation 2 
Surry 2 
05000281 
PWR 17 MI NW of Newport News, VA Dominion Generation 2 
Susquehanna 1 
05000387 
BWR 7 MI NE of Berwick, PA PPL Susquehanna, LLC  1 
Susquehanna 2 
05000388 
BWR 7 MI NE of Berwick, PA PPL Susquehanna, LLC  1 
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Plant Name 
Docket Number 
Reactor 
Type Location Owner/Operator 
NRC 
Region 
Three Mile Island 1 
05000289 
PWR 10 MI SE of Harrisburg, PA Exelon Generation Co., 
LLC 
1 
Turkey Point 3 
05000250 
PWR 25 MI S of Miami, FL Florida Power & Light 
Co.  
2 
Turkey Point 4 
05000251 
PWR 25 MI S of Miami, FL Florida Power & Light 
Co.  
2 
Vermont Yankee 
05000271 
BWR 5 MI S of Brattleboro, VT Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
1 
Vogtle 1 
05000424 
PWR 26 MI SE of Augusta, GA Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. 
2 
Vogtle 2 
05000425 
PWR 26 MI SE of Augusta, GA Southern Nuclear 
Operating Co. 
2 
Waterford 3 
05000382 
PWR 20 MI W of New Orleans, LA Entergy Nuclear 
Operations, Inc. 
4 
Watts Bar 1 
05000390 
PWR 10 MI S of Spring City, TN Tennessee Valley 
Authority  
2 
Wolf Creek 1 
05000482 
PWR 3.5 MI NE of Burlington, KS Wolf Creek Nuclear 
Operating Corp.  
4 
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 1.0  Abstract 
 
This overview research plan presents a number of summary work plans (WPs) for the conduct of 
international cooperative research that could lead to the implementation of Proactive Materials 
Degradation Management (PMDM) programs.  These plans are aimed at developing knowledge and 
technology necessary to predict and manage materials degradation that can occur in light water reactors 
(LWRs).  These plans provide a broad framework for the specific detailed research plans to be developed 
by the participants for the research they will contribute to the cooperation.  One of the important aims of 
the WPs is to include the broadest possible consideration of conditions that include the current range of 
LWRs.  Thus, a study of electrochemical potential would include oxygenated and deoxygenated 
conditions.  A study of alloys would include Alloy 690TT, 600TT, 800, and stainless steel.  The work 
plans are directed mainly to modes of degradation that have already shown to be the most aggressive, 
mainly stress corrosion cracking.  In this consideration of relatively rapid penetration, flow assisted 
corrosion (FAC) is also important.   
 
The scope of this international cooperative research program encompasses research and development of 
technology related to a) degradation mechanisms including the identification and quantification of 
important parameters and dependencies that affect the degradation initiation and growth, b) mitigation 
techniques to ameliorate or eliminate susceptibility to degradation, c) nondestructive examination 
techniques and continuous monitoring for early detection of degradation and its precursors, and d) 
effective repair/replacement techniques. 
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 2.0  Executive Summary 
 
This overview research program plan describes work plans (WPs) aimed at developing knowledge and 
technology that would allow for the development and implementation of proactive materials degradation 
management (PMDM) programs for light water reactors (LWRs).  This PMDM could be accomplished 
either by the development and implementation of mitigation processes or by the reliable inspection, 
monitoring and timely repair of susceptible components.  These WPs represent recommendations from 
technical leaders in the world nuclear community for specific work that should be undertaken within the 
International Cooperative Research Program for Proactive Materials Degradation Management program 
ICRP-PMDM).  These recommendations have been developed from participation by these world 
technical leaders in three meetings and from separate written inputs provided by several of them. 
 
The ICRP-PMDM emphasizes stress corrosion cracking (SCC) as the most likely to produce significant 
degradation and the majority of the WPs reflect this emphasis.  This emphasis on SCC is consistent with 
past experience.  
 
The current overview research plan contains 46 WPs for assessing degradation of materials, 7 for 
development of mitigation strategies, and 5 for nondestructive examination (NDE) technique 
developments.  The latter two categories are presented broadly, and many more research projects can fit 
under these categories. 
 
Emphasis is also placed on the WPs to address the continua of which they are a part.  For example, rather 
than a WP emphasizing only the standard BWR RCS temperature of 288°C, the ICRP-PMDM encourages 
research programs to include a broader range of temperature such as both PWR and BWR temperatures.  
Such an approach provides a broader understanding applicable to both designs and connects already 
existing data.  Other such continua include pH, electrochemical potential, chemical species, alloy 
composition, alloy structure, cold work, irradiation, and stress. 
 
The ICRP-PMDM also recognizes that, while it is desirable to evaluate degradation initiation and 
progression over 60 years of reactor operation, no SCC phenomena known require the longer times to 
occur.  Rather, it appears that such times will result from the necessity of conditions, which are required 
for SCC, to develop; such conditions are in the general province of aging that is associated with local 
metallurgy, surface deposits, and solid state diffusion. In the past such processes have been associated, for 
example, with the accumulation of deposits inside drilled hole crevices of tube supports.  Until such 
deposits accumulated, the necessary chemicals to produce SCC could not accumulate; only then, after two 
preliminary steps could SCC develop.  The period over which such preliminary processes develop before 
SCC could start is called the “precursor period” in this overview research plan.   
 
The ICRP-PMDM also recognizes that prediction depends both on a sound starting point and a solid 
scientifically based avenue for projecting predictions.  Thus, experiments in the ICRP-PMDM will utilize 
alloys such as Alloy 600MA and similar early materials for a basis; the prediction depends on the 
projections from this point. 
 
A review of recommendations for research programs proposed by the international community at three 
coordination workshops for the ICRP-PMDM and of the additional individual inputs indicates that: 
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 1. There is a body of excellent science and engineering that has been recommended for work plans. 
 
2. The organizations who have participated in recommending these plans represent major nuclear 
countries. 
 
3. There are clear avenues for developing the knowledge to predict and quantify future degradation. 
 
4. There are also sound avenues for developing mitigations for possible degradations as well as for 
developing advanced NDE programs. 
 
5. There is also significant personal commitment on the part of those who have actively participated in 
meetings and provided input to this overview cooperative research program plan.  
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 3.0  Introduction 
 
Reactor operating experiences indicate that a proactive approach to materials degradation management 
would be preferred to the reactive approaches of the past.   
 
The NRC has been pursuing a two-step approach to facilitate implementation of proactive materials 
degradation management programs. 
 
The first step was to identify materials and components that could realistically be expected to degrade in 
the future.  This first step has been accomplished with the completion of a Phenomena Identification and 
Ranking Table (PIRT) study by eight international experts.  Their work was published as NUREG/CR-
6923, “Expert Panel Report on Proactive Materials Degradation Assessment.” 
  
The second step is to assemble an international cooperative research group and program to develop the 
knowledge and technology to allow implementation of Proactive Materials Degradation Management 
(PMDM) programs. 
 
Given that the components susceptible to future degradation have been identified in the NRC proactive 
materials degradation assessment study and other studies, PMDM of susceptible components could be 
accomplished by two approaches: 
 
a. Take actions to either eliminate or mitigate the susceptibility of components to degradation, 
and/or 
b. Inspect, monitor, and conduct timely repair or replacement of susceptible components.  
 
Implementation of either approach will require certain knowledge and technology.  Management of 
degradation using the first approach of eliminating or mitigating the susceptibility, will require knowledge 
of degradation mechanisms and a quantitative understanding of the important parameters and 
dependencies that affect the degradation mechanisms.  Degradation management using the second 
approach of inspection, monitoring, and timely repair will require knowledge and technology such as 
effective inservice inspection (ISI) and continuous crack monitoring techniques in addition to crack 
initiation and growth rate information for implementing effective timing and frequency of inspections and 
timely repairs.  Also effective (and benign) welding and repair techniques and processes are needed. 
 
This overview program plan presents preliminary work plans (WP) for different subjects that have been 
developed as a part of organizing the ICRP-PMDM.  The WPs may be used by prospective participants in 
the ICRP-PMDM to develop detailed research proposals for the research that they will conduct and 
contribute to the cooperation.  Input for these WPs has been provided by experts in the world water 
reactor community as individual write-ups and through group discussion and writing at three working 
meetings at which the ICRP-PMDM was discussed:  
 
 Snowbird Resort, Salt Lake city, Utah, USA  August 16 and 19, 2005, 
 Tokyo, Offices of Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, November 9-11, 2005, and 
 Charleston South Carolina, Mills House Hotel, May 11-13, 2006. 
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A list of attendees at these meetings is given in the Appendix. 
 
During these three meetings the ideas of these work plans were developed in active floor discussions and 
breakout sessions.  Some of the ideas in these work plans were also developed during deliberations for the 
NRC proactive materials degradation assessment study (NUREG/CR-6923) over the period 2004-2005.  
Many work plans were prepared by international contributors in extensive detail and submitted to 
Muscara (NRC) before and after the three PMDM coordination meetings.  In this overview research plan, 
the essences of these work plans are given.  
 
The principal objective of the WPs described in this overview research program plan is to provide a 
framework from which individual participants can develop detailed program plans for the research they 
will conduct and contribute to the cooperation.  The subjects of the WPs are those that the international 
community believes should be incorporated in the ICRP-PMDM.  Additional WPs under the broad areas 
addressed in this overview program plan can be suggested by prospective participants and incorporated in 
the plan. 
 
Section 4.0 describes the central issues for developing an understanding of degradation as related to 
initiation of SCC, propagation of SCC, and aging processes.  SCC is emphasized since experience and 
proactive materials degradation assessment studies have shown that this mode is the most likely to lead to 
unexpected and rapid degradation.  Some other rapid processes, e.g. fast fracture and FAC are also 
considered. 
 
Section 5.0 describes the specific draft WPs where analysis and experiments are proposed for developing 
an understanding of degradation processes and quantitative relationships of the important parameters and 
dependencies that affect degradation initiation and progression.  This understanding and relationships will 
provide bases for a) proactive prediction of potential future degradation of water reactor components, b) 
developing mitigating actions and techniques to reduce or eliminate the susceptibility of components to 
the potential degradation, and c) for implementing timely inspection and replacement of components. 
 
Section 6.0 describes specific WPs for developing mitigation and repair/replacement strategies.  Section 
7.0 describes specific WPs for developing nondestructive examination (NDE) techniques for ISI and 
monitoring. 
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 4.0  Principal themes and guidelines for work plans 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the expected scopes and guidelines for the WPs in Section 5 
related to developing an understanding of degradation processes and to identifying and quantifying the 
important parameters and dependencies that affect degradation initiation and growth.  Each of the work 
plans emphasizes a small but critical quantity of work aimed at the overall goals stated above.  However, 
each work plan and the subsequent detailed research plans developed by individual participants should 
consider guidelines in this section. 
 
4.1  Proactivity and long term predictions 
 
The overall goal of the ICRP-PMDM is to allow implementation of proactive actions to effectively 
manage potential future degradation of materials.  As such, each WP and subsequent research plans 
should consider: 
 
1. Assuring that the basis for future understanding and prediction is credible and quantitative, i.e. 
predicting from an uncertain basis would not provide a credible prediction. 
 
2. The avenue for developing knowledge and prediction is based on good fundamental science since 
predicting decades into the future needs some authoritative support because there may be no base of 
reactor experience on which to calibrate the predictions. 
 
3. Using some of the past data from materials now in use, e.g. Alloy 600MA, to calibrate predictions. 
 
4. Understanding and predicting degradation over time periods up to 60 years of reactor operation under 
past and future operating conditions and environments. 
 
5. Operating conditions are expected to become more intense as operators desire more power output.  This 
direction implies higher temperatures, higher flows, and longer cycles.  Further, pressure will increase 
to minimize time and frequency of inspections. 
 
4.2  The evolution of SCC 
 
A major part of the research under Section 5 emphasizes quantifying SCC since, based on past 
experience, it is the most likely mode of degradation that leads to perforation or disabling of components.  
 
The NRC proactive materials degradation assessment report (NUREG/CR-6923) presents detailed 
discussions on the evolution of SCC.  Figure 1, taken from that report, describes schematically the 
evolution of SCC.  This figure includes the following stages: 
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Figure 1  Schematic view of penetration vs. time for the six stages of SCC 
 
1. Precursor:  The precursor stage is the time during which conditions for the initiation of SCC 
develop.  During this precursor period the processes that occur have nothing to do with the 
evolution of the SCC itself.  During the precursor period, the principal processes that prepare 
conditions for subsequent SCC might include changing the surface chemistry in an adjacent 
deposit, changing the grain boundary chemistry due to thermal or irradiation processes, surface 
mechanical abuse, adsorbing species that favor absorption of hydrogen, or changing local stresses 
due to accumulation of constrained corrosion products.  Precursor times vary for different 
degradation occurrences:  No precursor as is the cases for FAC or LPSCC; relatively short 
precursors such in the case for most of the SCC in steam generators associated with the buildup of 
deposits and chemicals in superheated crevices; and long precursors such as those cases where tens 
of years are required before the necessary conditions are present for SCC to start. 
 
2. Incubation:  Here, the earliest processes occur that lead specifically to the beginning of SCC, but 
these are not readily detected.  These processes may involve absorbing hydrogen, changing the 
properties of the passive film, diffusion of environmental species into grain boundaries, 
intergranular corrosion, or relative enrichment/depletion of alloy species. 
 
3. Early initiation:  These processes are those involved with the formation of very short SCC 
sometimes in “colonies” which are typically called “pre-coalescence SCC.”  Not all SCC submodes 
exhibit this step. 
 
4. Later initiation:  In the “later initiation” step the small SCC begin to coalesce and the local stress 
begins to play a specific role in continued coalescence and lengthening.  Typically low rates are 
observed but higher than that of the small initial SCC. 
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5. Propagation:  In propagation, a generally single SCC develops and the velocity is typically ten times 
or more than that of the SCC in “later initiation” step. 
 
6. Fast fracture:  Here, the SCC is sufficiently deep that the prevailing local stresses produce fast 
fracture. 
 
Some general comments on the stages of initiation and propagation: 
 
1. The stages through “later initiation” tend to be chemically dominated and are directly related to 
perforation in thin sections such as SG tubes. 
 
2. The “propagation” stage tends to be less dominated by external environments and is more 
dominated by general crack tip chemistry.  Propagation dominated conditions tend to be more 
relevant to thick sections.  However, initiation cannot be so readily dismissed 
 
3. While it is usually presumed that the initiation stage is easily, although slowly overcome, this is not 
always true and some SCC processes, e.g. in cold worked primary piping, may be inhibited at the 
initiation stage. 
 
4. The steps portrayed in Figure 1 apply to both intergranular SCC and transgranular SCC.  However, 
in LWRs most of the SCC has been intergranular.   
 
5. The characteristics of existing SCC indicate that it is not likely that it should require more than 
about 10 years for full initiation and propagation although very low crack velocities have been 
measured.  It is more likely that long times are associated with long precursor times related to aging 
where thermal diffusion, accumulation of surface chemistries, change in alloy structure and similar 
processes that depend on long times are involved. (Ref. NUREG/CR-6923, Appendix B-15)    
 
Research in the ICRP-PMDM program can beneficially be directed to any or a combination of the six 
steps in Figure 1 where more knowledge and quantification is needed for prediction or where there may 
be slow steps that can be exploited to prevent the overall development of SCC.  The precursor step is one 
of the most fruitful for investigating long times before SCC reaches the fast fracture step. 
 
4.3  The continua and applicability 
 
An important aim of the ICRP-PMDM is that the research findings be broadly applicable, e.g. to various 
types of water reactors including PWR, BWR, CANDU, and VVVRs and where these are produced by 
various manufacturers and used by different utilities.  This general mandate is not to suggest that each WP 
or participants’ research plans “be all things to all people;” but rather, where possible, multiple materials 
or multiple environments should be considered. 
 
The “broad applicability” mandate also produces a great benefit in that it produces connections among 
sets of data where the quantitative patterns can be compared, contrasted, and permit synergistically 
derived predictions.  Such broader bases provide further credibility to analytical models. 
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 This “broad applicability” suggests that the WPs and research plans consider, where possible, the 
following continua: 
 
1. Electrochemical potential:  A specific example here is the possible connection between extensive data 
for the effect of potential on crack velocity obtained for BWR normal water chemistry (NWC) 
applications and for PWR primary water chemistry applications.  By conducting experiments from 
either end of the potential scale typical of these reactor types but extending the experiments into the 
domain of electrochemical potentials of the other, both applications benefit.  Such a connection also 
permits direct application of data to the secondary side of PWR steam generators (SGs) and to 
hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) for BWRs. 
 
2. pH at temperature:  Somewhat different pHs exist on the primary side of PWRs, the reactor coolant 
system (RCS) of BWRs, the secondary side of PWRs, ad the primary side of CANDUs.  Further, pHs 
in crevices are generally known but are also associated with varying concentrations of more 
concentrated electrolytes.  Since the formation of protective films depends so closely to the pH, 
developing pH continua in the WPs would be valuable similar to such continua of potential. 
 
3. Concentrations of species:  In the bulk electrolytes the concentrations of impurity and intentionally 
added species are generally low according to guidelines for water chemistry.  However, in superheated 
crevices and with deposits on surfaces, local concentrations, especially of impurity species, increase.  
Concentrations of impurity species inside SCC also seems to increase owing to effects of potential 
gradients on migration.  Regardless, the continua of concentrations of species need to be considered as 
conditions vary among reactor applications. 
 
4. Alloy composition:  All of the LWR reactor types utilize most of their structural materials from the Fe-
Cr-Ni alloy system, sometimes in similar or somewhat different heat treatments.  Also, the welding 
alloys and cast alloys come from this system.  Thus, VVVR data should be applicable to primary 
piping; alloy 800 data should be applicable to stainless steels and to high nickel alloys.  e.g. lead 
studies show such connections.  LPSCC is known to occur in stainless steels.  While some of these 
connections are fragmentary, sparse data suggest either connections or legitimate boundaries. 
 
5. Alloy structure:  Elements of alloy structure that form continua include grain size, sensitization, 
wrought and weld structures.  There are well known dependencies of SCC on grain size although some 
of the results from studies of SCC in LWRs exhibit opposite dependencies.  Sensitization is known to 
inhibit some of the submodes of SCC, e.g. LPSCC; why sensitization exerts such effects is not clear 
but there is an important continuum of degree of sensitization.  It appears that anisotropy provides 
another continuum associated with the SCC of alloys. 
 
6. Cold work:  Both initiation and propagation exhibit strong dependencies on cold work up to 20-30%.  
Further, cold work on the surface and in the bulk are often different owing to such factors as surface 
abuse or machining effects.  Cold work is often the difference between significant SCC and not.  
Increasing cold work produces SCC in Alloy 690TT exposed to pure water.  Cold work arises in 
welding as well as in fabrication of complex geometries such as bends.  Further, it appears that many 
of the effects of cold work are similar to effects of irradiation or higher strength achieved by heat 
treatments. 
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 7. Irradiation:  Irradiation is not pertinent to all locations in the primary and secondary systems.  
However, it is clear that irradiation accelerates SCC, e.g., IASCC.  It is also clear that there is some 
connection among cold work, alloy strength, and irradiation.  Where applicable, this continuum of 
irradiation should be considered. 
 
8. Temperature:  The range of temperatures of interest to LWR performance includes 50 to 350°C.  In the 
full power operating range temperatures from 200-350°C range are relevant.  In these ranges, both 1/T 
patterns apply as do bi-modal patterns of both + and – slopes on the 1/T correlations depending on the 
water chemistry and material.  This bi-modal option means that extrapolations should be carried out 
with caution.  Further, it means that some more robust explanations of the bimodal patterns are needed. 
 
9. Stress:  Both initiation and propagation depend strongly on stress with exponents in the range of 4 
depending broadly on other factors.  Further, stresses of direct application to SCC are less frequently 
the calculated applied stresses but more likely from residual stresses.  Also, stresses seem to interact 
differently with initiation than propagation although the criteria for such transitions are not clear.  
Stresses, which are applicable to SCC propagation, often vary greatly within the component.  The 
stress continuum is important as it includes both applied stresses and residual stresses, the latter of 
which is often the dominating factor of stress. 
 
Within the domain of the stress continuum other stress-related parameters are important to 
understanding degradation: 
 
a. Mean stress. 
b. R ratio including what is called “ripple” stresses, which have been shown to produce important 
accelerative effects with small differences in magnitude in the maximum and minimum stresses. 
c. Periodic loading and unloading.  This may be a form of “ripple” effect but this is not clear. 
d. Cyclic frequency where frequencies below 1 Hz seem to be more accelerative for both initiation 
and propagation. 
e. Slow constant straining. 
f. Stress intensifications for geometrical reasons. 
 
Considering the stress continuum is complicated by the lack of certainty of residual stresses and the 
fact that the intensity of SCC so greatly depends on the total stress at the site of the SCC advance.  It is 
important to establish reliable estimates of magnitudes and directions for the local sum of applied and 
residual stresses.  
 
Further, regarding residual stresses, they exist at surfaces as result of surface abuse, along with local 
cold work; and they vary through the bulk and influence the course of propagation. 
 
While less frequent, the contribution of corrosion products to stresses inside SCC or inside constricted 
crevices have been shown to be significant.  Such a situation could produce the “denting” phenomenon 
at the tops of tubesheets even with 690TT alloy tubes. 
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 Finally, the continuum of stress also includes that between SCC and CF or between static loads and 
fully cyclic loads.  From a design point of view there is no clear fundamentally based and quantitative 
connection between the two.  Nonetheless this is an important continuum. 
 
4.4 Interactions and complexity 
 
Starting from the point of view of the desire to incorporate various continua into experimental and 
analytical work aimed at predicting degradation, the interaction of these continua should also be 
considered.  Considerations of such complexity are relevant to engineering applications; however, 
remaining focused on the continua provides good bounding conditions. 
 
Certain complexities should be considered in the ICRP-PMDM.  Such complexities should remain with 
the judgment of the individual investigators and discussed in the individual research plans developed by 
the participants. 
 
4.5  Statistical framework 
 
In developing an understanding of degradation and predicting the times to the occurrence of future 
degradation, it is important to recognize that such predictions cannot be deterministic and must 
acknowledge the inherent statistical nature of degradation.  Thus, there will always be a “first failure” 
from any group of components.  The evolution of such degradation always continues and an increasing 
number of components fails.  There is rarely any basis for the concept of a “bad heat.”  Thus, some of the 
PMDM research needs to address the fundamental basis for the dispersion of degradation occurrences as 
well as addressing the mean values.  Such first failures are often unexpected. 
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 5.0  Understanding and quantifying dependencies for degradation of materials and components 
 
The purpose of this section is to present specific topics and WPs for research on materials which are 
directed toward developing an understanding of degradation mechanisms and identifying and quantifying 
the important parameters and their dependencies as they affect degradation initiation and propagation in 
LWRs.  Contributions for topics of interest and for the WPs were presented in various of the PMDM 
planning meetings in Snowbird, Tokyo, and Charleston as well as in the NRC proactive materials 
degradation assessment report (NUREG/CR-6923) and separate submittals to Muscara (NRC).  An 
objective of the work plans here is to develop understanding and predict some aspect of critical 
degradation before it occurs over long times.   
 
Since no LWR has performed for long times exceeding 30-40 years and since some plants are still in the 
range of 20-40 years, the predictions here start from the basis of present knowledge, e.g. the behavior of 
Alloy 600MA, and project for longer times based largely on reasonable physical principles.   
 
Those who have recommended the topics and writeups for Sections 5, 6, and 7 are world experts (See the 
Appendix for participants in PMDM meetings) who are broadly experienced in nuclear power and 
therefore have substantial insights into the processes that should be considered for developing the 
necessary knowledge, predictions, and technology.  The descriptions of these contributions for the WPs of 
this overview research program plan for international cooperation are relatively short and give the 
essences of the discussions and submittals by various authors. 
 
5.1  Components 
 
5.1.1 Steam generators and their environments 
 
Consideration of degradation in modern steam generators (SGs) is dominated by the following: 
 
1.  Tubes are fabricated of Alloys 690TT, 800, 600TT, and stainless steels.  Tubes used in horizontal 
steam generators are fabricated from stainless steels.  
 
2.  Tube supports are no longer drilled holes with flow holes but rather line contact supports using either 
broached holes or “egg crate” designs.   
 
3.  Field data and laboratory studies have shown that all of the advanced alloys used for tubing are prone 
to SCC in lead and lower valence sulfur species.  Lead species have been shown to concentrate on 
surfaces and in cracks of steam generator tubes despite the low concentrations, in the range of 10 ppt, 
in feed water.  Low valence sulfur species result from a reaction between hydrazine and sulfate, and 
this reaction has also been confirmed.  The question is not whether such degradation occurs, but why 
it is not occurring more extensively. 
 
4.  The answer to why not more such SCC is occurring seems to be related to conditions that produce 
local insolubilities through the formation of compounds of Pb or S with other species thereby 
lowering the chemical activities. 
 
B.14 
 5.  The joint at the tube to tubesheet intersection remains prone to denting owing to the low alloy steel 
used for the tubesheet and the small but significant crevice. 
 
6.  The alloys in item 1 above are generally more resistant to LPSCC than Alloy 600MA.  However, 
laboratory testing shows that Alloy 690TT is not totally resistant to SCC especially with increasing 
amounts of cold work. 
 
7.  In the presence of lead, alloys with higher chromium, including Alloy 800 and Alloy 690TT exhibit a 
scaling reaction unlike the lower chromium alloys, such as Alloy 600MA.  The importance of this 
scaling to crack growth and denting have yet to be established. 
 
5.1.1.1  Introduction to proposed work plans (WPs) 
 
Steam generators in recirculating units contend with two slightly different bulk environments on the 
primary and secondary side of tubes with approximately 1 mm wall.  The primary and secondary sides 
differ in the following aspects, which are important to degradation: 
 
1.  The concentration of hydrogen in the bulk water on the primary side is about 2 ppm; whereas, on the 
secondary side is about 1 ppb.  This difference accounts for about 200 mV of electrochemical 
potential higher on the secondary side.  This difference is quite significant from a degradation point of 
view.   
 
2.  The average temperature on the primary side is about 25°C higher than the average temperature on the 
secondary side.  In general this difference accounts for a factor of about 20x in rates of stress 
corrosion cracking. 
 
3.  Hydrazine, N2H4, is used on the secondary side to minimize the concentration of oxygen.  The 
hydrazine also reduces sulfate impurities to lower valences including to –2, which is particularly 
aggressive both to localized corrosion and to SCC, including for Alloy 690TT. 
 
4.  Tube support and tube sheet crevices on the secondary side are locations where the local environments 
are superheated and lead to concentrating of impurities.   
 
5.  At the crevices at the top of the tubesheet the locally concentrated solution can corrode the low alloy 
tube sheet and may eventually produce denting and significant stresses in addition to those present 
owing to the expansion. 
 
6.  The crevices at tube supports, while now having a line contact geometry, still accumulate deposits, 
which will exacerbate the accumulation of aggressive chemicals, including lead and low valence 
sulfur.  It is not clear how Pb and S accumulate in such geometries and whether local concentrations 
or chemical forms are adequate to produce SCC. 
 
7. The gradual expansion at the TTS raises stresses and introduces cold work both of which accelerate 
SCC. 
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 8. Actions of the anti-vibration bars produce some wear and fretting thereby producing some penetration 
over time. 
 
9. The outside surfaces of tubes are prone to being scratched with the result of local cold work, which has 
been shown to accelerate SCC on the free span for Alloy 600MA and is also possible to occur in 
Alloy 690TT. 
 
5.1.1.2 WP:  Improving the boundaries on a recommended ECP/pH zone for minimizing SG tube 
degradation  
 
1. Background 
 
Many of the degradation phenomena are now known to depend, among other variables, strongly on the 
electrochemical variables of potential and pH.  Such dependencies relate directly to the oxygen, 
hydrogen, hydrazine, and flow of environments.  To date experimental and theoretical work has been 
carried out and shows that these dependences can be used to define the intensity of degradation over 
ranges of operation of the major SG alloys including Alloys 800, 600, 400 and 690.  These maps can 
define optimum conditions for operation of plants. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Extend work to refine patterns and boundaries for important alloys, impurities, and surface conditions 
such as deposits and crevices. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Work will be undertaken to characterize and rationalize effects of lead, chlorides, sulfates (+6 valence), 
and sulfide (-2 valence) on the patterns and rates of degradation.  Analytical and experimental work will 
aim at increased precision of the topography of degradation. 
 
5.1.1.3 WP: Define electrochemical properties of line contact relevant to secondary side tube 
supports.  
 
1. Background 
 
The action of impurities in the older drilled hole design involved concentration in the small space between 
the OD of the tube and the ID of the drilled hole.  Flow was directed through flow holes.  The superheat 
then caused boiling in this restricted geometry with the impurities remaining.  The extent to which 
deposits form in line contact geometries of both egg crate and broached holes is not known nor has it been 
studied significantly with respect to accumulation of impurities.  Such information is particularly 
important for understanding the role of lead and low valence sulfur as these impurities must first 
accumulate before they can exert their destructive degradation on such alloys as 800, 690, and stainless 
steel.  
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 2. Objective of WP 
 
Characterize the rate of depositing oxides and other materials, such as silicates, and then characterize 
properties that affect accumulation of impurities. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Adapt existing system for studying heated tubes in support plates to line contact geometries.  Develop 
methods for measuring thermal, electrochemical, and local chemical properties in a dynamically flowing 
system.  Experimental programs follow. 
 
5.1.1.4 WP:  Study the key factors leading to the PbSCC initiation and propagation of SG tube 
Alloys under plausible secondary side SG crevice chemistry conditions.   
 
1. Background 
 
The current status is that the envelope of environmental, material and mechanical conditions required for 
SCC, particularly in the presence of lead for the nickel base Alloys (Alloys 400, 600, 800, and 690) are 
still poorly defined and sometimes are controversial.  This is especially true for near-neutral 
high-temperature pH conditions where most SGs operate and where non-lead secondary side SCC is 
suppressed.  With only a few exceptions, most testing has been performed under unrealistic chemistry 
conditions different from the plausible SG secondary side chemistry conditions.  
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
The objective for this study is to establish a model to determine the initiation and propagation of SCC for 
the SG tube alloys exposed to secondary side SG crevice conditions including the presence of Pb. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Mechanistic studies are required to study the key factors leading to the passivity breakdown and the 
initiation of pitting/crevice corrosion/SCC under realistic SG crevice chemistry conditions. The studies 
will include: 
 
a.  Study the detrimental effect of Pb on SG tube degradation as functions of potential and pH of the 
solution.   
b.  Characterize the effect of lead and other impurities on the electronic structure and the composition 
of the passive films formed on SG alloys. 
c.  Determine the effect of stress in the migration and incorporation of lead in passive films. 
d.  Determine the effect of Pb-contamination on mechanical properties of passive films. 
e.  Following the study on the SG tube degradation initiation, key factors leading to the propagation of 
pitting/crevice corrosion/SCC are to be determined.  
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 5.1.1.5  WP: Solubility of lead compounds  
 
1. Background 
 
Knowledge of the regions of thermodynamic stability and solubility for lead species are necessary to 
determine lead mobility.  It will also provide insights into the possible mechanism of SCC. 
 
Currently, there is a lack of high-temperature, pH-dependent experimental solubility data of lead 
compounds possibly existing under secondary side SG conditions.  
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the solubility of Pb in various solutions and provide bases for transport models. 
 
With solubility data, it is expected that the following will be learned: 
 
a. which species of lead are most likely to precipitate in the steam generator and crevice environment; 
b. which species of lead are most likely to cause or promote lead assisted corrosion or cracking; 
c. a simple model to simulate the migration of lead species towards to the metal alloy can be developed 
and verified. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Work should be conducted to measure the solubility of: 
 
a. lead oxide 
b. lead sulfate 
c. lead chloride 
d. lead carbonate 
e. lead silicate 
f. metallic lead 
g. lead sulfate in the presence of chloride. 
 
5.1.1.6  WP:  Identification of the stable phases of lead under SG conditions  
 
1. Background 
 
The Pb-containing compounds at reactor operating temperatures seem to be the bases for immobilizing Pb 
and preventing it from being active in producing PbSCC.  While numerous nominally stable minerals 
containing Pb exist, it is not known whether such compounds exist and are stable at reactor operating 
conditions. 
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 2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine what Pb-containing compounds exist at reactor operating temperature and the extent of their 
stability as functions of potential and pH. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
The thermodynamically stable lead phases under selected sets of steam generator operating conditions 
will be determined experimentally through autoclave tests. 
 
5.1.1.7  WP: Lead mobility  
 
1. Background 
 
Lead mobility (dissolution, precipitation, and transport by diffusion, convection and advection) in the 
steam cycle and inside the SG is required to develop an overall model for effects of Pb in SGs. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Provide bases for overall model of lead movement in SGs. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
In conjunction with the solubility data from the WP in Section 5.1.1.5, a model will be developed to 
elucidate how lead drifts towards the metal-deposit interface and induces tube degradation. It is 
anticipated that this will provide insights as to the water chemistries under which lead could cause SCC, 
and those water chemistries where PbSCC could be avoided. 
 
Develop a practical set of equations to describe lead mobility and conduct experiments to measure the 
transport dependencies involving dissolution rates, precipitation, convection, and advection to validate 
and update the equations.   
 
5.1.1.8 WP:  Sulphur chemistry under SG conditions  
 
1. Background 
 
The normal concentration of high valence sulfur, e.g. sulfates, species in feedwater for SGs is in the range 
of 10 ppb although sometimes transients due to the release of resin species raise this concentration.   
 
In addition, hydrazine is intentionally added to the secondary side to minimize the concentration of 
oxygen and to maintain the electrochemical potential relatively low.  
 
Owing to the thermodynamic properties of the high valence sulfur and the hydrazine, the high valence of 
sulfur species can be reduced to –2 or +2 valence species such as HS- or H2S and S2O32- depending on the 
pH. 
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 These low valence sulfur species have been shown to accelerate corrosion of high nickel alloys, including 
Alloys 600MA, 600TT, and 690TT, as well as to accelerate SCC.  These low valence sulfur species 
should be especially aggressive to the higher strength iron base alloys used in turbines. 
 
So far. quantitative data for the rate, conditions, and speciation  of reduction of high valence species of 
sulfur are lacking.   
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Develop rate theory relationships for the reduction of sulfate to lower valences. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
a. Develop a model SG system and conduct experiments in which the reduction of high valence sulfur 
species will be characterized under realistic conditions of steam generator operation. 
b.  Develop refined laboratory equipment and conduct experiments where the reaction rates of high 
valence sulfur species with hydrazine will be characterized quantitatively. 
c.  Develop laboratory equipment and carry out experiments where the carryover of sulfur species to 
turbines will be quantitatively characterized. 
d.  Conduct surveys of turbines in the shutdown condition for the presence and distribution of reduced 
sulfur species. 
 
5.1.1.9  WP: Measurement of accumulation of Pb and Sy- in line contact crevices of steam 
generators  
 
1. Background 
 
Modern steam generators in PWRs use line contact tube supports on the secondary side in place of the 
older drilled holes and associated flow holes.  In the line contact crevices, secondary coolant flows 
through the spaces in the line contact geometries and cools the outside surfaces of tubes more directly 
than in the drilled hole geometries. 
 
While it was expected that the line contact geometries would produce little accumulation of deposits on 
tube surfaces, in fact, the accumulation of deposits is significant; and it is likely that the superheat 
conditions produced by drilled holes may occur with the line contact geometries. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Measure the rate of accumulation and properties of deposits in line contact geometries. 
b.  Determine the effects of subsequent chemical cleaning on these deposits. 
c.  Determine the properties of these crevices relative to OD surface temperatures, distribution of 
surface temperatures, existence of two phase regions, associated electrochemical potentials and pH. 
d.  Determine the rate of accumulation of Pb and Sy- in deposits in line contact geometries, 
emphasizing the hottest surfaces on the inlet side. 
B.20 
 e.  Determine the existence and distribution of species that immobilize both Pb and Sy- species. 
f.  Determine the rate of accumulation of Pb and Sy- species as well as their speciations. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
a.  Obtain deposits from operating SGs with line contact geometries to assess general patterns of 
properties of deposits and chemical species and their distributions. 
b.  Develop a laboratory system, where flow and heat flux of operating SGs can be modeled, and where 
important quantities such as distributions of local temperatures, electrochemical potential, chemical 
species can be measured as functions of time.  Possibly two such systems should be available for 
long and short term experiments. 
c.  Using the laboratory system from item b. above, determine the rate of accumulation and subsequent 
distribution and speciation of Pb and Sy-. 
d.  Determine effects of possibly inhibitive species that would minimize the deleterious effects of Pb 
and Sy-. 
 
5.1.1.10  WP:  SCC and mitigation for Alloy 600TT and 690TT in Pb and Sy- contaminated 
solutions   
 
1. Background 
 
The chronology of PbSCC and Sy-SCC has been reviewed in detail at specialists’ meetings both at the 
Pb/S workshop held at Argonne National Laboratory and at the Environmental Degradation meeting held 
in                  during 2005.  Essentially, it appears that PbSCC could have been a contributor, if not the 
major contributor, to the past ODSCC of Alloy 600MA.  
 
Further, Alloy 690TT is more prone to PbSCC than Alloy 600MA in alkaline solutions.  Pb is readily 
enriched in superheated crevices starting with concentrations of Pb in the feedwater in the range of 10-
100 ppt.  Pb might be further enriched by possible electrodeposition on metallic surfaces. 
 
While there have been significant experiments on the PbSCC of high nickel alloys, in fact, there is little 
knowledge that provides bases for prediction.   
 
Also, there is little basis for explaining the transitions between TGSCC and IGSCC for PbSCC. 
 
Finally, there are no bases yet for explaining the large variability of SCC of Alloy 600MA. 
 
In view of the potential for future degradation of Alloy 690TT and he lack of a coherent basis for PbSCC, 
this submode of SCC needs a quantitative foundation. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Develop multiple facilities for conducting controlled studies of both PbSCC and Sy-SCC over 
ranges of pH, potential, concentration, and temperature that are relevant to the secondary side.  
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 Owing to problems of contamination, facilities for the Pb and Sy- need to be separate.  Further, it is 
unlikely that such facilities can be utilized for studying other chemistries owing to contamination 
from the Pb or Sy-. 
b.  Obtain specimens from operating SGs to calibrate the magnitudes of concentrations of Pb and Sy- as 
well as other species present that may contribute to immobilizing or activating the aggressiveness 
of the Pb and Sy-. 
c.  Concentrate mainly on initiation of SCC since the application is thin walled SG tubing. 
d.  Direct some experiments to rationalizing the intergranular or transgranular morphology manly of 
PbSCC. 
e.  Develop approaches to mitigating Pb and Sy-. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
a.  Determine the dependencies of PbSCC and Sy-SCC on pH, potential, concentration, and 
temperature in ranges that are relevant to the deposits on free surfaces, TTS crevices, and line 
contact crevices. 
b.  Assess the action of possible inhibitors for PbSCC and Sy-SCC. 
c.  Assess the possible acceleration of PbSCC and Sy- SCC when normal impurities, e.g. Si, Al, are 
depleted from crevices, with respect to the possibility that such impurities are providing inhibition. 
 
5.1.1.11  WP:  Scaling of Alloy 690TT in Pb-containing environments   
 
1. Background 
 
In the development of the Alloy 690TT chemistry, in addition to assessing the occurrence of SCC in Pb 
solutions as a function of compositions of Ni, Cr, and Fe, the rate of scaling was also determined as a 
function of the same alloy variables.  While the occurrence of SCC decreased in Pb-containing solutions 
of otherwise pure water with increasing Cr and Fe, scaling in the same solutions increased with increasing 
Cr but decreased with increasing Fe.  Scaling on high nickel alloys has been observed on Alloy 690TT 
and Alloy 800 but not on Alloy 600MA in accordance with the early comprehensive studies of alloy 
dependencies. 
 
The scaling process becomes important both from denting types of processes in tube supports and TTS 
geometries and in the acceleration of crack growth via the wedging action inside growing scales.   The 
magnitudes of scaling for the various higher Cr alloys are such as to justify these concerns. 
 
This scaling process in Pb-contaminated solutions depends first on the accumulation of Pb under heat 
transfer deposits.  If no Pb accumulates, then the scaling does not seem to occur. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Determine the rate of growth and properties of scales on Alloys 690TT and 800 as a function of 
potential, pH, concentration of Pb, and temperature. 
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 b.  Develop rate laws that permit extrapolating data to long times. 
c.  Determine the magnitude of forces that can be produced in tight geometries. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
a.  Measure rates of growth of scales on Alloys 690TT and 800 compared with Alloy 600MA in Pb-
contaminated water as a function of chemistries expected to occur in deposits in line contact TSP 
geometries and in TTS crevices as well as on free span surfaces such as in OTSG upper bundles.  
Include variables of electrochemical potential, pH and temperature. 
b.  Measure forces that can be exerted by such scales. 
 
5.1.2  Piping, Welds 
 
5.1.2.1  Introduction to proposed WPs 
 
The reactor coolant systems in both PWR and BWR technology are fabricated from stainless steel with 
welds variously of like materials of stainless steels or dissimilar materials of nickel-base alloys or 
stainless steels having higher chromium and nickel.  Few significant stress corrosion cracks have occurred 
in these pipes except for sensitized stainless steels used early in BWRs.  However, some SCC has been 
associated with welds.  Issues associated with welds as components are the following: 
 
1. The welding process produces both high residual stresses and high cold work, both of which accelerate 
SCC. 
 
2. Welds are often the subject of surface grinding to smooth the weld contour.  Such grinding can be 
abusive and accelerates inititiation. 
 
3. There is to date no good correlation between FEM and model of actual welds. 
 
4. Welding often produces hot cracking that initiates SCC. 
 
5. The metallurgy of welded structures is often metallurgically unstable. 
 
6. Welds associated with Alloy 600 components in the NWC of BWRs are particularly prone to SCC. 
 
7. Stress corrosion cracking of dissimilar metal Alloy 82/182 weldments in piping connected to the RCS 
cold legs operate at high temperature in primary water and are highly susceptibile to SCC.  
Weldments of Type 308/309 stainless steel are less susceptible.  
 
In addition to the problems with welds, the non-welded portions of pipes are prone to SCC as cold work 
increases.  The SCC velocity is sufficient at 20% cold work, the degree of cold work of a bend that is not 
stress relieved, to perforate the wall of a thick primary pipe in a few years.  The combination of the 
initiation and propagation stages are not well understood. 
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 5.1.2.2 WP:  Improved understanding of microstructural/micro-chemical evolution and hot 
cracking in nickel-base alloys and weld metals  
 
1. Background 
 
Hot cracking occurs in welds of 182/82 and 152/52.  This hot cracking provides sites for initiating SCC 
and CF.  Thus there is a need to better understand and provide mitigation for the known weld metal 
cracking. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the microstructural bases for the occurrence of hot cracking. 
 
3. Work outline 
Characterizations will be performed at moderate-to-high resolutions of weldments removed from LWR 
service, mock-ups welds and various test welds made with alloy 182/82 and alloy 152/52.  Base 
weldment microstructural features will be documented including inclusions, precipitates, interdendritic 
boundaries and grain boundaries using scanning electron microscopy (SEM).  Microchemical analysis 
will be performed using EDS and compositional mapping to document micrometer-scale 
segregation/precipitation in the SEM and nanometer-scale elemental distributions in the transmission 
electron microscope (TEM).  The intent will be to greatly expand the understanding of weld metal 
structures in actual and simulated LWR service components with a focus on solidification segregation and 
second-phase precipitation particularly at interdendritic grain boundaries.  The microstructural and 
microchemical features will be related to the susceptibility to hot cracking for both the low-Cr alloy 
182/82 welds and the high-Cr, alloy 152/52 welds.  The same SEM and TEM approaches will be 
employed to establish relationships between interdendritic segregation/precipitation and the cracking 
morphology at both micro-and nanometer resolutions particularly where hot cracks have propagated.  
Tips of advancing hot cracking will be characterized. 
 
5.1.2.3 WP:  Influence of weld metal microstructure/micro-chemistry and pre-existing hot cracks 
on stress-corrosion cracking of nickel-base alloys  
 
1. Background 
 
There are differences of opinion in the technical community between those who believe that cracking in 
Ni-base alloy weld metal (alloy 182 or 82) can occur solely due to SCC and others who perceive that 
susceptibility primarily results from pre-existing hot cracks due to poor manufacturing.  Further, there are 
questions about the relative contributions of dendritic and grain boundary compositions as well as relative 
orientations. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the critical factors for hot cracking in initiating and propagating SCC. 
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 3. Work outline 
 
a. critically assess the influence of not only pre-existing hot cracks, but solidification segregation or 
precipitation on SCC.    
b. Conduct Gleeble experiments and document the effects of controlled heating and cooling on 
interfacial structure and composition to establish an improved understanding of dendritic and 
grain boundary compositions in weld metals. 
c. Use the information from item b. above to systematically create realistic weld material conditions 
and samples for quantitative SCC tests.   
d. Conduct experiments using well characterized realistic laboratory samples and mockup welds 
where hot cracking has occurred to determine the critical factors affecting whether initiation 
occurs and the velocity of SCC.    
e. Finally, the influence of pre-existing hot cracks on SCC initiation and propagation will be 
evaluated.    
 
5.1.2.4 WP:  Assessment of strain and stress states in weld metal and heat-affected-zone regions of 
LWR weldments  
 
1. Background 
 
Whether and how rapidly SCC initiates and propagates in welds depends in part on the local stresses and 
plastic strains which are in turn affected by the initial manufacturing and fabrication conditions.  It is now 
possible with modern systems to measure residual plastic strains and stresses in stainless steel and Ni-
base alloy welds.  These stresses and strains are affected by initial welding and repair welding as well as 
the complex geometries of welds. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
To develop the quantitative capability to assess strains and stresses in realistic LWR weldments through 
an integrated experimental and modeling program.  
 
3. Work outline 
 
a. Conduct systematic studies using Orientational Imaging Microscopy (OIM) on various stainless 
alloy weldments in both the as-welded and repair-welded condition.   
b. Employ finite-element modeling to investigate welding parameters that modify the stress/strain 
profiles throughout the weld.   
c. Conduct controlled experiments to test model parameters and help validate predictions.  
d. Finalize predictive capability for tailoring weld parameters to optimize material microstructure 
and final stress/strain condition.  
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 5.1.2.5  WP:  SCC of cold worked pipes 
 
1. Background 
 
Piping used in primary system, including BWR RCS, is fabricated of stainless steel.  In many instances 
these stainless steels need to be deformed to meet geometric requirements.  Cold work in the range of 
20% can be incurred.  The damage of cold work is often relieved by heat treatment and sometimes not.  
Despite the well known proneness of these areas of cold work to SCC, they are often not inspected.  
Existing data show that, while experimental work indicates high crack growth rates of these cold worked 
materials, virtually no SCC has occurred in the field.  There is no explanation for this contradiction. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Develop quantitative bases for initiation and propagation of SCC in cold bent elbows.  Determine 
effectiveness of stress relief heat treatments. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Develop a quantitative description of initiation of SCC on cold worked pipe sections using both direct 
measurements of SCC initiation and TEM measurements of early initiation stages.   
 
Develop a quantitative description of propagation of SCC in cold worked stainless steel components. 
 
Develop an integrated model for the initiation and propagation of SCC in cold worked components. 
 
5.1.3  Socket welds and weldolets 
 
5.1.3.1  Introduction to proposed WP 
 
“Socket welds” and “weldolets” constitute a particular geometry usually involving a large pipe or cross 
section to which a relatively small pipe is fastened by welding.  These geometries often degrade by 
perforation due to SCC or corrosion fatigue.  Owing to the high moment at the joint between large and 
small piping and the expected relative movement or vibration at the joint, the occurrence of perforation is 
not surprising.  In general, it appears that the issue here is not one of why such degradations occur but the 
lack of a design basis for calculating stresses and their time-dependence. 
 
5.1.3.2  WP:  Developing an improved design basis for perforations at the joint between large and 
small piping. 
 
1. Background 
 
The fact that there are relative large numbers of perforations at joints between large and small piping does 
not seem to relate so much to lack of understanding of mechanisms of SCC and CF but rather to the lack 
of adequate bases for designing such joints.  Such SCC and CF is accelerated by the ripple loading 
superimposed on high local mean stresses.  Also, such perforations seem to be related to unanticipated 
flow induced vibration which is not well characterized. 
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2. Objective of WP 
 
Develop improved design bases for welded joints between large and small diameter piping. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Collect analyses of perforations in the field, then develop a laboratory model that can be used together 
with a FEM analysis to develop an improved basis for design. 
 
5.2 Materials 
 
5.2.1 Cast stainless steel 
 
5.2.1.1 Introduction to work plan 
 
Cast stainless steels are widely used in applications such as housings for impellers in primary coolant 
pumps and for other cast components.  The fracture properties of cast stainless steels have been 
investigated.  Performance of cast stainless steels has been good without any serious degradation.  
However, the SCC and CF behavior, particularly in the aged condition, has not been significantly studied.  
The reproducibility of metallurgical properties of cast stainless steels is not well documented.   
 
5.2.1.2  WP:  Aging and future degradation of cast stainless steels 
 
1. Background 
 
Cast stainless steels are widely used in critical locations of important components especially in primary 
systems.  There have not been any significant degradation of such components.  This lack of significant 
degradation is consistent with good and reproducible fracture toughness.  However, the metallurgical 
properties of cast stainless steels are not reproducible and the cast materials are not stable metallurgically 
over long times. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Characterize the changes in metallurgical structure with time at temperature, especially at grain, phase, 
and dendrite boundaries.  Assess the significance of these changes on the initiation and propagation of 
SCC and CFF. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Using existing data and an activation energy extrapolation determine changes in local chemistries of 
metallurgical boundaries and phase stabilities with time to long times.  
 
Determine the variation of metallurgical phases and boundaries among heats of cast stainless steels. 
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 Determine effects of changes in metallurgical structure due to aging on the SCC and CF of cast stainless 
steels, initially in primary water chemistry for the full range of relevant electrochemical potentials.  
Determine also effects of these changes on the absorption of hydrogen. 
 
5.2.2 High Strength materials, bolting 
 
5.2.2.1  Introduction to work plans 
 
High strength bolting is required in many applications in light water nuclear plants.  Essential issues with 
the applications of high strength materials in bolting are: 
 
1.  Increasing strength of materials almost always increases rates of initiation and rates of propagation of 
SCC in all materials.  These rates increase substantially as the strength of the alloy increases. 
 
2.  Irradiation exposure increases the proneness to SCC of high strength even more. 
 
3.  The actual applied load on bolts is often uncertain. 
 
4.  Residual stresses are often high as a result of fabrication procedures. 
 
5.  Bolts have built in stress intensifications owing to configuration of threads. 
 
6.  Bolts are often used where the immediately adjacent environments are sequestered such the oxidizing 
or reducing conditions are intensified. 
 
7.  In addition to the loss of integrity owing to the degradation of bolts, the loose pieces from the bolts can 
impinge on critical components. 
 
5.2.2.2  WP:  Determine the rates of initiation and propagation together with statistical 
distributions of bolting of low alloy and high alloy steels. 
 
1. Background 
 
In order to predict to behavior of high strength bolting an improved experimental method is required for 
measuring initiation and propagation.  Such a method may involve a potential drop method now used for 
CT specimens.  This method needs to distinguish early SCC from later propagation. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Develop a useful experimental method for measuring the earliest stages of SCC where such a method can 
be used to assess methods for reducing the proneness of high strength bolting to SCC. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Measure initiation and propagation of SCC in high strength bolting materials from low alloy steel and 
higher iron and nickel base alloys. 
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Conduct these experiments in the expected engineering environments including internal and external 
chemistries as well as PWR and BWR (NWC, HWC).   
 
Characterize the initiation and growth of such SCC with ATEM. 
 
5.2.2.3  WP:  Determine effects of alloy structure as affected by sequences of heat treatments 
 
1. Background 
 
Existing data show the resistance of high strength bolts to SCC can be increased by various heat 
treatments while achieving the same strength.  While there is probably a limit to such improvements, they 
can also increase the margin for long life performance.  
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Develop principles and procedures for heat treating high strength bolts with the aim of improving 
resistance to SCC. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Develop foundations in physical metallurgy for heat treating high strength bolts that can achieve greater 
resistance to SCC.   
 
Determine how the metallurgical structures interact with initiating and advancing SCC in relevant 
environments. 
 
5.2.2.4  WP:  Assess the magnitudes and distributions of residual stresses in bolts using neutron and 
x-ray diffraction 
 
1. Background 
 
Patterns of SCC in bolts suggest that residual stresses contribute substantially to the initiation and 
propagation of SCC.  Identifying the magnitude and distribution of these stresses is the first step in 
assessing approaches to minimizing such residual stresses. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine quantitatively the magnitudes and distributions of residual stresses in standard bolting used in 
exterior and interior applications. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Choose typical bolts used in different applications including low alloy steels and highly alloyed stainless 
and high nickel types.  Characterize the distribution of residual stresses and hardness.  Correlate with 
metallurgical phases. 
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Determine magnitudes and orientations of residual stresses using neutron diffraction and x-ray methods. 
 
5.2.2.5  WP:  Environments and their effects for high strength bolts 
 
1. Background 
 
The local environments, which surround bolts, especially inside the reactors are subject to different 
chemistries owing to the local gamma heating and lack of mixing with surrounding bulk environments.  
These environments need to be assessed for possibly different effects on SCC than available from bulk 
water chemistries. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine in detail local environments around high strength bolts. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Develop instrumentation for monitoring the local chemistry and thermal conditions adjacent to high 
strength bolts.  Measure potential, pH, temperature, and specific ions (specific ion electrodes).  Having 
characterized these environments, they would be used in testing for measuring initiation and propagation 
of SCC. 
 
5.2.2.6 WP:  Surface treatments to inhibit initiation of SCC of bolts 
 
1. Background 
 
Since all SCC must start at the surface, altering the stresses, composition, and metallurgical structure at 
the surface provides options for minimizing SCC.  The reproducibility of such treatments needs to be 
established. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Significantly improve the resistance of bolts to SCC degradation through surface treatments. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Survey methods of changing the surfaces of threads by water jet peening, laser peening, transient thermal 
pulses, atomic bombardment and subsequent diffusion and chemical treatments such as carburizing.  
Demonstrate effects of such treatments on initiation and propagation of SCC. 
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 5.2.3  Low temperature creep cracks in steel 
 
5.2.3.1  Introduction to work plans 
 
Cracks have been experienced in the primary heat transport system of some CANDU reactors.  
Metallurgical investigations discounted the role of fatigue or SCC in this cracking.  The cracking occurred 
on the outside surfaces of SA 106B carbon steel piping which has been cold worked in the range of 20-
30% and not stress relieved.  This cracking occurred on several pipes after exposure on the order of 
40,000 hours and in the temperature range about 310°C.  No particular outside environment was present 
other than reactor room air. 
 
Similar cracking of such steels has been observed in fossil plants in the range of 360°C.  Investigations 
revealed a 100% intergranular fracture with little to no microstructural damage away from the crack.  
Laboratory investigation into these degradations led to the recognition of a new degradation mechanism, 
low temperature creep cracking.  The temperature at which this process is active is below that previously 
thought to be necessary for creep process to occur at meaningful engineering rates in carbon steels.  
Subsequent research has established the occurrence of creep cracking in cold worked pipe material to 
temperatures as low as 340°C in carbon steel, and as low as 320°C in a low alloy steel heat treated to 
simulate a coarse grained heat affected zone. 
 
This cracking from the outside of cold worked and non-stress relieved carbon steel suggests similar 
possibilities in all carbon steels, especially those that are cold worked by bending or at welds.  Therefore 
it is important to investigate the potential for low temperature creep cracking of carbon steels under LWR 
conditions. 
 
5.2.3.2 WP:  Investigation of metallurgical variables affecting the low temperature creep cracking 
susceptibility of carbon steel piping   
 
1. Background 
 
The cracking described in Section 5.2.3.1 is new to the LWR industry although not so to the fossil 
industry.  This cracking is also occurring at temperatures somewhat lower than have occurred in the fossil 
industry.  Therefore, a database has first to be established to provide a basis for extrapolating into the 
future. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Establish a data base.  Develop a screening test for evaluating heats of steel. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
a.  Testing should continue to the temperatures of interest to the LWR industry. 
b.  Material from the flank of the bends, which has only been cold worked approximately 15% 
should be tested. 
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 c.  Steels from other heats should be tested that comprise a range of chemistries within the SA 106B 
specification.  Special attention should be given to the concentrations of phosphorous and sulfur 
and if there is any enrichment of these species at the grain boundaries. 
d.  Free nitrogen is known to promote dynamic strain aging at reactor operating temperatures.  Heats 
of high and low free nitrogen steel should be tested to evaluate their susceptibility to cracking. 
 
5.2.3.3  WP: Microscopic characterization of low temperature creep cracks  
 
1. Background 
 
At temperatures less than 340°C no features in the micron scale are associated with the cracking which is 
purely intergranular and follows one well defined crack path with no branching.  Transmission electron 
microscope work is virtually non-existent with regards to studying this mechanism. 
 
A project of detailed SEM and TEM has been concluded studying cracks in failed ex-service piping.  The 
results from this investigation did not reveal any new insights into the microstructural parameters 
associated with cracking. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine detailed correlations of cracking with microstructural characteristics. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
The production of creep crack samples in the laboratory allows material for detailed microscopic 
examination at the optical, SEM and TEM scales.  Cracks of known history in well characterized 
materials will be available for study.  Examination of such material offers a higher probability of 
identifying the relevant microstructural parameters than studying degradations from the field. 
 
5.2.3.4 WP:  Investigation of the role of hydrogen in enhancing low temperature creep cracking of 
carbon steels  
 
1. Background 
 
The presence of a flux of hydrogen through the walls of carbon steel in question has been well established 
due to oxidation reactions, which are part of FAC.  The concentration of hydrogen is below that required 
for hydrogen embrittlement of steel.  Indeed no microstructural evidence of hydrogen damage has been 
observed in failed pipes.  However hydrogen concentrations below those necessary for hydrogen 
embrittlement are known to accelerate movement of dislocatons in carbon steel. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine whether a connection exists between the observed cracking and the flux of hydrogen from 
inside surfaces as produced by FAC. 
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 3. Work outline 
 
Measure rates of creep cracking in the presence of an internal hydrogen flux such as might occur during 
FAC. 
 
5.3 Phenomena 
 
Section 5.3 deals specifically with phenomena that are central to several materials and components and 
addresses the scientific bases for understanding degradation and projecting into the future. 
 
5.3.1  SCC Precursors 
 
5.3.1.1  Introduction 
 
Following the discussion associated with Figure 1, “precursors” are those processes that come before the 
SCC itself and provide the conditions where SCC can initiate and propagate.  The main reason for 
identifying the concept of precursors is that usual SCC cannot be rationalized in terms of existing insights 
as requiring 5-10 years at the longest.  Thus, developing an understanding of degradation that occurs at 
longer times during a 60-year period of operation requires that other preliminary processes operate before 
the SCC initiates.  Such processes can easily be imagined as requiring long times based on processes that 
require long times, e.g. for thermally activated diffusion and accumulations. 
 
The detailed background on the concept of a precursor and sources of processes that become precursors 
are discussed in Appendix B-15 of the NRC proactive materials degradation assessment report 
(NUREG/CR-6923). 
 
5.3.1.2  WP:  Long term LPSCC of Alloy 690TT   
 
1. Background 
 
While Alloy 690TT has performed well both in service and in some laboratory testing, the alloy is quite 
prone to SCC in alkaline solutions and in Pb-containing solutions especially at mild to concentrated 
alkalinity.  Further, Alloy 690 sustains significant SCC in mildly acidic solutions at somewhat elevated 
potentials in the higher part of the range expected on the secondary side of steam generators. 
 
Studies of SCC propagation for Alloy 690TT have shown that it sustains SCC.   
 
Further, studies of surfaces of Alloy 690TT in concentrated alkaline solutions show that chromium is 
preferentially depleted from the surface.  Further, the transition from Cr+3 to Cr+6 exhibits a decreasing 
slope that is twice that of the H2O/H2 equilibrium; this means that the potential for the Cr+6/Cr+3 transition 
is accessible to the potentials in the SG in the range of about pHT 8. 
 
Alloy 690TT is inherently reactive owing to the high concentration of chromium.   
 
Finally, the observation in stainless steels that nickel is enriched at the tip of cracks in the metal ahead of 
the crack tip suggests that the metal ahead of crack tips for Alloy 690TT may also enrich in Ni and 
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 therefore become li1 Alloy 600 and therefore prone to LPSCC.  The rate of growth of LPSCC then would 
be related to the rate of depletion of Cr from the material ahead of the crack. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Determine the critical processes that affect the initiation and propagation of LPSCC for Alloy 
690TT. 
b.  Determine the long term dependence for the initiation and propagation of SCC in Alloy 690TT as 
a function of PWR and BWR environments. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
The first step in this study would involve the ATEM study of crack tips from Alloy 690TT that have been 
exposed over a range of conditions.  These results would be compared with those from Alloy 600MA.  
Again, this work would concentrate on the material ahead of the crack tip with respect to structure and 
composition. 
 
5.3.1.3  WP: Surface aging and relationship with SCC crack initiation for Alloy 600 and Alloy 182 
in PWR primary water environments  
 
1. Background 
 
Changes in surface and near-surface metallurgy in nickel-base alloys will be assessed in both service and 
laboratory samples after long-term exposures (10-30 yrs) to PWR primary-water environments.  The need 
for proactive management of crack initiation drives this research as well as the lack of knowledge of 
surface aging processes 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Characterize microstructural features affecting SCC after long times. 
 
The goal of all characterizations is to establish environment-induced aging (changes to near surface 
metallurgy) and to link observations to SCC initiation and short-crack-growth processes. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
The focus of the examinations will be on nickel-base Alloy 600 and alloy 182 weldments.  Service 
samples will be prepared from various PWR upper head penetrations and steam generator tubing that 
have been removed over the last decade.  In both cases, heats/conditions have been identified as being 
highly susceptible or more resistant to IGSCC in PWR primary water.  Laboratory test materials will be 
also identified to obtain specific heats/conditions highly susceptible and resistant to SCC initiation after 
reasonable long-term exposures (months to years).  Cross-sections will be fabricated at locations near 
crack-initiation sites (when present) enabling surface and near surface examinations by a combination of 
micro-to-nanometer resolution analytical techniques including analytical electron microscopy.  
Microstructural and micro-chemical characteristics of the multi-layer, surface corrosion-product films, 
metal/oxide interface regions and the altered metal zone beneath the surface film will be systematically 
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 documented for each material. Particular emphasis will be placed on identifying changes that may have 
occurred at grain boundaries intersecting the surface.   
 
5.3.1.4  WP: Practical assessment of Pourbaix diagrams for assessing thermodynamics and kinetics 
of forming corrosion product films on Fe-and Ni-base alloys  
 
1. Background 
 
Reliable SCC susceptibility predictions are inhibited by the lack of understanding of oxide kinetics and 
stability. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Characterize in quantitative detail the interaction of thermodynamic boundaries and associated kinetic 
processes in the formation of protective films on Fe-and Ni-base alloys for application to understanding 
bases for SCC. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Integrated experiments will map important regions of the high-temperature-water potential/pH diagrams 
for Ni- and Fe-base stainless alloys including alloy 600, alloy 690, alloy 800 and 300-series stainless 
steels.  Contact electric resistance will be used to identify the metal to metal-oxide transition as a function 
of realistic changes in potential and pH expected at the surface and possible at crevices or crack tips. 
Laser Raman spectroscopy will be conducted for selected materials and conditions.  Oxide structures will 
be identified in-situ at several potential/pH/temperature combinations and Raman measurement will be 
repeated after the high-temperature-water environment is removed.  Final detailed characterizations will 
then be conducted by high-resolution analytical transmission electron microscopy (ATEM) on cross-
section samples to quantitatively determine the surface film structures and compositions.  The 
combination of all three unique techniques on the same alloys during or after exposure to critical 
potential/pH/temperature conditions will provide key insights into the fundamental corrosion/oxidation 
processes controlling performance in LWR environments. 
 
5.3.1.5 WP:  Evaluating material composition and solution chemistry effects on corrosion-product 
film formation   
  
1. Background 
 
The integrated series of experiments proposed in Section 5.3.1.4 can also be effectively used to elucidate 
the influence of LWR solution additions/impurities and alloy composition differences.  Knowledge of 
these influences enables predictive mitigation of alloy cracking.  Potential changes in the thermodynamics 
and kinetics of surface film formation should be studied isolating the influence of independent additions 
of S, Pb and Zn. 
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 2. Objective of WP 
 
Characterize contributions of impurities in crack tip solutions arising from grain boundary species and 
bulk environments to the advance of SCC. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
A few LWR environments should be chosen to represent realistic crevice and crack-tip potential/ph 
conditions.  Compositions of segregated grain boundaries would be chosen. This would include non-
equilibrium thermal segregation in mill-annealed 316SS where grain boundary Mo concentrations can 
reach ~10 at% and radiation-induced segregation in SS where Ni and Si concentrations can exceed 30 at% 
and 15 at%.  Such large non-equilibrium enrichments would be produced in a bulk alloy by high-rate 
sputter deposition, thereby producing a bulk material with the grain boundary composition.  Surface film 
formation can then be dynamically measured in-situ by contact electric resistance and laser Raman, then 
quantitatively evaluated with cross-section ATEM.  These results would be compared to high resolution 
ATEM characterizations of crack-tip films from the work in Section 5.3.3.2.  
 
5.3.2  SCC Initiation 
 
5.3.2.1  Introduction 
 
The role of initiation in SCC is shown schematically in Figure 1.  Initiation is an important consideration 
in SG tubes since the thickness of the tubes is on the order of the depth over which initiation is affected 
by external environments.  Initiation is sometimes less important for thick sections where propagation 
seems to consume the overall time to perforation.  Initiation is greatly accelerated by surface abuse and 
cold work.  
 
5.3.2.2  WP:  Initiation and propagation of SCC in cold worked stainless steel and Alloys 600 and 
690:  fundamental assessments of crack tips  
 
1. Background 
 
Cold work accelerates both the initiation and propagation of SCC in stainless steels and high nickel 
alloys.  Increasing cold work increases the intensity of both initiation and propagation.  The observed 
rates of propagation in laboratory testing are sufficient to perforate thick piping in relatively short times, 
possibly several years.  The initiation of SCC in cold worked surfaces can acquire sufficient depth to 
continue in less cold worked materials.   
 
This task is aimed at understanding the processes whereby cold work affects the initiation and 
propagation of SCC via detailed characterizations of crack tips using analytical transmission electron 
microscopy (ATEM) and theoretical metallurgical and mechanics analysis of crack tips. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Provide fundamental bases for predicting long term effects of cold work on the initiation and 
propagation of SCC in stainless steels and high nickel alloys of interest to LWRs. 
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 b.  Integrate the observations of ATEM work on both material ahead of the SCC tip and at the tip of 
SCC with fundamental studies of theoretical mechanics and solid state processes. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
a.  Characterize in detail the chemical composition ahead of propagating SCC with ATEM. 
b.  Characterize the geometry of advancing SCC during propagation and during early stages of 
initiation. 
c.  Characterize stainless steels and high nickel alloys in low potential  and high potential ranges as 
are related to hydrogenated and non-hydrogenated environments. 
d.  Develop improved theoretical models for strain distributions immediately adjacent to very narrow 
tips of SCC. 
e.  Develop models for the creation of vacancies, their mobility, and the implications for diffusion of 
alloy species in the region of crack tips.  
f.  Develop models for the relaxation of strains at tips of advancing SCC. 
 
5.3.2.3  WP:  Surface aging and insights into SCC crack initiation and short-crack growth for 
304SS and 316SS in BWR environments   
 
1. Background 
 
Similar to the study in WP 0f Section 5.3.1.3 for Ni-base alloys, changes in surface and near-surface 
metallurgy of stainless steels will be assessed in both service and laboratory samples after long-term 
exposures to BWR water environments.   The focus of the examinations will be on 300-series stainless 
steels and may include heat-affected-zone regions.  Service examples will include 304 and/or 316SS pipe 
samples where SCC has been promoted by surface grinding or damage. Laboratory test materials will be 
identified to obtain heats/conditions of highly susceptible and resistant heats to SCC initiation. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Characterize in high magnification detail early stages of SCC in stainless steels initiated from surface 
abuse. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Samples and near-surface regions that will be characterized by analytical TEM techniques will depend on 
the variability observed among different surface/near-surface structures, IG attack/oxidation, cracks and 
crack tips.  Microstructures will be documented at several magnifications to illustrate corrosion-product 
films, sub-surface degradation and the near-surface alloy microstructure.   A combination of techniques 
including high-resolution TEM imaging and nano-diffraction will be employed to characterize the 
multilayer films and altered base material that may be present near the surface.  Nano-probe micro-
chemical analysis will be performed using EDS (including compositional mapping) and possibly electron 
energy loss spectroscopy (EELS) techniques. 
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 The final step, after establishing critical aspects of long-term LWR service aging for both Ni- base and 
Fe-base stainless alloys, should be to conduct SCC initiation tests in the laboratory.  These tests should be 
designed to provide quantitative evaluations of the surface and near-surface metallurgy effects on 
cracking.  As possible, actual LWR service materials should be used after detailed characterizations 
described above have been completed along with well-controlled laboratory samples. 
 
5.3.3  SCC Propagation 
 
5.3.3.1  Introduction 
 
SCC propagation differs from initiation in several important ways 
 
1.  Propagation depends less on the external environment and more on the crack tip environment. 
 
2.  Propagation depends on the continuum crack tip stress fields to a first approximation although in detail 
the stress fields at crack tips have not been quantified. 
 
3.  Propagation depends on some prior defect or initiation stage before it becomes a propagating SCC. 
 
4.  Whereas initiation depends on stress at the surface as applied and residual sources add, propagation 
must contend with the changing stresses throughout the depth. 
 
5.  While propagation is often viewed as the limiting case, i.e. “everything initiates” this is not always so 
and sometimes initiation is the limiting case as for cold worked stainless steel pipes in primary water. 
 
6.  A propagating SCC is subject to large changes in internal chemistry owing to effects of migration to 
the point of achieving saturation with the latter being the driving force for migration to the crack tip. 
 
5.3.3.2  WP:  Film formation in SCC cracks and at crack tips for insights into environment-assisted 
crack-growth mechanisms   
 
1. Background 
 
Initiation and propagation of LPSCC in high nickel alloys in primary water of PWRs seem to exhibit 
maxima at the NiO/Ni equilibrium.  The reason for such a correlation is unknown.  The advent of 
applying the ATEM to the study of morphology and chemistry of crack tips has provided an avenue for 
detailed studies of chemical processes of advancing SCC.  This WP integrates the in-situ and ex-situ 
surface film examinations in WPs of Sections 5.3.1.4, and 5.3.1.5 with processes that occur at the SCC 
crack tip during propagation. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Examine the thermodynamic conditions associated with SCC.  Especially consider the significance of the 
NiO/Ni equilibrium as the location of most intense SCC.  
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 3. Work outline 
 
a.  Stress-corrosion, crack-growth-rate (SCC-CGR) tests will be conducted on selected Ni- and Fe-
base stainless alloys in LWR environments under well-controlled potential/ph/temperature 
conditions.  These tests will be performed spanning the Ni/NiO phase transition on Alloy 6oo 
using low-high hydrogen additions to move from an electrochemical condition where NiO is stable 
to one where Ni metal is stable. 
b.  These specific conditions will be mapped following previous research performed at other 
laboratories.  Samples will be removed under load and prepared for cross-section ATEM enabling 
quantitative characterization of crack and crack-tip corrosion films and local metallurgy changes.  
Fundamental alterations in the crack tips will be established by comparing each 
potential/pH/temperature condition and linking results to the surface work from the WP of Section 
5.3.1.4. 
c.  Oxide film differences can be documented as a function of distance from the crack tip (very short 
exposure time) to the crack mouth (exposure times reaching several months).  The kinetics of 
oxidation can be studied since crack-growth rates have been accurately established helping 
quantify exposure time along the length of the SCC cracks. 
d.  Key solution chemistry conditions will be selected where significant influence on the SCC-CGR is 
observed, i.e., where S and Pb enhances SCC propagation and where Zn decreases growth. 
e.  The influence of Mo grain boundary segregation and high matrix Si concentration will be 
evaluated on SCC growth rates followed by detailed ATEM crack-tip characterizations. 
 
5.3.3.3  WP:  Application of finite element modeling to characterizing the electrochemical 
conditions at crack tips.    
 
1. Background 
 
Finite element methods are widely used to characterize processes occurring in complex geometries.  The 
crack tip of an advancing SCC is one of the complex geometires. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Apply FEM to characterizing propagating SCC tips. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
The first step is to set up equations and boundary conditions.  These could be most reasonably based on 
work on crack tip geometries now being observed. 
 
Once such a set of equations has been developed the results from these equations could be compared with 
direct observations from ATEM work. 
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 5.3.4 Cold work:  Surface and bulk 
 
5.3.4.1  Introduction 
 
Cold work is an important, even critical, contributor to the occurrence and rate of SCC.  Increasing cold 
work increases the intensity of initiation and propagation.  Cold work changes an otherwise SCC-resistant 
alloy into one quite prone to SCC. 
 
Cold work seems to play different, but significant, roles in initiation and propagation. 
 
Important background items concerning cold work: 
 
1.  Cold work at the surface at thicknesses of tens of microns is potent for accelerating SCC.  This is 
shown in the SCC observed in BWR shrouds.  Such cold work results from surface preparation or 
abuse.   
 
2.  Scratches observed on the free span of Alloy 600 mill annealed steam generator tubes on the cold leg 
side of operating plants, nucleated hundreds of SCC events per inch of scratch.  No superheat nor 
secondary side deposits were present.  Furthermore, the cold leg side temperatures were significantly 
lower than the hot leg side surfaces and of the secondary side surfaces inside superheated crevices.  
Once the SCC was nucleated it penetrated the wall completely and substantially beyond the domain of 
cold work from the scratch.  This pattern is much like the surface-initiated SCC from BWR shrouds. 
 
3.  Cold work from scratches also nucleated the SCC in the upper bundle of a once-through steam 
generator, but these were associated with the deposits of secondary impurities on the superheated 
surfaces.  However, the SCC was focused at the scratches. 
 
4.  The preferential SCC on surfaces of control rod drive mechanisms during the 1990s seemed to be 
preferentially associated with machining abuse preferentially associated with specific fabricators.  In 
some cases no SCC was observed and in other cases excessive SCC was observed. 
 
5.  Preferential SCC related to surface abuse occurred in Alloy 600 tubes used in housings for 
pressurizers.  Depending on the machining practice, SCC occurred or it did not. 
 
6.  In the case of bulk cold work in components in contrast to that at surfaces, such cold work results from 
the cold bending of piping, especially where warm working or post stress relief is not utilized.  
Laboratory experiments as well as field data show that 90° bends sustain 20-30% strain and that this 
strain can lead to SCC at operating temperatures as well as at temperatures in the range of 50°C. 
 
7.  Cold work also results from welding where the weld strains produce cold work effects. 
 
8.  Cold work of components, where stress relief is not utilized, is a special concern since such 
components are not routinely inspected as are welds. 
 
9.  Measurements of SCC propagation in pure water shows that Alloy 690TT sustains slow but significant 
crack growth. 
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The damaging effects of increasing cold work both in the bulk and on surfaces is widely appreciated.  
What is not so clear is why cold work exerts such effects or how such effects can be predicted and 
mitigated.  There are no insights to the extent of inspections that should be applied.  Further, lacking are: 
 
1.  The ranges of temperature over which cold work accelerations are important. 
 
2.  The extent of stress relief required. 
 
3.  The depth and character of surface abuse that exerts the surface effects. 
 
4.  The interaction of cold work with alloy chemistry (Alloys 600MA, 690TT, 800, stainless steels) and 
environmental chemistry. 
 
5.  The broader but nominally obvious connection of cold work with alloy strength and irradiation. 
 
6.  The interaction of cold work with alloy structure including grain size and second phases. 
 
7.  An explanation of why cold work so greatly accelerates SCC  propagation in stainless steels in PWR 
primary chemistries but the initiation stage is so greatly inhibited. 
 
8.  A prediction of the cold work effects that result from progressive denting at the TTS location over time 
for Alloy 690TT SG tubes. 
 
While the effects of cold work are wide spread and while there are many important situations that are not 
explained, mechanisms by which cold work exerts its effects are less well understand making long term 
predictions tenuous or absent: 
 
1.  A frequent explanation for cold work exerting acceleration of propagation is related to the capacity of 
the crack tip to sustain increasing hydrostatic stresses with increasing local strength due to cold work.  
However, such cold work also produces increased cross slip which relaxes stresses due to dislocation 
pile ups. 
 
2.   At the surface, an explanation for cold work is more difficult since there is no pre-existing SCC.  
Further, cold work favors extensive cross slip, which relaxes local stress intensifications at barriers. 
 
3.  It appears that the role of cold work may be more related to production of vacancies, which nucleate 
small cracks.  As dislocations interact during cold work vacancies are produced as dislocations on 
different slip planes pass through each other. 
 
4.  The role of cold work introducing vacancies has been indicated in two laboratories where extensive 
diffusion has been observed in the metal ahead of crack tips.  Such diffusion requires the presence of 
relatively high concentrations of vacancies. 
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 5.3.4.2  WP:  Behavior of grain boundaries in cold worked stainless steel exposed to PWR primary 
chemistries   
 
1. Background 
 
Data are available to show that SCC propagates relatively rapidly in cold work stainless steel piping when 
exposed to PWR chemistries.  However, no such degradations have been observed.  This suggests that the 
limiting factor is initiation rather than propagation. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Elucidate the mechanism by which grain boundaries facilitate both initiation and propagation of SCC in 
PWR primary water. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Experiments to compare rates of propagation and initiation in both BWR normal water chemistry (NWC) 
and PWR environments. 
 
Detailed experiments to examine grain boundary rotation as a mechanistic avenue for SCC of stainless 
steels. 
 
Creep experiments at higher temperatures to provide data on rates of grain boundary rotation and 
morphology of resulting cracking. 
 
5.3.4.3  WP:  Characterize cold worked surface layers on stainless steels and effects on the rate of 
initiation of SCC in BWR and PWR chemistries.   
 
1. Background 
 
Failures in shrouds of 316L stainless steel associated with cold worked layer about 300 m deep.  
Significant molybdenum at grain boundaries observed. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine why thin cold worked layer produces such extensive damage. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Determine effect of extent of cold work on initiation of SCC:  depth of cold work, degree of cold work. 
 
Determine the effect of PWR and BWR chemistry on the initiation due to such cold worked layers. 
 
Study the structure of cold work layers using ATEM before and after initiation of SCC. 
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 5.3.5 Compounds and kinetics at grain boundaries 
 
5.3.5.1  Introduction 
 
Most of the SCC observed in primary and secondary systems of PWR and in the BWR reactor coolant 
system (RCS) is intergranular. This includes SCC in high nickel and stainless steel alloys.  In addition 
some intergranular corrosion also occurs.   
 
Further, unlike the general effects of sensitization in producing accelerated intergranular SCC (IGSCC) in 
stainless steels, SCC in the high nickel alloys is generally inhibited by the presence of grain boundary 
carbides especially exposed to pure water. 
 
In the pure water of BWRs (NWC) IGSCC also occurs in low carbon non-sensitized stainless steels used 
in major structural applications. 
 
In addition to the interests in compounds, the possible diffusion of oxygen in grain boundaries has been 
the subject of speculation and needs further investigation. 
 
Thus, the experiences of performance of Fe-Cr-Ni alloys in the pure water of PWR and BWRs are 
different from expectations based on other industry experiences with these alloys. 
 
5.3.5.2  WP:  Metallurgical chemistries of 316L commercial stainless steels involving Ni3P2 and CaS   
 
1. Background 
 
While there has been significant interest in the formation of carbides at grain boundaries of stainless 
steels, there is a body of information showing that significant amounts of Ni3P2 and CaS also segregate at 
grain boundaries during sensitizing heat treatments.   
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the conditions that influence the segregation of Ni3P2 and CaS at grain boundaries. 
 
Determine effects of these compounds on chemical reactivity and SCC of stainless steels. 
 
Determine the extent to which these compounds are important to Ni-base alloys. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Prepare commercial Fe- and Ni-base alloys with appropriate heat treatments. 
 
Examine grain boundaries with ATEM and micro-EDS with special interest in Ni3P2 and CaS. 
 
Determine the chemical reactivity of the compounds by high temperature polarization. 
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 5.3.5.3  WP:  Role of carbides at grain boundaries 
 
1. Background 
 
Carbides in high nickel alloys seem to be beneficial even to the point of depleting chromium.  This effect 
is inverse to the sensitization of stainless steels where the opposite is true. 
 
A satisfactory explanation is desired for the role of carbides in minimizing SCC at boundaries especially 
in pure water.  
 
Some progress in explaining the role of carbides in the high nickel alloys comes from the idea that at least 
LPSCC is related to the rotation or sliding of grain boundaries, which can be expected to be inhibited by 
the presence of insoluble compounds at the boundaries. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the role of carbides in high nickel binary Fe-Ni and ternary Fe-Cr-Ni alloys. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Explore the effects of carbides on grain boundary sliding or grain rotation.  Use creep experiments and 
fiducial marking.  Examine grain boundaries after experiments with ATEM and EDS.   
 
5.3.5.4  WP:  Role of grain boundaries in low carbon stainless steels with no grain boundary 
carbides 
 
1. Background 
 
Extensive SCC of Type 316L stainless steel has been experienced in the core shrouds of BWR plants 
operating with NWC.  The cracks started in the cold worked surface layers but extended into the bulk 
material.  Such a result is nominally contrary to the expectation of SCC only related originally to 
sensitized stainless steels having normal carbon concentrations. 
 
The grain boundaries where this SCC occurs seem greatly enriched in molybdenum.   
 
With high concentrations of molybdenum, the grain boundaries would be expected to become more 
reactive owing to the high solubility of molybdenum in water above pH of about 3 (RT). 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the composition of grain boundaries of low carbon stainless steels with varying amounts of 
cold work up to 20%.  Include in the study Alloy 800, Alloy 600MA, Ni-20Fe, and Alloy 690TT.  Give 
particular attention to aging effects. 
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 3. Work outline 
 
Use existing commercial materials used in LWR applications where possible and laboratory heats where 
required.  Prepare alloys with 0 and 20% cold work.  Using activation energies for the average diffusion 
rates of substitutional solutes prepare alloys with aging times of 10 and 40 years.  Unfortunately, these 
temperatures may also relax the cold work effects.  Some optimum condition should be determined. 
 
Examine grain boundaries with ATEM and EDS to measure concentrations of solutes as a function of 
alloy, cold work and aging times. 
 
5.3.5.5  WP:  Diffusion of oxygen in grain boundaries  
 
1. Background 
 
There is some evidence that oxygen diffuses along grain boundaries and produces some kind of 
embrittlement that may be a part of the mechanism of at least LPSCC.  Such a process may also be 
important to other alloys in the Fe-Cr-Ni alloys. 
 
The diffusion of oxygen in grain boundaries should be measured definitively.  Further, this diffusion 
should be measured as a function of the oxygen activity at the surface as it is equivalent to the range of 
potentials that include BWR NWC and PWR primary environments. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the diffusivity of oxygen in significant grain boundaries of relevant alloys including the Ni-Fe 
binary analogous to Alloy 600MA. 
 
Determine a mechanism by which such diffusion can embrittle grain boundaries. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Develop optimum method for measuring the diffusion of oxygen in grain boundaries of the relevant Fe-
Cr-Ni alloys.  This method should produce the same oxygen activities on the surfaces as result from the 
range of potentials observed in BWR NWC and PWR environments. 
 
Measure the extent of embrittlement and determine the mechanism of embrittlement. 
 
5.3.6  Irradiation effects 
 
5.3.6.1  Introduction 
 
Core internals in BWR and PWR applications sustain high fluxes that are now known to affect many 
aspects of metal properties possibly leading to premature degradation.  Most important are changes in 
properties at surfaces where degradation initiates although the bulk properties of core internals need to 
sustain loading.  Also, the formation of local bubbles produces non-uniform strains that degrade 
properties. 
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Specimens with high doses and experimental equipment, e.g. ATEM, are now available that provide the 
capacity to develop mechanistically based predictions. 
 
5.3.6.2:  WP: Detrimental material changes and embrittlement in highly irradiated stainless steels   
 
1. Background 
 
Several evaluations have indicated that stainless-steel LWR core internals may become susceptible to 
intergranular embrittlement at high irradiation doses.  Microstructure/property relationships at high LWR 
doses have not been sufficiently explored for proactive management of irradiation embrittlement.  
Recently, nanometer-scale cavities have been identified at grain boundaries during limited examinations 
on isolated samples by transmission electron microscopy (TEM) that may promote this low-toughness, 
intergranular fracture.  More extensive research is needed on the microstructure, microchemistry, 
deformation and mechanical properties of highly irradiated stainless steels.  
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine detailed mechanistic bases for embrittlement of core internals. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Primary work should be centered on the dose-dependence material changes in BWR thimble tubes 
examining low-fluence (<0.1 dpa), moderate-fluence (20-40 dpa) and high-fluence (60-85 dpa) locations. 
 
Specially designed deformation tests will be conducted at ~300oC on 3-mm disc samples documenting 
localized channeling behavior and grain boundary interactions to access precursors to intergranular 
cracking.  Attempts should also be made to obtain high-dose PWR materials, such as baffle bolts, where 
comparative data could be generated to the BWR thimble tube response.   
 
Detailed microstructural and microchemical characterization will be performed including the presence of 
bubbles, voids, dislocation loops, cold work recovery and segregation in the matrix and at/near grain 
boundaries.  Helium and hydrogen will be measured and related to the cavity observations.  Where 
possible, these observations will be compared to existing tensile test data and to additional shear punch 
test assessing radiation hardening and ductility.   
 
Small test materials of commercial stainless steels and of high-purity stainless steels with single-element 
additions have been irradiated to doses of 5, 10, 20, 45 and 65 dpa.  Once again, important comparisons 
can elucidate the radiation-induced microstructure and microchemistry influences on mechanical behavior 
(deformation, strength and fracture). 
 
High-purity alloys with and without Si will be evaluated in detail since strong radiation-induced 
segregation of this element occurs to grain boundaries and may impact the susceptibility to intergranular 
embrittlement.   
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 5.3.6.3  WP:  Surface and near-surface aging in stainless steel core internals and influence on 
irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking   
 
1. Background 
 
SCC initiates at surfaces.  Therefore detailed characterization of surfaces of reactor core internals should 
be specifically evaluated.  Such surfaces should be specifically evaluated in order to develop models for 
the initiation of SCC over time of irradiation exposure. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
To examine changes in the near-surface that have been produced by the simultaneous irradiation and 
high-temperate water exposure for more than 20 years to help predict crack initiation. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Surface and near-surface metallurgy changes affecting initiation and short-crack growth will be assessed 
in a PWR baffle bolt and BWR top guide where IASCC has been discovered during service. 
 
Examine changes in the near-surface that have been produced by the simultaneous irradiation and high-
temperate water exposure for more than 20 years.  Cross-sections will be fabricated at locations near 
crack-initiation sites enabling surface and near surface examinations by high-resolution analytical 
electron microscopy.  Microstructural and microchemical characteristics will be documented and related 
to potential radiation- and environment-induced changes impacting SCC initiation. 
 
Microstructures will be documented at several magnifications to illustrate corrosion-product films, sub-
surface degradation and the near-surface alloy microstructure.   A combination of techniques including 
high-resolution TEM imaging and nano-diffraction will be employed to characterize the multilayer films 
and altered base material that may be present near the surface.  Nano-probe micro-chemical analysis will 
be performed using EDS (including compositional mapping) and possibly electron energy loss 
spectroscopy (EELS)  
 
Local compositions at grain boundaries will also be established as a function of distance below the 
surface and boundary regions leading to intergranular attack or SCC will be evaluated if such degradation 
is observed.  Detailed analysis of corrosion product phases in tight cracks will be performed by these 
various methods and the possibility of selective oxidation ahead of the crack tip will be assessed.  The 
presence of solution impurities within existing cracks and in corrosion films will be ascertained.  
Composition profiles will be taken to indicate changes across films at the surface and at near-surface 
crack-tip regions.    
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 5.3.6.4  WP:  Isolating matrix and grain boundary deformation mechanisms on irradiation-assisted 
stress corrosion cracking 
 
1. background 
 
Recent studies have investigated matrix channeling and grain boundary sliding in charged-particle-
irradiated stainless steels.  Stacking fault energy has been implicated as an important parameter 
controlling localized deformation and potentially susceptibility to IASCC.   
 
2.  Objective of WP 
 
To conduct assessments on neutron-irradiated stainless steels with direct links to SCC crack initiation.   
 
3.  Work outline 
 
a. Research focuses on quantitative deformation studies on stainless steels where extensive IASCC 
testing has been performed.   
b. Disc-bulge tests will be conducted on polished sub-size samples at different levels of plastic 
strain and surface slip steps quantified by a combination of SEM and atomic-force microscopy 
(AFM) examinations.  
c. Detailed characterizations of channel intersections with grain boundaries will be conducted.   
d. Boundary distributions will be established by orientational imaging microscopy (OIM) to help 
quantify importance of boundary interactions.   
e. Direct comparisons will be made between surface slip steps and boundary interactions to 
previously measured IASCC response.   
 
5.3.7  Flow assisted corrosion 
 
5.3.7.1  Introduction 
 
Flow assisted corrosion (FAC) produces rapid penetrations relative to general corrosion but at rates 
generally in the range of 1/10 of slow SCC propagation.  These comparisons vary.  Numerous serious 
failures have resulted from FAC especially where adequate monitoring was not in place or where special 
flow conditions—e.g. local turbulence--were not accounted for.  Such failures occur in both steam and 
feedwater lines. 
 
The conventional approach to modeling and predicting FAC is to use data base correlations.  These are 
not mechanistic but rely on previous observations.  FAC tends to be linear with time.   
 
In general, the main dependencies of FAC on alloy composition, temperature, pH, potential, and flow 
have been studied and reasonable information is available. 
 
However, FAC for very long times has not been studied nor have the interactions with aged materials. 
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 FAC has an important associated effect of producing hydrogen in proportion to the loss of material.  
Neither the rate of absorption nor the effects on properties of the substrate are well understood.   
 
5.3.7.2 WP:  Adequacy of current models of flow accelerated corrosion, especially when combined 
with possible galvanic effects or flow disturbances that might be associated with 
weldments  
 
1. Background 
 
Models available for FAC are based mainly on correlations.  Physical insights into FAC rely on the 
stability of passive films:  pH approaching minimum solubility, Fe2O3 is better than Fe3O4, adding 
chromium is beneficial.  Also, minimizing turbulence is beneficial.  Enhanced FAC at welds has been 
observed in piping and equipment (e.g. feedwater heaters) at over 30 plants globally covering BWR, 
PWR and VVER  designs. The precise reason for this enhancement is currently unknown. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Develop a more fundamentally based model that permits an analytical approach to optimizing resistance 
to FAC. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Develop a fundamentally based model for FAC that includes input from theory of fluid flow near surfaces 
and the evolution of dissolving species and the fluid surface film.  The second input is associated with the 
solubility of the films as functions of pH, potential, and film composition.  A third input is associated with 
the defect structure of the film that can provide a basis for the oxidation rate of the film.  In these inputs, 
include potential effects of galvanic currents and flow disturbances that might be associated with 
weldments.  
 
Conduct experimental validation of the improved analytical modeling.  Sufficient data from plants are 
available for calibrating the analytical model. 
 
5.3.7.3  WP:  Absorption of hydrogen produced in FAC 
 
1. Background 
 
Hydrogen is produced during FAC as a result of the continued oxidation of iron or alloy substrate.  Some 
of this hydrogen enters the metal.  The rate of hydrogen production is reduced as the potential is 
increased—which also reduces the rate of FAC owing to the increased stability of films. 
 
Three important aspects of hydrogen production are not known:  (a) whether the rate of production is 
stoichimetric; (b) what fraction of the hydrogen produced enters the metal substrate; (c) where the 
hydrogen is produced on an atomic scale. 
 
In addition, effects of hydrogen produced in FAC are not known: (a) Does the hydrogen interact with 
SCC or with creep?  (b) Does the hydrogen affect the fracture resistance? 
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2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Quantify the production of hydrogen entry into the metal. 
b.  Elucidate and quantify the effect of FAC-produced hydrogen on properties of the substrate. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Develop a FAC model experiment that is capable of monitoring the absorption of hydrogen in real time.  
Incorporating a dynamic monitor of hydrogen flux should provide such data.  This system would also 
monitor the production of Fe2+ and Fe3+ dynamically under conditions of controlled potential.  Hydrogen 
entering the solution would also be monitored.  The state of the surface and properties of the film would 
be monitored with electrochemical impedance monitoring. 
 
5.3.7.4  WP:  SCC of replacement materials 
 
1. Background 
 
Some cold worked carbon steel has irregularly exhibited SCC on a water outlet of a PWR but irregularly.  
It appears that that the irregularity is associated with the FAC removing the initiation sites for SCC since 
the FAC velocity exceeds the velocity of the initiation stage; only the most rapidly moving initiation sites 
are spared.  If the carbon steel is replaced with an alloy with a much lower FAC rate, then the SCC 
initiation rate could exceed the countervailing FAC rate, and SCC of the cold worked material could be 
accelerated. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine whether a cold worked alloy with a lower FAC rate will sustain a higher SCC rate. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Measure the SCC rate of initiation and propagation for proposed cold worked alloys to replace cold 
worked carbon steel under PWR outlet conditions.  Compare these rates with the reduced rate of recession 
due to FAC.  Such alloys should also be considered relative to the lowered but finite hydrogen absorption.   
 
5.3.8  Fracture Resistance 
 
5.3.8.1  Introduction 
 
Many of the topics in the work plans discussed thus far deal with SCC type degradations.  Eventually, 
according to Figure 1 the SCC becomes sufficiently extensive that fracture occurs.  There is an 
assumption that fast fracture is independent of the environment in which it occurs, contrary to the SCC.  
This assumption is now being challenged. 
 
Also, it has been assumed that welds in nickel base alloys had high fracture resistance over a broad range 
of temperatures.  This assumption is also being questioned.  
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5.3.8.2  WP:  Fracture resistance in environments   
 
1. Background 
 
Some recent experiments have led to challenging the assumption that fracture resistance of welds, 
especially, is independent of the chemical environment although dependent on the thermal environment.  
Also, such concerns apply to welds with unstable structures where properties change with aging. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the extent to which chemical environments affect the fracture resistance in PWR and BWR 
(NWC, HWC) environments.   
 
3. Work outline 
 
Conduct fracture resistance testing of stainless steel and Ni-base weld materials carried out under RCS 
operating conditions for PWRs and BWRs.   
 
Assess any significant effects. 
 
5.3.8.3  WP:  Fracture resistance of Fe- and Ni-base alloys at low temperatures   
 
1. Background 
 
It appears that Fe- and Ni-base alloys may be prone to lowered fracture resistance after they have been 
exposed to hydrogenated high temperature water, and are tested at temperatures below 150C (302F) at 
specific applied strain rates.  These conditions may exist during transient reactor operations such as when 
shutting down the plant.  Early work has shown that Alloy 690 weld material was especially prone to such 
lowered resistance to fracture.  This lowered resistance to fracture seems to be related to environments 
favoring entry of hydrogen into the materials, e.g. PWR deaerated environments and BWR HWC. 
 
While no failures have been attributed to this effect, it has been reproduced in the laboratory.  Also, such 
results were observed twenty years ago with SCC propagation at RT in Alloy 600 specimens removed 
from autoclave testing. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Assess this loss of fracture resistance at low temperatures in Fe- and Ni-base allows as a function of 
temperature, material composition, material aging. 
 
Develop a mechanistic understanding for this effect. 
 
Determine what operating evolutions could lead to premature failures by this effect and develop 
experiments to assess such possibilities. 
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 3. Work outline 
 
a.  Measure fracture resistance of Fe- and Ni-base alloys and welding materials before and after 
aging. 
b.  Consider a range of  microstructures and orientations. 
c.  Measure absorption of hydrogen in specimens. 
d.  Develop a mechanistic understanding. 
e.  Develop a model for the occurrence of such effects in practice. 
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 6.0  Mitigation, repair and replacement 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
As understanding of degradation is developed from projects in Section 5.0 and similar programs, 
programs to consider mitigation can be developed further and implemented.  In this section some 
programs of mitigation, repair and replacement are discussed where their need is already evident. 
 
6.2  WP:  Surface modification techniques to reduce residual stress and strain and improve SCC 
and fatigue resistance  
 
1. Background 
 
The SCC susceptibility, growth rate and high-cycle fatigue are severely affected by residual stress in the 
materials and the SCC growth rate and low-cycle fatigue are severely affected by residual strain in the 
materials.  As a result, methods to reduce the residual stress and strain of the materials for pressure 
boundary components are extremely important to mitigate materials degradation.  Many techniques have 
been used effectively for LWR components including local thermal treatments (e.g., a band heater or 
laser) to reduce stress/strain and mechanical treatments (e.g., peening by shot, water-jet or laser methods) 
to alter the residual stress.  Up to this time, these techniques were basically developed by individual 
private companies with details for application of techniques different and typically proprietary to each 
company.  Therefore, to properly evaluate and optimize these mitigation techniques to benefit commercial 
LWRs world wide, independent research is needed.   
 
An alternative modification approach to provide protection for SCC and fatigue is to completely remove 
the surface layers where cracking initiates.  A simple method is the removal of the damaged (corroded or 
cracked) or cold-worked layer or locally heat-affected zone by grinding, machining or another abrasive 
technique.  The application of a thin cladding of a corrosion-resistant alloy to the surface by laser 
techniques may also be highly beneficial in certain circumstances (e.g., alloy 690 at J-welds in PWR 
lower-head penetrations).  Once again, there is a significant need to properly evaluate the effectiveness of 
these surface modification approaches. 
 
The effective reduction of the residual stress and strain and improvement in SCC and fatigue resistance of 
materials using the various techniques are not always reliable and reproducible.  The reliability, 
reproducibility, and effectiveness of the techniques must be verified by laboratory and mock-up testing.   
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
To evaluate and validate that surface modification techniques for improving SCC and fatigue resistance of 
components are reliable and reproducible. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Quantitative measurements (e.g., x-ray and/or SEM backscatter imaging) of residual stresses and strains 
would be performed as a function of location in the components of interest.  Once the capacity to reduce 
stresses and strains is demonstrated, tests would be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
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 mitigation treatment to significantly improve the materials resistance to SCC and fatigue degradation.  
This evaluation can be conducted using laboratory and mock-up tests.  In order to check the possibility of 
detrimental side effects, materials modified by the thermal or mechanical techniques should be tested 
from the view point of the mechanical properties, microstructure, dimension, corrosion properties, and 
surface roughness. 
 
The research discussed above for the thermal/mechanical stress/strain reduction techniques should also be 
conducted for the surface removal approaches.  Once the surface damaged or altered layer is removed, the 
reliability of this mitigation treatment in improving SCC and fatigue performance should be evaluated by 
laboratory and mock-up tests.  Application reliability for the corrosion-resistant cladding is critical and 
detailed characterizations of the cladding should be done followed by appropriate laboratory and mock-up 
tests. 
 
A critical aspect for these techniques to modify stresses and strains will be their long-term stability and 
effectiveness in mitigating degradation.  Accelerated aging would be employed to assess long-term 
changes in the modified material. Temperature-accelerated corrosion, SCC and fatigue testing should be 
conducted under controlled conditions to evaluate the effectiveness of modifying residual stress and strain 
to the end of plant life.  
 
6.3  WP:  Surface coatings for mitigating SCC and corrosion    
 
1. Background 
 
An inhibitive treatment or coating of metal-alloy surfaces has been proposed as an effective mitigation of 
corrosion and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) for BWR components. The approach is to employ the 
inhibitive nature of ceramic compounds in deterring the redox reactions required for metal corrosion.  In 
theory, this type of coating could deter the major redox reactions (namely the oxidation of H2, the 
reduction of O2, the reduction of H2O2, and the oxidation of metals) in the high-temperature water 
environment.  The exchange current densities (ECDs) of these reactions on the base metal surface would 
accordingly decrease.  In a typical, oxidizing BWR environment that usually contains hundreds of ppb O2 
and tens of ppb H2O2, corrosion of stainless steel (SS) components will be significantly reduced if the 
ECDs of the O2 and H2O2 reduction and SS oxidation reactions are effectively decreased.  In addition, the 
effectiveness of HWC could be enhanced in terms of a reduced electrochemical corrosion potential (ECP) 
accompanied by a lower H2 consumption or even without any added hydrogen.  
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
The objective of this coating work is the development and quantitative evaluation of inhibitive coatings 
for corrosion and SCC mitigation. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Candidates to be used as the coating material can be different but should bear a common nature of 
deterring oxidant reduction and metal oxidation.  Prominent examples that merit further study are 
zirconium oxide (ZrO2) and titanium oxide (TiO2).  Preliminary results have demonstrated their positive 
benefit in terms of comparatively lower corrosion rate and lower corrosion potential.   
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There are issues with regard to practicality of application methods, and coating integrity and durability.  
In addition, the TiO2 coating technique was proposed mainly with the simultaneous presence of 
ultraviolet photon radiations with a certain range of wavelength.  Its effectiveness in the absence of the 
ultraviolet radiation for components away from core regions should be addressed.   
 
For each coating and alternate techniques of application, the influence of long-term, high-temperature 
exposure on the coatings should be assessed along with the influence of component loading/deformation.  
Quantitative examinations of SCC response should also be included to fully evaluate the mitigation 
capabilities of the coatings.  Finally, the effects on the performance of fuel and on the integrity of fuel rod 
surfaces should also be investigated.  
 
6.4  WP:  Modification of water chemistry of BWRs   
 
1. Background 
 
The generally oxidizing environment in the primary coolant circuit (PCC) of a boiling water reactor 
(BWR), exacerbated by the radiolysis process of water in the core region, poses a serious threat of stress 
corrosion cracking (SCC) to structural components.  An effective method to mitigate SCC problems is to 
modify the BWR water chemistry, namely from an oxidizing one to a reducing one.  In the past decades, 
hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) alone and with noble metal chemical addition (NMCA) have been 
widely adopted and have been generally successful.  However, concerns remain for this approach for SCC 
mitigation with issues of the optimal hydrogen levels, the possibility of incomplete protection and 
undesirable increase of radiation fields.   
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
The research objective within this topic is focused on an improved understanding of normal and off-
normal water chemistry effects on SCC resistance of BWR components.  In particular, quantitative 
evaluations of water chemistry on SCC are needed.  This should include the influence of hydrogen 
concentrations and electrochemical potentials on SCC of Ni-base alloys and stainless steels (in and out-
of-core).  Solution chemistry additions for mitigation are of direct interest ranging from Zn to more 
complex alternative chemistries.   
 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Further research on HWC/NMCA is recommended to ensure effective mitigation is obtained.  For 
example, continuous injection of noble metals into a BWR or other approaches to restore the catalytic 
activity of already present noble metals should be considered carefully since impurities in the BWR 
coolant may contaminate the deposited noble metals and thus reduce, gradually, their catalytic activities.   
 
There is also a concern that platinum or other noble metals may catalyze the oxygen reduction reaction in 
the absence of sufficient hydrogen and may promote accelerated SCC in a BWR.  A possible solution to 
this problem is to find a different catalyst that would catalyze only the oxidation reaction of hydrogen and 
be inert to oxygen reduction.  Alternate water chemistry is an approach that needs additional study to deal 
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 with the problems of SCC in BWRs.  The most promising candidates in replacing hydrogen at the 
moment seem to be alcohols (e.g., methanol or ethanol) and hydrazine.  Both alcohol and hydrazine can 
act as reducing agents in the PCC of a BWR; and preliminary experimental results have demonstrated that 
these chemicals could effectively scavenge dissolved oxygen, and they do not form significant amounts of 
radioactive, volatile species after reacting with water.  
 
Although the main goal of zinc addition (preferably prior to the adoption of HWC/NMCA) is to reduce 
the shutdown dose rate in a BWR, it is possible that the structural components may actually benefit from 
the surface composition modification after zinc addition in terms of deterred SCC, probably resulting 
from less conducting property of the treated component surfaces.  In each of these cases, quantitative 
examinations of SCC response are needed along with proper characterizations of water chemistry effect 
on corrosion product films. 
 
6.5  WP:  Modification of water chemistry of PWRs  
 
1. Background 
 
An optimum hydrogen concentration needs further consideration.  Recent work has demonstrated a 
significant variation in SCC crack growth rates for Ni-base alloys with electrochemical potential (with 
respect to the Ni/NiO line) as affected by the amount of injected hydrogen.  It is important that this 
variability be quantitatively understood.  The PWR water environment also has other complexities 
particularly on the secondary side where significant off-normal chemistries can develop in crevices.  
Water chemistry modifications (e.g., B/Li ratios) and additions (e.g., Zn) have been used without a clear 
definition on their influence on SCC susceptibility. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
The research objective within this topic is focused on an improved understanding of normal and off-
normal water chemistry effects on SCC resistance of PWR components.  In particular, quantitative 
evaluations of water chemistry on SCC are needed in several areas.  This should include the influence of 
hydrogen concentrations and electrochemical potentials on SCC of Ni-base alloys and stainless steels (in 
and out-of-core).  Solution chemistry additions for mitigation are of direct interest ranging from Zn to 
more complex alternative chemistries.   
 
3. Work outline 
 
There have been concerns that the currently adopted hydrogen injection rate in PWR primary water may 
not be appropriate to minimize IGSCC in Ni-base alloy components.  Further study is needed including 
quantitative crack-growth-rate testing to better quantify the relationships among hydrogen concentration, 
electrochemical potential (versus the Ni/NiO line) and cracking.  It is critically important to establish this 
response for the lower-Cr alloys (e.g., alloy 600 and weld metals) and higher-Cr replacement alloys (alloy 
690 and weld metals).   
 
Although the main goal of Zn additions is to reduce the shutdown dose rate in a PWR, it is possible that 
the structural components may actually benefit from the surface composition modification.  Quantitative 
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 examinations of SCC response are needed along with adequate characterizations of water chemistry as it 
affects the integrity of passive films. 
 
Chemistry modifications can be much more aggressive on the PWR secondary-side environment.  Recent 
observations of high Pb concentrations in surface films, IG attack and IGSCC cracks suggest that it may 
be beneficial to add species that can remove Pb from solution.  It becomes important to understand the 
solution chemistry in the secondary-side water and in crevices.  Thermodynamics and kinetics of 
reactions between primary impurities of concern (e.g., Pb and S) with possible mitigation species (e.g. 
hydrazine) need to be determined and critical tests performed.  
 
6.6  Welding optimization for microstructural control and stress/strain Modification to improve hot 
cracking and SCC resistance  
 
6.6.1  Introduction 
 
Weldments continue to be a primary location of stress-corrosion cracking (SCC) in LWR systems.  While 
problems related to heat-affected-zone (HAZ) sensitization and intergranular (IG) SCC of austenitic 
stainless steels in BWRs have been significantly reduced, SCC has now been observed in HAZs of non-
sensitized and often L-grade materials.  A key aspect of this SCC susceptibility results from welding-
induced local strains and the final residual stresses.  In addition, cracking has been observed in dissimilar 
metal welds where Ni-base alloy weld metals are used.  Interdendritic (ID) or IGSCC has been observed 
in both BWRs and PWRs with recent examples for PWR pressure vessel penetrations (upper and lower 
head) producing the most concern.  By comparison to the Ni-base alloy welds, stainless steel welds have 
shown much greater resistance to SCC although a few cases of cracking have been identified in BWR 
components.  This brief overview demonstrates the critical need for an improved understanding of 
welding materials and the welding process itself. 
 
The research objective of this topic area is broad-based and encompasses existing LWR weldments and 
materials, replacement materials, repair considerations and new welding approaches for next generation 
LWRs.  A combination of experiments and modeling is proposed to develop fundamental understanding 
of weld metal and the HAZ metallurgy.  These characteristics would be linked to SCC and hot cracking.  
The emphasis is expected to be on Ni-base alloy dissimilar-metal welds, but is not limited to these 
materials.  A key aspect will be establishing microstructural/micro-chemical and stress/strain evolution in 
the weld metal and HAZ as a function of welding procedures and component aspects.  The ability to 
model these relationships effectively may allow welding approaches to be tailored on a pass-by-pass basis 
to optimize final weldment resistance to service failure.  Several WPs for research tasks are given below.  
These are provided to illustrate a few specific areas where fundamental understanding is needed and are 
not intended to restrict proposed ideas and research within this general topic.   
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 6.6.2  WP:  Improved understanding of the microstructural/microchemical evolution and hot 
cracking in nickel-base alloy weld metals 
 
1. Background 
 
The understanding of the metallurgy in Ni-base alloy welds is not sufficient to effectively assess 
performance.  It is highly desirable to expand the knowledge base through detailed characterizations of 
LWR-qualified weldments 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Improve the understanding of Ni-base alloy weldments. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Examinations should be performed at moderate-to-high resolutions of weldments removed from LWR 
service, mock-ups welds and various test welds fabricated with alloy 182/82 and alloy 152/52.   
 
Measurements should be performed spanning macroscopic to microscopic techniques and in some case 
will require characterizations at nanometer resolutions.  The intent will be to greatly expand the 
understanding of weld metal structures in actual and simulated LWR service components with a focus on 
solidification segregation and second-phase precipitation particularly at inter-dendritic grain boundaries.   
 
The microstructural and microchemical features will be related to the susceptibility of hot cracking for 
both the low-Cr alloy 182/82 welds and the high-Cr, alloy 152/52 welds.   
 
6.6.3  WP:  Influence of weld metal microstructure/microchemistry and pre-existing hot cracks on 
SCC of Ni-base alloys   
 
1. Background 
 
An important difference of opinion exists between the technical community who believe cracking in Ni-
base alloy weld metal (alloy 182 or 82) can occur solely due to SCC and the utility community who 
believe that susceptibility primarily results from pre-existing hot cracks due to poor manufacturing.  Key 
tests are needed to assess critically the influence of not only pre-existing hot cracks, but solidification 
segregation or precipitation on SCC. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Determine the origin of SCC in welds of Ni-base alloys. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
An improved understanding of dendritic and grain boundary compositions in weld metals should be 
established and used to create systematically realistic conditions of material for quantitative SCC crack-
growth tests.  Gleeble experiments should be conducted to document controlled heating and cooling on 
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 interfacial structure and composition.  Finally, the influence of pre-existing hot cracks on SCC initiation 
and propagation should be explored.   Initial experiments should be conducted on samples removed from 
laboratory welds where hot cracking has been investigated.   
 
6.6.4  WP:  Assessment and modeling of strain and stress states in weld metal and heat-affected-
zone regions for optimized welding   
 
1. Background 
 
SCC susceptibility in both weld metal and HAZ regions is typically produced by welding-induced local 
strains and the associated residual stresses.  Prior work related to BWR pipe cracking has examined 
welding procedures and component issues such as pipe diameter and constraint on the plastic strains 
developed in the HAZ on a pass-by-pass basis. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Validate predictions of welding-induced stresses and strains. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Modern finite element modeling (FEM) approaches can effectively evaluate temperature, stress and 
strains that evolve dynamically during welding.  Additional experimental work is needed to assess FEM 
predictions on a pass-by-pass basis to quantify the predictive capability.  Once established, FEM should 
be used to systematically evaluate effects of welding procedures on the stress/strain evolution and even 
microstructural changes (through the temperature/strain history) for specific weld-metal and HAZ 
regions.  
 
Controlled experiments will be conducted to test model parameters and validate predictions.  The intent 
will be to select weld parameters for optimizing microstructures of weldments and final stress/strain 
conditions. 
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 7.0  Nondestructive examination techniques for inservice inspection and monitoring 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
Current periodic inservice inspections attempt to identify degradation before such degradation results in 
component failure.  Advanced inspection and monitoring techniques could provide the capability for 
reliable and timely identification of degradation for planning and implementing repair or replacement of 
components before failure occurs.  Advanced inspection monitoring techniques that re capable of 
detecting the precursors to degradation can play an important role in a PMDM process as susceptible 
components could be identified early enough to develop and implement mitigation actions as well as 
repair or replacement as desired. 
 
7.2  WP:  Detection and characterization of material degradation precursors  
 
1. Background 
 
Presently, NDE is used to identify defects (cracks, fabrication flaws, wall thinning) that have already 
developed and may challenge component integrity. The capability to detect and characterize the 
precursors to degradation initiation enables proactive materials degradation management by mitigation as 
well as by timely repair or replacement.   
 
The precursor stage of degradation may exhibit physical characteristics substantially different than the 
macro-defect that ultimately manifests. The ability to predict degradation by detecting and characterizing 
precursor state(s) may require an inspection capability that is: 
 
a.  evolutionary (i.e., higher spatial resolution ultrasound) 
b.  revolutionary (i.e., entirely new application of physics/engineering to this NDE problem).   
 
The technical issues for development of new NDE approaches to precursor detection and characterization 
range from advanced engineering concepts to more fundamental understanding of how physical states and 
material features (or properties) are exhibited and hence, measurable. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
Design, develop, and evaluate advanced laboratory NDE techniques to quantify precursor state, validate 
theories on precursors and demonstrate potential for field deployment.  
 
Validate the techniques by inspecting/monitoring mockups under realistic testing conditions and in situ 
reactor components. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
NDE technology for identifying and quantifying precursors to degradation is a new field.  Research is 
needed to develop a sound technical foundation for advances in measurement science related to 
precursors. Development of new/advanced NDE theory and systems needs to occur in parallel with 
precursor materials research.  
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Research activities include: 
 
1. Establish or identify potential measurable precursors to degradation 
a. Localized surface chemistry changes 
b. Surface phenomena (bubbles, micro cracks, voids, etc.) 
c. Material properties changes.    
2. Develop theoretical models that provide the physical basis for direct and indirect relationships 
between material degradation precursors and NDE measurement(s). 
3. Develop new/advanced NDE inspection measurements and sensors with sufficient spatial and 
contrast resolution, signal-to-noise ratio, etc. for precursor assessment. 
4. Demonstrate developed NDE systems on mockups and reactor components. 
 
7.3  WP:  Detection and evaluation of micro/macro cracks  
 
1. Background 
 
In nuclear power plants microcracks are initiated and their growth is driven by the surface degradation 
caused by environmental factors such as coolant chemistry, pressure, vibrations, high temperature, etc. 
The growth of micro cracks into larger cracks contributes to the failure of major components in nuclear 
power plants.  Thus detection and evaluation of micro cracks can be a key step in the proactive 
management of materials degradation. 
 
However, using conventional nondestructive testing methods such as bulk wave ultrasonic testing and 
eddy current testing it may not be possible to detect and evaluate micro cracks quantitatively since these 
conventional methods have been developed primarily for detection and evaluation of defects having 
relatively large size. 
 
Therefore, new nondestructive testing techniques are necessary for improving the detection and 
evaluation of micro cracks. 
 
Conventional NDE techniques have not shown the capability to detect and characterize micro cracks, 
however laboratory research techniques indicate the potential for detecting and evaluating micro cracks. 
 
Some of the research under development includes the following: 
 
a.  The detection of material degradation caused by corrosion-fatigue has been demonstrated using a 
computer controlled backscattered surface wave system. 
b.  Very high-frequency surface wave acoustics (in GHz range) have demonstrated the detection of 
micro-scale stress corrosion cracks based on velocity variation. 
c.  Time reversal techniques for improving probability of detection (POD) of small flaws such as hard 
alpha inclusions, stress corrosion cracks, circular cracks, etc have been adopted. 
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 2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Development and evaluation of NDE techniques for reliable detection and accurate 
characterization of micro cracks in LWR components. 
b.  Determine characteristics of micro cracks parameters (size, number, distribution, etc.) and their 
influence on materials degradation status. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
The research to be conducted includes the following: 
 Investigation of performance and limitations of conventional NDE methods for detection and 
evaluation of micro cracks. 
 Develop theoretical models for predicting responses from micro cracks that describe the underlying 
physics related to generation and acquisition process. 
 Development of new signal processing and interpretation methods for quantitative micro crack 
evaluation. 
 Develop new/advanced NDE techniques for detection and evaluation of micro cracks located on the 
surface and/or embedded in the subsurface. 
 Establish relationships between micro crack parameters and materials degradation status. 
 
7.4  WP:  Continuous monitoring for detecting LWR materials degradation  
 
1. Background 
 
Degradation has been occurring in light water reactors (LWRs) since reactors started operation.  NDE is 
one layer of the defense-in-depth for safe operation by detecting degradation before it challenges the 
structural integrity of nuclear reactor components. 
 
There are significant limitations to the required NDE that is performed on a periodic basis as part of the 
inservice inspection (ISI) program.  Improvements can be made to ISI programs to overcome some of the 
limitations through improvements in how frequently inspections are performed (reduction from a 10 year 
interval to every refueling outage), the effectiveness of the NDE method (employing SAFT or phased 
arrays versus conventional amplitude based UT), etc.  Other limitations are not solvable with simplistic 
improvements in the ISI program.  For example, there are a number of locations where access to the areas 
requiring inspection are limited because the surface of the component is in an as welded condition or 
surface geometries (tapers) limit inspection.  
 
There are also limitations because of other components or structures preventing delivery of the NDE 
energies to the zones requiring inspection.  In addition there are classes of problems such as the coarse 
grained materials which are found in cast stainless steels, dissimilar metal welds, corrosion resistant 
cladding and the far side inspection of austenitic stainless steels for which reliable and effective 
inspections have not been developed.   
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 Limitations of periodic ISIs, which are conducted infrequently and on a relatively small sampling basis of  
the accessible components, can be overcome by the online continuous monitoring of the reactor and its 
components using techniques such as acoustic emission. 
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
a.  Develop and demonstrate continuous on-line methods to monitor all forms of LWR materials 
degradation as it initiates and grows. 
b.  Include in the evaluation other methods besides AE that can be used to provide more information 
about degradation precursors on a continuous on-line basis. 
c.  Validate continuous on-line technology on operating plants to demonstrate the viability for 
performing this type of monitoring without false alarms and to provide an accurate reflection of 
degradation status. 
 
3. Work outline 
 
Although AE has been demonstrated and extensively tested for fatigue in pressure vessel steels and 
IGSCC in stainless steel, this study will demonstrate the technology for a wide range of LWR materials 
and expected degradation mechanisms to establish the case that all degradation occurring or expected to 
occur can be detected and evaluated. 
 
In addition, the AE demonstrations that have been conducted in the past on operating plants occurred over 
10 years ago and advances in computers, electronics and sensors will be integrated into a new state-of-
the-art system for validation on nuclear power plants. 
 
Review degradation precursors and processes and assess other monitoring technologies such as guided 
waves to support, compliment, replace and/or enhance AE continuous monitoring. 
 
Conduct demonstrations of technology to address engineering issues of cabling and full plant monitoring 
needs. 
 
Assess all forms of nuclear power plant emissive energies to determine viability for passive monitoring of 
materials degradation. 
 
7.5  WP: Screening of array probe data for steam generator tube inspections 
 
1. Background 
 
As the demands for reducing the time for steam generator inspections increases, advanced eddy current 
array probes, such as the X-probe and others, are becoming more popular.  They provide detection 
capabilities similar to those of industry standard rotating probes, yet they can scan tubes at speeds typical 
of bobbin probes.   However, the large quantities of data generated by these probes make data analysis 
time consuming.  The maximum benefit from steam generator inspections with the array probes can only 
be realized if techniques are available to quickly analyze the large amounts of data.   
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2. Objective of WP 
 
Develop screening software to identify regions requiring analyst attention with the objective of shortening 
analysis time and providing safeguard against human error.   
 
3. Work outline 
 
Develop software that automatically screens eddy current data and identifies flaw signals that need 
analyst attention, but ignores non-flaw signals.  Evaluate the effectiveness of this software to provide 
similar or better results for probability of flaw detection as manual (human) analysis, while reducing the 
time and manpower needed for data analysis.  
 
7.6  WP:  Effect of crack conductivity on detection and sizing of SG tube cracks 
 
1. Background 
 
Low detectability of cracks has often been attributed to either the presence of ligaments across the crack 
opening or to the presence of a family of short cracks with ligaments in between.  Understanding the 
correlation between flaw parameters such as crack depth, crack tightness, percent degraded area and the 
presence of crack ligaments to the NDE responses is paramount in predicting the reliability of SG 
inspections.  
 
2. Objective of WP 
 
To establish correlations between crack morphology parameters and crack conductivity and to determine 
their effect on probability of detection and crack sizing.   
 
3. Work outline 
 
Using pulled tube specimens and a family of samples containing laboratory produced SCCs and EDM 
notches, measure electrical conductivity across the defects (cracks) in an attempt to correlate crack 
opening and other crack morphology parameters with eddy current probe responses.  
 
Use the results to develop better interpretation methods of NDE signals and to improve the understanding 
of some of the factors affecting detectability and characterization of cracks in steam generator tubing. 
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